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The call from my sister Nancy Wexler still resounds in my 
mind. “We found a marker!” she shouted over the phone. 
It was the summer of 1983 and Nancy had helped lead 
the team of geneticists and neurologists who had just 
mapped the gene for Huntington’s disease (hd), an in-
curable hereditary motor, cognitive, and psychiatric dis-
order. Huntington’s had claimed the lives of our mother, 
uncles, grandfather, and cousins over multiple genera-
tions. The discovery of the genetic marker – a variable 
stretch of dna on chromosome four, located close to the 
Huntington’s gene – was a giant step toward finding this 
gene and, we believed, developing a cure, or at least ways 
to prevent or mitigate the disease’s cruelest effects. 
The marker also made possible a predictive or pre-
symptomatic test. Geneticists and neurologists had long 
dreamed of such a test and so too had many families like 
mine. Huntington’s is an autosomal dominant disorder 
– meaning that each offspring of a parent who devel-
ops symptoms has a 50% risk of inheriting the disease. 
Typically these symptoms emerge in a person’s thirties 
or forties, or even later, after children are born. A predic-
tive test using the genetic marker – and ultimately the 
gene, discovered in 1993 – could indicate who among the 
offspring was free of the disease and who had inherited 
the abnormal gene and could pass it on to their children. 
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Many of us believed such a test, chosen freely by the in-
dividual concerned, could alleviate anxiety and dread in 
the lucky ones and at least facilitate future planning for 
the others. After all, a positive predictive test result – 
sometimes called a positive genetic diagnosis – did not 
mean you were ill in the present; it was strictly a proph-
esy for the future.
But what kind of prophesy? Predictive genetic test-
ing turned out to be more complex, more challenging, 
and more ambiguous in its impact than we imagined, 
as Katrin Solhdju shows in her compelling and powerful 
book Testing Knowledge: Toward an Ecology of Diagnosis. As 
disclosed to Alice Rivières, a brilliant young French psy-
chologist and writer, the predictive genetic test result for 
hd foreclosed any future other than deterioration and 
decline. “The doctors I met with were both terrified and 
fascinated by what they were having me do,” writes Riv-
ières. In possession of a powerful new technology, “a des-
tiny-making machine,” they suffered from a devastating 
failure of imagination that reduced “the multiplicities 
of tomorrow into a narrow, monolithic, flat, diagnosed 
sick future that stops the mind from the business not of 
grieving but of creativity.” 
Testing Knowledge builds on Alice Rivières’s “ruinous” 
experience, which Solhdju interprets as both a caution-
ary tale and a provocation. She does not condemn a par-
ticular clinician or the (French) medical establishment 
for conveying a genetic test result in a brutal manner, as 
if it were a foreordained sentence to suffering. Instead 
she takes Alice Rivières’s encounter as a starting point for 
improvisation. She asks how we can “cultivate an ecol-
ogy of diagnosis that could place all actors involved in 
situations where they become capable of acting to the 
fullest extent possible.” How can we develop narratives 
of Huntington’s that fully acknowledge the variability 
of this illness, that situate those living with hd as actors 
rather than as passive victims, and that allow doctors and 
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scientists to say “I don’t know” in the face of uncertainty 
and ambiguity. She asks for “celebration without denun-
ciation,” that is, for celebrating hard-won biomedical ad-
vances – as of 2021, medications for chorea and clinical 
trials for gene-lowering therapies – while valuing alter-
native non-medical ways of knowing and responding to 
disease. 
Even as they recognize the severity of Huntington’s, 
Solhdju and Rivières reject the tragedy narrative and 
eugenic assumptions that run through much of the dis-
course on this illness. They ask instead, how can we live 
better with such a disease? How can we use Huntington’s 
as “an opportunity to push thinking further?” As predic-
tive and prenatal genetic testing becomes possible for a 
widening range of conditions, Katrin Solhdju shows us 
that, more than ever, we need the voices and knowledge 
of the users. We need our collective imaginations, fanta-
sies, and “speculative narrations,” from outside medicine 
and science as well as from within, to invent a future in 
which all of us, with Huntington’s as well as without, may 
flourish.










Don’t look at what you’re losing, look on what you’ve gained.
 – My mother
In the beginning, when the world was just fifty centim-
eters long, there was Jeanne’s inquiring face. A five-year-
old face, flush up against the months-old fragment I then 
was, my opaque little mole eyes fumbling across this 
earliest of landscapes, my sister’s face watching me. She 
smiles, I smile. I smile, she smiles. She gives me a quick 
slap, I cry, she smiles, I smile, she gives me another quick 
slap, I cry, she smiles, I smile. Late at night, we bond. My 
father bursts in, he sees me in my crib, he sees Jeanne as 
she leans over me and gives me a quick slap, he sees me 
cry, he slaps her, she cries, I cry, we cry, he gets angry. He 
doesn’t understand. Jealousy, hostility, who knows what 
he assumes, but he thinks: here’s a problem that needs 
fixing, separate them.
In the beginning and evermore, the limits of the Earth, 
its firmament, its floor, and its ceiling, they’re Violette, 
who tackles everything with an eight-year head start, 
in other words an entire lifetime. Violette has a whole 
life on me, she goes on ahead, far in front, as big as the 
sky. She scatters her protective pheromones around me, 
something quakes in her when it quakes in me, our con-
nection draws on resonance, and whether she’s here or 
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not, it’s a thing of taut threads and stiff winds that carry 
fast and far. Early on, thanks to her, I learn that uncon-
ditional love does exist. At the same time, thanks to her, 
I learn that all love is not equal and that rarely is love 
so verily unconditional. I can act out, I can be away for 
years on end, I can fling myself every which way: she’ll 
check if I’m still alive, sometimes gently reproach how I 
am mistreating myself, and then lets me go, loving me 
as always, which is to say without the slightest qualifica-
tion, unequivocally.
There you have it. Nuzzled against me, one builds my 
self-awareness, and the other, awareness of the world 
around me, danger/no danger. (For a long time I thought 
none of this was mutual. I thought that for them we were 
just three sisters, and that I was the only one who saw it 
differently: the three-of-us.) My existence is stitched in 
double lining. And if I’ve forever sought to break these 
seams, to pierce them, to blaze my way through them, it’s 
because wherever I go, they will always keep me together. 
When we learned that our mother had Huntington’s dis-
ease, I hurried. I’m like that, I hurry, I rush things, I tear 
along, I rough draft, because all of my trials and errors 
are padded by my sisters, my double lining. It’s not about 
rebelling or getting defensive about overprotective care, 
just the opposite: my sisters exist and so doing protect 
me, and so I am blessed with an incredible gift, the pow-
er-cum-duty to take risks. When my test results for Hun-
tington’s went red, they both jumped. When I’d rush into 
things, it often made them skittish, but this time they 
really jumped. I saw tremble with fear, body and soul, and 
my self-centered understanding of things finally came 
around to the fact that the three-of-us share a highly 
sensitive reciprocity mechanism: my sisters’ lives also 
depend on mine. As we made our way in life through our 
respective bouts of trial and error, I had not concerned 
myself with this existential reciprocity, but ever since we 
learned that it was yes for me, no for Violette, and maybe 
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yes maybe no for Jeanne, the world has really begun to 
shake: the problem is not that I’m struck, rather that the 
three-of-us are. Anything can happen to me on my own, 
indeed must happen to me on my own, because that way 
nothing happens that the three-of-us cannot deal with. 
But if something does happen to the three-of-us, there’s 
a real danger it will all irreversibly unravel. That’s why 
now I’m going to start at the end. It doesn’t matter how 
the three-of-us came to be. It doesn’t matter for now how 
many millions of minutes make up this singular thing, 
the three-of-us. The only thing that matters now is the 
emergency of dealing with what Huntington’s has threat-
ened to pollute in one fell swoop.
We were stunned, when Violette’s test results came 
back negative three months after mine, by how devastat-
ed we both were, right when we expected we’d be jump-
ing for joy. Violette’s results were a good thing and they 
vindicated my conviction, steadfast from the very outset: 
Violette is to be spared from this bullshit. Violette, my 
compass, my very big sister, my little mother, founder 
of her very own clan that has since also become mine 
given how the three-of-us constantly entangle ourselves: 
spared from this bullshit, one and all. At almost that same 
moment, however, I was enveloped in a sphere of pure 
loneliness, a white and silent nucleus, that abrupt and 
radical removal from the world. (Maybe, when someone 
drowns, there’s a point where they encounter this same 
loneliness, and at that moment they know that nothing 
is more real, more true – the slightest idea, the slightest 
concept is annihilated by the absolute purity of this lone-
liness.) I did not expect I would react by developing such 
an injury, such an open wound. With one blow, more than 
ever before, Huntington’s had polluted me. It was not my 
test results but Violette’s that led me to understand what 
was really going on, only then did the three-of-our pollu-
tion become clear: no for her, yes for me, and a tragic yes 
or an equally tragic no for Jeanne regardless. Hence what 
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I’m now fixing to imagine, a reaction in phase with the 
three-of-us. It’s like the word game we so loved when we 
were kids, where you aren’t allowed to give a yes/no an-
swer. It’s not the path of resistance, but of imagination. A 
merely defiant response will not overcome Huntington’s 
pollution of the three-of-us. If we managed to invent the 
three-of-us, we can find something better than a yes/no 
answer for Huntintgon’s.
Huntington’s. The three-of-us learned that our mother 
had it first, which was difficult because she didn’t know 
that we knew. Many years ago, when her father told her 
he was sick, he gave her an article on the subject from a 
medical journal, she tucked herself in a corner and read 
it alone, didn’t tell anyone anything, and then ended up 
going for the blood test. Huntington’s is an autosomal 
dominant disease, which means that if one of your par-
ents is affected you’ve got a fifty-fifty chance of contract-
ing it too, making you an “at-risk” person for the medi-
cal system. Since the genetic mutation was identified in 
1993, to date it is one of the only predictive tests for a 
fully penetrant neurodegenerative disease. Technically, 
nothing could be simpler: you just take a blood test to 
find out if you have the bad version of the gene or not. 
Philosophically, ethically, psychologically, existentially, 
nothing could be more difficult, for Huntington’s is a ful-
ly penetrant monogenetic condition: knowing you carry 
the abnormal gene means knowing with absolute cer-
tainty that one day you will develop the disease, yet not 
knowing whether that will be in three, five, ten, fifteen, 
or, if you’re lucky, twenty years. My mother had the blood 
test done and then waited two years to go get the results. 
That was ten years ago, she learned she had the abnormal 
gene, then the disease, the very same condition that was 
incapacitating her own father, and throughout all this 
she did not tell a soul, especially not us. For ten years she 
did not say a thing. It’s incredibly difficult to fathom: my 
mother’s loneliness, my mother dealing with it all on her 
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own, all this time. I cannot imagine it. And when I try 
to anyway, I’m overcome with tears of compassion: my 
thoughts stop and my head fills with terrible anguish 
for her instead. Much later, when we asked her why she 
kept it from us that whole time, she answered that she 
simply wanted to protect us. “Telling you such a thing 
when you were barely twenty years old, you must be mad! 
Why would I do such a thing?” She wanted to spare our 
twenties. To tell us or not to tell us: it was an impossible 
dilemma for her, and so we had to guess instead. And, 
after seeing her decline mentally and physically over so 
many years, without understanding what was happening 
to her, that’s just what we did.
When the truth eventually came out, when we learned 
that Huntington’s ran in the family and that our moth-
er was sick, I already had a bit of an idea what to expect 
because of my training in psychology. I had hated that 
train-wreck of a class:
multiplesclerosisalzheimersparkinsonshuntingtons
Truth be told, it was more of a course on disability 
than anything else. Neurodegenerative diseases lead to 
the following physical disabilities and mental disorders, 
blah blah blah, there’s nothing you can do about it, in fact 
nobody can do anything about it, so the best thing that 
you, future caregivers, can do is work with the disabled 
patient through mourning her normality. She’s descend-
ing further and further into abnormality, but she doesn’t 
know it, so you’ve got to help her recognize what’s hap-
pening, in other words what she no longer has, or maybe 
she knows but won’t accept it, and then you’ve got to help 
her mourn this loss. I had to write up all of this in my 
notes, and then recite it all on exam day to get a passing 
grade. I remember coming up with an exorcism ritual to 
cleanse myself of this foul nonsense straight afterwards. 
The classes taught us to transform people into anybodies 
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(quiconque).1 It wasn’t a course in psychology but a course 
in anybodification (quiconquisation), and at that time I 
already found it infuriating. Yet two years later, when I 
crossed over to the other side, when I myself became a 
subject of medical anybodification, it did not matter that 
I was angry, it did not matter that I had worked “in the 
field” and had already given considerable thought to the 
matter – on certain medical practices’ knack for captur-
ing and purging, for instance. None of this protected me 
from the medical machine’s remarkable power to any-
bodify me. Not one bit.
When we find out about her disease, all of a sudden my 
sisters and I have to revisit the last fifteen years of our 
mother’s life, the last fifteen years of our own lives, the 
last fifteen years of our relationship with her. With this 
news, much of her odd behavior can be understood very 
differently. At the same time we are flung up against our 
own futures, now instantly and forever changed: Hun-
tington’s runs in the family, and each of us might have it, 
a fifty-fucking-fifty chance. At the time, the three-of-us 
are often overcome by waves of turmoil, by fits of anger, 
but rarely in unison. One of us whips into a rage, another 
slips into a Zen-like calm, the third falls somewhere in 
between, and the roles change from one moment to the 
next. That’s still how it is for my sisters and me, we each 
dance a solo, taking turns, and we very rarely perform 
as a trio. One goes off and explores the hostile extremes 
while the others stay back and guard the base. When I 
learn of my mother’s disease, I talk a lot, get tired, every 
day I think my understanding is getting better, stronger, 
deeper, but sometimes I trip and fall flat on my face, from 
really high up, and then all the meaning, all the meaning 
1 Tobie Nathan, “En psychothérapie: maladies, patients, sujets, clients 
ou usagers?” paper presented at La psychothérapie à l’épreuve de ses 




built up all that time is flushed down the drain. Some-
times all that work makes my stomach weak, like I have 
indigestion. I get a little quieter than usual, I get stuck on 
repeat: I don’t know, I don’t understand. I forget how to 
start the thought process up again.
At this point, we don’t talk about it with our par-
ents. Our father is undergoing cancer treatment and our 
mother doesn’t yet know that we’re aware of what she’s 
been going through. And we don’t know how to go about 
telling her. My eldest sister and I go to see a therapist at 
a neurology clinic specializing in Huntington’s hoping to 
better inform ourselves and get some advice on how to 
act towards our mother: how do we tell her that we know? 
Is she aware of her symptoms? What should we do to 
not upset her? The psychologist, who has never met our 
mother, her white lab coat doing all the talking, tells us 
that our mother is mad anyway and doesn’t realize what’s 
happening to her. “No matter how you go about things 
with her, it won’t make a difference because she’s anosog-
nosic.” This sinister word pollutes any attempt at defin-
ing Huntington’s. It means that the patient is unaware of 
the horrific psychiatric and physical symptoms caused by 
the disease. The psychologist tells us our mother is ano-
sognosic and she does it with a smile that drips with the 
magnanimous sputum of closure: what I’m about to tell 
you is how it is, and it’s for your own good, you’ll have to get 
used to it. Regarding our own peril, she suggests we think 
of a coin: it’s just a matter of heads or tails. We leave her 
office more dazed than ever. I find somewhere to hole up, 
far away. I need to be alone. I don’t do anything except 
bury myself in Rachmaninoff, in his language of war. For 
two weeks I turn myself inside and out, and end up decid-
ing to get tested. All in all, I’d spent six weeks thinking 
about it. First I wanted to get tested, then I didn’t, and in 
the end I decided I wanted to know. We weren’t designed 
to know our destiny before it happens, says one expert. I 
agree, but when you have got the option to know anyway, 
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you automatically become a bit different as a human be-
ing. I wanted to know so as to not be sick. To rid myself 
of medicine and disease. I was convinced I was not a car-
rier, I wasn’t shouting it from the rooftops, but I was both 
terrified and confident: I don’t have this thing. If I had it, 
I’d have felt it, I would feel it. Feel what, exactly, I didn’t 
rightly know. But I also knew that if I didn’t get tested, I 
would be wracked with doubt, like a house haunted by a 
troublesome poltergeist that wreaks havoc day and night.
Jeanne is less frightened than Violette and me at this 
time, she didn’t go with us to see that hospital therapist, 
she isn’t corrupted, her connection to it all is much sim-
pler and more candid, and so one fine day, without any 
warning whatsoever, she turns to our mother, uncorks 
a bottle of champagne (because for us champagne and 
announcements go hand in hand) and tells her we know 
that she is sick. She brings her up to speed and everyone 
cries, not so much of sadness as of tenderness: we have 
found each other again, after all these years of senseless 
separation, we are together once more. My mother is im-
mediately overwhelmed with relief at no longer having 
to live alone this knowledge, because she blamed herself 
terribly for not saying anything yet would have blamed 
herself even more had she told us, for it would inevita-
bly have poisoned our lives – our lives, that which she 
holds most dear. Our mother’s reaction is the exact op-
posite of what the specialist therapist had predicted. She 
is entirely aware of what is happening to her, she is not 
the slightest bit mad and can understand everything we 
tell her as long as we communicate things clearly. This is 
one of the first lessons we learn: to see someone as ano-
sognosic – as the psychologist had encouraged we look 
on our mother – sows confusion, misunderstanding, and 
estrangement (we’re normal, they’re abnormal). It places 
this person in a world that isn’t quite ours anymore, the 
very world of anosognosia. The belief that Huntington’s 
and anosognosia go hand in hand, and the associated im-
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pact on how you behave towards those affected, causes 
as much anosognosia as the condition itself. I therefore 
came to regard anosognosia with the greatest suspicion.
I set off on the path to genetic testing. I am told it will 
take time: three months, maybe more. First I meet with a 
neurogeneticist, who explains that I have to see a psychi-
atrist, a psychologist, a social worker, and then another 
geneticist before getting the blood test done. I manage to 
get around the social worker and the psychiatrist. I meet 
with a psychologist who asks me why I have decided to get 
tested. I explain everything candidly, and her response 
is that I appear quite unemotional, that I should let my 
feelings out. What about a slap in the face, how’s that 
for feeling? Or maybe she would rather watch me and my 
emotions yank the drawers from her desk and roll around 
on the floor, sniveling and in tears? The other geneticist 
is an old man who scrawls impenetrable diagrams full of 
arrows on bits of paper while he talks. I leave with his 
scribblings, more confused than ever about what they are 
all going on about. Meanwhile, I google Huntington’s dis-
ease six ways from Sunday and become more and more 
terrified at what I find. Soon enough, I stop being able 
to type the words “Huntington’s disease” into Google’s 
search bar without literally starting to shake. My investi-
gations grind to a halt. I have to go back and see the first 
neurogeneticist again, to let her know whether I’ve de-
cided to go ahead with the blood test or not. It feels like a 
driving test: I have to prove who I am, they have to think 
I’m strong enough to quell their fears that I’ll kill myself 
because of them, yet I also have to appear upset enough 
not to come across as emotionally shut down. It’s a tricky 
line to walk, but I end up pulling it off and they allow me 
to get my results two months after the start of the test-
ing process, the hallmark of a successful applicant. They 
draw two vials of blood, because the results have to be 
double-checked by two different labs.
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In the weeks leading up to the test results, the more 
the night draws on, the less tired I become. Lying in bed, 
my mind wanders, eyes wide open in the darkness, and 
I go looking for this hypothetical foreign body that, un-
beknownst to me, might have been living within me this 
whole time. Huntington’s disease. I don’t find or feel any-
thing in particular except for the sheer terror of the ex-
pedition itself. Often I have strange bodily sensations, I 
experience astonishing ways of thinking and feeling, tin-
gling, electric shocks, dissociations, murderous thoughts, 
a lot of desire. My thoughts jump seamlessly from one 
subject to the next, or the exact opposite occurs, they 
come to a complete standstill, like the ceiling above me. 
I experience all of these things, yet remain aware enough 
throughout to know that for the most part these phe-
nomena stem from that same question – “have I got this 
thing in me?” – and were they not always there, making 
my body their home sweet home. That very question sets 
off this rollicking jig of physical sensations and sudden, 
strange thought processes, not so much moments of 
weakness as moments of panic in which my brain works 
at lightning speed to find an answer. Soon enough I’m 
barely sleeping or eating, all I can do is think, and I don’t 
want to do anything else. Hours go by like seconds while 
I investigate the possibility of this occult marriage, Hun-
tington’s and I. I now know that the question of whether 
or not I was a genetic carrier was not alive. In the words 
of William James, the hypothesis that I could be a genetic 
carrier was a dead hypothesis because it did not appeal 
to me “as a real possibility.”2 The question was a zombie 
2 “Let us give the name of hypothesis to anything that may be pro-
posed to our belief; and just as the electricians speak of live and dead 
wires, let us speak of any hypothesis as either live or dead. A live 
hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom 
it is proposed. If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes 
no electric connection with your nature, it refuses to scintillate with 
any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it is completely dead. To an 
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question, and I was its prey. It produced no vitality what-
soever, and was maybe even dead itself, but when this 
question captured me as it did, I was wholly and utterly 
at its command. With the test results a few days away, 
having looked long and hard and finding nothing much 
at all other than the side effects of the question itself, I 
latched onto the certainty that I was not sick.
On the day itself, I went to see the neurogeneticist 
for a third time. Emmanuelle came along with me. She 
had been by my side every step of the way, playing my 
girlfriend at each appointment (given they asked me to 
play a part, why not take it all the way and pretend to be 
homosexual?). Another close friend also came along, and 
it is fortunate they were there because I have no recol-
lection whatsoever of the moment when my test results 
were revealed. My memory refused to capture it and my 
two friends now carry the memory of this instant for me. 
I can only remember the neurologist telling me it was 
bad news, and that she herself was surprised because, she 
said, more often than not in her experience she did not 
need test results to recognize, know, or sense that some-
one had the disease. And that she hadn’t “seen” any such 
signs in me. She delivers the sentence as my cag number: 
44.3 No need for a second opinion. The number is well 
above the threshold that separates those who carry the 
disease from those who do not. She then turns to Em-
manuelle and tells her how dreadful it will be for family 
and friends, and that she needs to quickly start getting 
Arab, however (even if he be not one of the Mahdi’s followers), the 
hypothesis is among the mind’s possibilities: it is alive. This shows 
that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic prop-
erties, but relations to the individual thinker.” William James, The 
Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1956), 2ff.
3 cag stands for Cytosine-Adenine-Guanine. More than thirty-six 
repetitions of this glutamine on the fourth chromosome indicate 
the presence of the gene responsible for Huntington’s disease.
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help herself. Not content with cursing me, she dunks my 
friends in her pox as well. All I can think about is fleeing 
this place as quickly as I can, but first I have to pretend to 
listen to her advice about coming back to see them and 
getting counseling from their team of therapists. I make 
a silent oath never to see her again. I close my ears and 
manage not to break down. (My emotions and feelings 
are chunks of intimacy that she does not deserve.) Out-
side in the corridor, five minutes later, I collapse for a mo-
ment. I wait until I’ve left the hospital to scream.
Throughout this entire journey, I never felt as if any-
thing other than a predetermined set of reactions and 
behavior was expected of me: “good behavior,” the kind 
that would or would not grant me what I wanted: to take 
the test. Taking the test – because from the moment it 
existed, from the very moment it had been created, I had 
to take it. The simple fact that the test existed made it 
utterly irresistible to me. When I learned of my mother’s 
disease, all my bearings past and future skipped town and 
the test revealed itself to me, radiant with the glory of its 
absolute certainty. Because there was a test, I could not 
do without it when erecting even the slightest of solid 
foundations for my future. Every hypothetical construc-
tion of self I would devise independently of the test was 
necessarily based on hope, on a “maybe not,” one step 
removed from the denial of reality that we psychology 
practitioners so gleefully condemn.
To devise such an instrument, the predictive test for 
Huntington’s disease, such a resolutely vertiginous in-
strument, and then to allow it to become the withering 
process I underwent, is, I believe, not only a deep disap-
pointment but the sign of a very grave, unforgivable fail-
ure of medicine. The test is a destiny-making machine. 
Going through with it means witnessing the radical and 
immediate transformation of your inner truth, that con-
stantly quivering kaleidoscope, into the simple truth of a 
medical definition. My kaleidoscope and medical defini-
29
the dingdingdong Manifesto
tion do not share the same mode of existence. I am will-
ing to incorporate a medical definition into my kaleido-
scope, but a medical definition is not able to integrate 
my kaleidoscope without destroying it down to the last 
shard. In the case of Huntington’s, the test had trans-
formed medicine into the provider of singular forms of 
truth, truth-which-cannot-lie, the specificity of which is 
to crush all others. As the testing process wore on, the 
geneticist kept saying that if the outcome were bad, what 
she’d have to tell me would not be a diagnosis (of my 
current state) but information (about my future state). 
Yet when it comes to a genetic condition like Hunting-
ton’s, where the genetic anomaly is fully penetrant, the 
distinction between information and diagnosis is far too 
subtle to be of any use. The test is formidable. I do not 
regret having taken it, because there’s no point regretting 
the inevitable. However, I do regret that it was invented. 
Had it not been invented, I would not have taken it, and 
I would have had to construct something else from the 
news that my mother had the disease. I realize today that 
I had two possible destinies: not “with or without Hun-
tington’s,” but rather, “with or without the test.”
Experts carefully argue that testing is not so much a 
matter of diagnosing as “revealing genetic status.” Sure, 
why not! But in that case why stop there? They should 
work with us on this new riddle (énigme) of theirs: what 
does it mean for a person to have their genetic status 
revealed? There’s nothing trivial about a revelation, it’s 
a big deal, and I agree with geneticists when they talk 
about revelation to describe the predictive test. But I do 
not agree with the conclusions they draw from such an 
experience. Revelation does not inform you. Quite the 
contrary: it transforms you. It can either make you sick or 
make you better: it all depends on what you do with it. As 
for me, and I know I’m not alone, the test stopped being a 




I blame the scientists and doctors for making an offer 
that was too good to resist for someone in my position,4 
and then displaying such galling incompetence, not so 
much towards me as towards their own creation, the test. 
The process itself reflects this problem every step of the 
way. The doctors I met with were both terrified and fas-
cinated by what they had me do. And from this strange 
vantage point, the best they could offer me was depress-
ing and corrosive stereotyping. The only pronounce-
ments they made were condemnations: your mother is 
insane, your life is a coin toss, a matter of heads or tails, 
it’s going to be dreadful for friends and family, there’s no 
treatment, you are very healthy for now but when you get 
worse you will come and work on your disability with us, 
what’s that, you plan on adopting a child?! … (expression 
of horror/sympathy). Thinking through Huntington’s 
disease together, thinking through this terribly enigmat-
ic business, was never an option for them. Perhaps they 
aren’t there for that because they are doctors and not phi-
losophers. Perhaps they are just there to treat you and 
make you better. The problem with Huntington’s, how-
ever, is that there is no making you better. The disease 
has no cure.
What do I blame them for? Not that they can’t do 
anything to help (they’re not omnipotent, I realize that), 
rather, that they opt for a default professional viewpoint 
bereft of humility, and cowardly to boot. If you don’t have 
the technical means to make me better, yet you have got 
a hold of this test – an instrument too powerful for you 
to handle – try and take the opportunity to learn some-
thing, try and push yourselves a little: the situation is 
4 Early thirties, single, and without children. The decision to get test-
ed or not is intrinsically linked to your personality, age, relation-
ship status, and whether or not you have children, in which case the 
curse inevitably takes hold of their futures. Thankfully, these days 




not business as usual so don’t act as usual. Don’t look at 
me all, “been there, done that.” You’re telling me my fu-
ture is Huntington’s and then you say I’m not emotional 
enough? Do you realize what an absurd and destructive 
position that is? The problem is not Huntington’s incur-
ability; the problem is that the test holds you as you hold 
it. It demands that you be able to make something living 
out of it. But you wouldn’t dare. You are cowards, your 
conscience is sitting pretty while we struggle through 
testing, and you take every opportunity to belittle us as 
we go.
Therein lies my anger. Those who get tested give you 
a chance to raise your standards, and you do not take it 
up; quite the opposite, you want to anybodify us as usual. 
And so doing, not only do you not fix us, you make mat-
ters worse. You make our situation even more depressing 
than it already is, because you block off possible escape 
routes and flatten our futures. You concoct a Huntingto-
nian future for us that is bland, mediocre, handicapped, 
insane, predictable – a definition wrought by you alone – 
without thinking for one second that it might be possible 
to have Huntington’s and completely eschew the model 
you’ve created, to be doggedly out of step with your def-
inition. It never occurs to you that you do not own us, 
that we could be something other than your creatures. 
And how could you? Your power to transform humans 
into medically conforming creatures, into beings defined 
from head to toe by you alone, this power is such that, 
once caught within its cogs, it becomes incredibly diffi-
cult if not impossible to disentangle and defend oneself. 
Most of the time, getting sick is a double bind: disease 
on the one hand, medicine on the other. Should a sick 
person begin to challenge her treatment, she soon finds 
herself in pain and alone. At best, her aggressive behavior 
is explained away to her as the result of feeling that, as a 
sick person, she is the victim of some sort of injustice for 
which her anger can find no other outlet. At worst, say if 
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she’s a smoker and happens to enjoy a drink from time 
to time, she is told that what is happening to her is her 
fault anyway. How dare we question those with the pow-
er to make us better? A power relationship such as this, 
which quashes and silences any semblance of a challenge, 
is profoundly unhealthy. I’m lucky: medicine cannot do 
anything to help me, which is why I’m free to criticize it.
My indignation is greater still when it comes to psy-
chology’s attitude toward Huntington’s disease. If medi-
cine considers that thought production is none of its 
business, so much the pity. For psychology to take a simi-
lar view is, however, astounding. As always, in the testing 
process for Huntington’s disease, psychology intervenes 
when medicine hits a dead end. And when the moment 
comes for psychology to take up this glorious and ambi-
tious charge, to generate healing in spite of it all, it too 
sets to work on its default setting, bathing me in precon-
ceived and pitifully inadequate notions like “the grieving 
process.” Psychology too is determined to treat me like 
it’s been there and done that, and so doing serves medi-
cine’s needs and not my own, applying its tools to rein-
force the impact of the medical curse. To encourage me 
to work on mourning my normality is not only stupid but 
also dangerous. I’m not dead yet. Maybe I shouldn’t have 
been born, but I’m not dead yet.5 And like most of us, I 
was never normal. Telling me to grieve for my normal-
ity places me within a normative program of long-term, 
existential withdrawal that destroys all the singular pos-
sibilities contained within my experience of becoming-
Huntington’s before they’ve even been explored.
I understand medicine’s difficulty as guardian of the 
genetic test, whether it likes it or not. The art of the test is 
5 These days, women who carry the disease or the genetic expansion 
and who decide to conduct a prenatal test when pregnant, are ad-
vised to have an abortion if the results indicate the fetus is also a ge-
netic carrier. Carrying the disease means being forced to live along-
side this eugenic logic.
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in its hands, and yet medicine is ambivalent about mak-
ing it available to the infamous “at-risk” population, par-
ticularly after having observed a rise in suicide attempts 
from individuals who test “positive” for the disease.6 And 
if there’s one thing medicine hates, it is killing people. 
Indeed, its sole obsession is making sure that people do 
not die, or if they do, that it is absolutely not medicine’s 
fault. Medicine is right to fear suicide attempts from in-
dividuals who follow through with the predictive test-
ing process. This risk is embedded within the test’s very 
outcome. My hypothesis is that, as things currently stand 
and in terms of their respective effects, the disease and 
the test are one and the same. Testing deforms your life, 
whether you carry the disease or not. If it shows that you 
are not a carrier, you have nonetheless been possessed by 
the prospect such that you are irrevocably transformed. 
Upon learning the good news, what do you make of this 
stunted metamorphosis? Not to mention the rift that 
such a result creates with those in your family who are 
sick. How do you rejoice without placing an irreparable 
distance between you and them, without feeling guilty? 
If the test says you are a carrier, your path in life takes a 
degenerative, downhill turn. Checkmate. The process can 
fuss over you all it likes, with its social workers, psychia-
trists, and psychologists. It does nothing else but confirm 
and empower the withering malediction uttered by the 
test. Under such conditions, depression and suicide at-
tempts are hardly unexpected. In fact, I’m surprised any-
one survives the experience at all.
Through this powerful labeling process, where the 
only vanishing point provided by medicine is a gener-
alized withdrawal – deterioration – it immediately oc-
6 Elisabeth W. Almqvist et al., “A Worldwide Assessment of the Fre-
quency of Suicide, Suicide Attempts, or Psychiatric Hospitalization 
after Predictive Testing for Huntington’s Disease,” The American Jour-
nal of Human Genetics 64, no. 5 (May 1999): 1293–304.
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curred to me that suicide was the only alternative with 
enough power, counterpoint, and emancipatory freedom. 
The thought seized me straight away: if I’m going to dete-
riorate, I may as well finish it right now. I’m not interested 
in that future, I reject it and if, as it seems, I’m not able to 
reject it, if the only thing I’m offered is to help me accept 
it, then I’ll stop all this right now because I’m not inter-
ested in accepting such a thing. I refuse to consider that 
life is deterioration. I have never, for instance, considered 
that aging is an unrelenting phase of decline, that it is set 
to be that equation they drum into us: the older you get, 
the less you get. Less strength, less health, fewer memo-
ries, less sexuality, less flavor, less knowledge. I’ve never 
got my head around that kind of thinking and if, after all 
that, because of Huntington’s, I’m forced to think of my-
self as someone who will never again be moving forward, 
then too bad, I’ll end it now one way or another. I began 
to think this way from the moment I was polluted by the 
medical definition of Huntington’s and, more generally, 
by the medical definition of my genetic status. From this 
pollution onward, committing suicide was therefore the 
only sensible answer to an absolutely senseless medical 
proposition.
I managed to rid myself of this pollution by quaran-
tining away medicine, by realizing that what ails me is 
not so much Huntington’s disease as a disease for which 
medicine has found a definition but can do preciously 
little else. By understanding that medicine defines noth-
ing, that you have to take its definition for what it is: a 
stop sign, beyond-this-point-we-are-no-longer-compe-
tent, in other words, an object still needing to be thought 
through and defined. By understanding this, I began to 
breathe again. Medicine takes its own limitations as a 
working definition. The test makes Huntington’s disease 
into something phantom-like: an entity holly and yet 
possessive and terrifying. Each time a patient takes the 
test and is told of her Huntingtonian future, one of these 
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disturbing creatures enters the world. The testing process 
and its design principles of precaution and anybodifica-
tion address this creature the only way they know how: 
domestication by way of notional deterioration. As such, 
the situation resembles a state of war. Medicine is my en-
emy for it insists on wanting to brand me with a mori-
bund future. It can be my ally if and only if it agrees to 
fashion a surfeit of intelligence (i.e., vitality) from what’s 
happening to me.
It took me four years to get better. Not from Hunting-
ton’s disease, but from the psychological trauma I experi-
enced when my test results were announced. I call them 
“tragic spells”: they’re just as powerful as magic spells but 
they make you rot, reducing the multiplicities of tomor-
row into a narrow, monolithic, flat, diagnosed sick future 
that stops the mind not from grief but from creativity.
I recovered because I met a neurologist and hd spe-
cialist who agreed to work on an antidote with me. This 
doctor’s patience and common sense are impervious to 
assault and her commitment and empathy are extraor-
dinary. As I see it, however, these qualities are not what 
make her so effective. (I should say, I do not doubt that 
within the medical profession, of which I have been so ve-
hemently critical here, there are many who possess these 
same qualities). I believe her ability to make this antidote 
stems from one thing only: her humility towards the dis-
ease, an a priori humility. She could have said no for the 
simple reason that it’s not her job, which is to treat the 
truly sick and ignore pre-symptomatic carriers sickened 
by the test, like me. But she offered to do it, and most im-
portantly, she offered knowing full well that neither she 
nor I had any idea what we were getting ourselves into. 
From the moment we were both of this mind, the antidote 
wasn’t that hard to make. It consisted of a slow and grad-
ual reinjection of everything that had been eroded by the 
test: doubt, uncertainty, hesitation, the maybes, what-ifs, 
and feel-your-ways. In other words, she put her stock in 
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pragmatism (following what this experience could teach 
us) rather than determinism (knowing in advance what 
would happen). Along the way, within the very core of 
this abstract, bland, and empty place called the genet-
ic-coding-of-Miss-A.R.-with-Huntington’s-mutation, 
she knitted, strand by strand, the possibility of releasing 
surprise anew, and displacement, disorientation, zigzag-
ging, depth, perspective, insight, unexpected knowledge 
– simply put, a dose of living-living.
In a few words, my task now is to invent a solution 
akin to an antidote in its nature and its action. To devote 
your entire being to devising a truly operational solution 
is an undoubtedly vitalizing path – so much so that I of-
ten wonder if life and the endeavor to create this solution 
are not one and the same. When it comes to developing 
this solution, anything that cannot be put to the test or 
into the world is of no interest. In this sense, my process 
is one of pragmatist research, drawing on the Jamesian 
notion of a wager.7 For William James, when you’re faced 
with a painful, stultifying, and moribund existential co-
nundrum, it’s time to have a wager, a somewhat thera-
peutic wager with a revitalizing thrust. James points out 
that once I’ve designed this wager, I have to set about 
building up everything that will help me pull it off. It’s 
like he’s asking me not just to bet on a horse, but also and 
above all, to make sure the horse wins, by taking care of 
it, readying it, by riding it and, who knows, why not, even 
by becoming the winning creature myself.
Intelligence is the relationship that thought forges 
with reality, the world, and adjacent sources of intelli-
gence. Intelligence cannot exist, cannot unleash itself, 
unless it is extended through contact, in an interactive 
mode. To emerge and develop, it must enter into an al-
most loving relationship with whomever and whatever 




it encounters. Here I wish to suggest that the conditions 
that would ensure my solution are grounded not in the 
energies of despairing loneliness but in collective emu-
lation. Inventing an alternative understanding of Hun-
tington’s disease is an extraordinarily ambitious project 
needing robust means and a number of able minds to see 
it through. The greatest risk posed by such an experiment 
– having-Huntington’s-disease – is that the sickness be-
comes separated from its own intelligence, which would 
kill both things: a patient’s intelligence and the potential 
for intelligence inherent in the disease itself. My wager 
is that Huntington’s disease provides an opportunity to 
push thinking further.
Dingdingdong was born to give me the means to win 
this wager. Dingdingdong is a collective whose sole voca-
tion is to create a living and operational way of think-
ing through Huntington’s. This collective does not in-
tend to collate general information about the disease, or 
raise funds to treat those affected by it, which existing 
organizations do a remarkably good job of already.8 It’s 
not a federation but a gathering of individuals driven by 
a common, vital concern for creating innovative thinking 
from their experience with the disease. The collective’s 
communication strategy could be termed proffercation: 
no condemnation without a counterproposal. It’s not a 
collective against anything – against the disease, for in-
stance – but rather for building something that does not 
as yet exist, above all, a specifically Huntingtonian way of 
thinking whose current lack exacerbates the suffering of 
those affected by the disease.
Dingdingdong is first the call of three bells whose 
voices ring true and clear and yet, like the three-of-us, 
8 For France, see Huntington France, http://huntington.fr/; Huntington 
Avenir, http://www.huntingtonavenir.net; as well as Huntington’s 




are linked together, an echo of folly ringing in their 
hearts. It’s a warbling call, high and loud, to cut through 
the brouhaha of routine thoughts and warn of an urgent 
need to slow down. It’s a call that chimes with Hunting-
ton’s, so much so that for the three-of-us it became an 
acoustic compact: say Dingdingdong when you’re too 
scared of Huntington’s, and say Dingdingdong when you 
want to laugh or scare off Huntington’s.
How do you think when thinking deteriorates?
How do you think through how to think when think-
ing deteriorates?
How do you think through how to think when think-
ing deteriorates while thinking is deteriorating?
How to write about how to think when thinking dete-
riorates?
How to write about how to think when thinking dete-
riorates while thinking is deteriorating?
My circumstances naturally lend themselves to the 
idea of founding a collective. I have an urgent need to 
strengthen the three-of-us. I have an urgent need to have 
an army of my own, to protect the three-of-us from all 
contamination. Given that one day the disease will limit 
the means and faculties I currently enjoy, I want to put 
safeguards in place now, so that these limitations will 
be balanced out by other intelligences that can continue 
to provide adequate nourishment for my soul, despite – 
indeed, by way of – these same limitations. Such safe-
guards are not meant to guard us from madness, but to 
keep madness safe in its intrinsic state, to encourage its 
expression, so that it might be released and inform the 
world with its fragile teachings. Today, I can be this safe-
guard for others but one day I will surely need others to 
take my place.
This project means I must consider myself to be Hun-
tingtonian. However, all I can say at this stage, given 
where my thinking is currently, is that I do not yet know 
if I am Huntingtonian. Not because I am yet to display 
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any symptoms of the disease, but because it all depends 
on how the collective tackles this sprawling entity, the 
constellation called Huntington’s. Unlike many diseases, 
especially mental ones, the identification of a gene spe-
cific to Huntington’s disease (it15 on the 4th chromo-
some) should close off the question, “am I Huntingto-
nian or not?” There is no doubt that my own gene bears 
Huntington’s mark: my cag repetitions exceed normal 
levels. I’m at 44 on this scale-that-does-not-lie – over 36 
and you’ve got Huntington’s. My mother has 42, like her 
father. My elder sister has 17. The existence of such a “re-
liable witness” – abnormal cag repetitions – makes this 
question obsolete when in fact it is open, open and fas-
cinating for a majority of diseases, for which no reliable 
genetic markers have yet been found.
Schizophrenia is a good example. One of the collec-
tives concerned by this disease does not believe in calling 
itself a gathering of schizophrenics because, in light of its 
members’ own experiences, it feels that the term “schiz-
ophrenic” is less pertinent than “voice hearers.”9 The 
members of this collective hear voices, it’s complicated, 
it’s uncomfortable, and at times painful, it may not be 
normal, but that doesn’t make them schizophrenics (par-
ticularly because “schizophrenic” immediately seems to 
mean one thing only: the imperative to take antipsychot-
ics for the rest of your life – which is something some 
choose not to do, in any case, not at all costs). They prefer, 
and I agree with them on this, to call themselves “voice 
hearers” because this designates that they have an ability 
that other “normals” do not, and further, that the goal of 
their treatment is not to eradicate this additional ability 
but to live a better life with it. Their question is not, “how 
do I treat my schizophrenia?” but rather, “how do I live a 
better life with my voice-hearing ability?”
9 See Hearing Voices Network, http://www.hearing-voices.org.
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Thanks to the voice hearers, I can rephrase my ques-
tion. The problem is not: to be or not to be Huntingto-
nian, but rather: what do I gain from defining myself as 
Huntingtonian? It’s about transforming a tragic question 
into a Jamesian question: what is the better wager? What 
is the wager that conjures the most vitality? What do I 
win and what do I lose by suggesting I am Huntingto-
nian? The stance taken by some Autistic people is help-
ful for thinking this question through. Unlike the voice 
hearers, some Autistic people not only accept but uphold 
their Autistic status, yet only insofar as adopting such a 
position means acknowledging the singularity of their 
world, a world which is theirs and resolutely not ours: 
Autistic culture. They therefore do not locate themselves 
in a hierarchy that runs from normal to pathological, 
but rather in the simple acknowledgment of difference. 
In other words, these individuals with Autism rally be-
hind the medical syndrome known as Autism, yet they 
do so in order to arrive somewhere far beyond obedient 
adherence to its medical definition (handicap, deficien-
cy, other-than-normal). This Autistic culture movement 
leads, for instance, to the discovery of another culture, 
diametrically opposed and foreign to theirs, neurotypi-
cal culture, which is to say normal people’s culture, which 
they cheerfully conceive of as some kind of incurable pa-
thology.10 The fact such groups exist is an extraordinary 
boon to me. If I’m at all confident in my efforts, it’s be-
cause their audacity is infectious.
(I won’t hide that founding a collective is somewhat 
entangled with my own personal writing project, as I also 
need the collective to continue this work. The project, 
titled Tahitidouche,11 is a literary and existential project. 
10 See, for instance, the “Institute for the Study of the Neuro-
logically Typical” project, archived on http://web.archive.org/
web/20101225092135/http://isnt.autistics.org/index.html.
11 Some of this project’s ideas will be developed within the foam labo-
ratory and research unit of Dingdingdong, the Institute for the Co-
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It’s the starting point for the search for my own language, 
for my own sense of reason and of madness. Writing is the 
most precious and reliable means at my disposal for host-
ing the creations to which my Huntingtonian life is now 
bound. Because writing is both how I remember and how 
I create. I am unable to create anything outside of writing 
and I am unable to remember anything that is not writ-
ten down. If Huntington’s disease is a world waiting to 
be discovered, she – Huntington’s is indeed female, as in 
the French language the words “earth” (monde) and “dis-
ease” (maladie) are feminine – needs her own language, 
her own mythology, her own founding texts. I need the 
collective to inform the mode of writing which can speak, 
describe, and bring Huntington’s into existence, thanks 
to the shared experiences it will provoke and thanks to 
the Huntingtonian us-jectivity (nousjectivité) it will re-
veal. I have no doubt whatsoever that the raw material of 
this us-jectivity will be text.)
Dingdingdong’s challenge is to establish a system of 
knowledge production that articulates the collection 
of individual accounts with the development of new 
pragmatic proposals, with a view to helping its users 
(usagers)12 – carriers, patients, kin, caregivers – to live 
with Huntington’s honorably. Original forms of collabo-
ration between users, researchers (medicine, philosophy, 
sociology, history), and artists (fine artists, writers, vide-
ographers, choreographers…) are needed for an endeavor 
such as this: probing this disease as unchartered territory 
and discovering narrative forms capable of relating this 
adventure as it unfolds.
In this sense, there is no one goal, no predetermined 
production to be achieved, but rather an expedition to 
be carried out, an expedition whose trajectory cannot be 
production of Knowledge about Huntington’s Disease. See https://
dingdingdong.org/.
12 See this volume, 50n3.
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known in advance. By ridding ourselves of a specific goal, 
we’re delivered from that same panic felt by Huntington’s 
carriers who have undergone the predictive test and who 
are continually shepherded toward the disease as the sole 
apex, endpoint, and inescapable destination in life. Yet 
everything changes if we refuse to be blithely captivat-
ed by this eerie attraction to the distant and dangerous 
planet pointed out to us by the medical profession. Far 
off, and far removed from our current condition, held 
aloft as some kind of solar system at the heart of which 
lays a fatal star, the sun of death. Everything changes if 
we choose, instead, to look at our feet, to look all around 
us, just behind us, or just in front us: if we begin to ob-
serve the ways in which we’re already in contact with this 
thing. Everything changes if we consider what is hap-
pening right now. We’re already making contact. In other 
words, it’s already an event.
This planetary metaphor is no coincidence.13 With con-
siderable nuance, Lars Von Trier’s film Melancholia relates 
the different possible ways of facing a foretold catastro-
phe. In brief: a planet called Melancholia is about to crash 
into Earth and we witness a family’s last days – a couple, 
their sister in law, and young son. The husband character, 
played by Kiefer Sutherland, believes tooth and nail in 
the official/scientific assessment that the planet will just 
brush past Earth before continuing its onward trajectory. 
He is so deeply convinced that when he realizes the sci-
entists were wrong or lied (we never really find out, and 
for once this isn’t the point), he kills himself by swallow-
ing the vial of poison his less trusting wife procured. Her 
character, Claire, played by Charlotte Gainsbourg, is, on 
the other hand, constantly afraid: we see her, now para-
13 I follow, on tippy-toes, in the footsteps of Émilie Hache, here, who 
deploys Lars Von Trier’s Dogville to literally make the reader experi-
ence the moral positions of a societal controversy. Émilie Hache, Ce 
à quoi nous tenons (Paris: La Découverte, 2011).
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lyzed with fear, now gesticulating wildly, possessed by 
terror and unable to do anything but submit to it, until 
the very end, when she gives in and entrusts herself, body 
and soul, to her sister Justine, played by Kirsten Dunst. 
Justine (whose impossible “human” matrimony we fol-
lowed in the first half of the film), is the only person able 
to experience the planet’s encounter. She shares this abil-
ity to not shy from reality with the property’s horses, who 
make their own journey, as if to say: the ways that lead 
us to this encounter are varied and infinite, because they 
reveal our very inner natures.
Melancholia is as much the story of this encounter as 
it is of the disease, its necessary prelude: a strange afflic-
tion that befalls Justine, a nameless sickness, or rather 
a sickness that does not so much bear the name of the 
approaching planet, but a sickness that is itself the ap-
proaching planet. In other words: Justine is not mel-
ancholic. Melancholia has taken Justine. Under such 
circumstances, Justine suffers from not yet having en-
countered what she already belongs to. Like a fish out 
of water, Justine is sick from having to exist outside her 
natural environment, and her condition worsens until 
she encounters that which, at last, makes her become 
who she really is. This encounter gives rise to an amazing 
scene in which, bathing naked in its glow, Justine makes 
love with the planet. From this moment on, Justine re-
gains her appetite and her strength. She is cured.
I believe you can compare the existential dissonance 
that afflicts Justine with the impossible encounter expe-
rienced by carriers of Huntington’s disease – insofar as 
current medical knowledge sets the conditions for such 
an encounter, in any case.
It’s worth remarking that, in this film, “official” science 
aspires to be reassuring and constantly intones that noth-
ing bad is going to happen, unlike what happens with 
Huntington’s disease. Yet, indeed, when it comes to the 
encounter itself the net effect is the same: “don’t worry, 
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nothing’s happening” and “red alert, disaster imminent!” 
conjure a paralyzing fear. One is confronted with some-
thing for which no answers can be found, but of which 
one thing is certain: it’s really happening. Dingdingdong 
is an encyclopedic endeavor whose object is not Hunting-
ton’s disease but the encounter with a neurodegenerative 
genetic disease understood as a mysterious planet that 
has already taken some of us. The researchers involved 
in this collective – whether they are carriers, patients, 
doctors, philosophers, sociologists, artists, writers  – are 
committed to using their know-how in order to experi-
ment with ways of proudly coming to know an experi-
ence, something scouted out by its users yet which may 
concern us all: living with a genetically foretold disease.
 
Testing Knowledge:  








The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inher-
ent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made 
true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the 
process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication.
– William James1
Medical diagnoses transform those who receive them, 
dividing a person’s life into a before and after. They dra-
matically reveal the implacable entanglement of the bio-
logical life of the organism with the biographical life of 
the subject. When danger befalls biological life, a person, 
along with her entire life story, comes undone. The trou-
ble with diagnostic situations is that they force a trans-
lation upon factual and objective knowledge produced 
by scientific techniques, for instance regarding the ge-
netic status of a living organism, turning it into an an-
nouncement made to somebody. They thereby acquire, 
so to speak, the “wild” or untamed power to transform 
a person in her entirety. If diagnostic enactment is capa-
ble of radically calling the existence of its addressees into 
1 William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking 
(New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1916), 201.
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question, then those involved, practitioners and patients 
alike, are in urgent need of tools and techniques for shar-
ing the responsibility that invariably goes hand in hand 
with such power.
This is an especially challenging undertaking in diag-
nostic situations that force medicine to reckon with its 
own limitations. What happens when a test confirms that 
a person – or more accurately her blood, urine, skin, or 
limbs – has or will develop a disease, yet no correspond-
ing treatment exists? Medical practice cannot then oper-
ate as curative art towards the conditions it diagnoses. 
This inability to act suggests therapeutic powerlessness, 
which produces profound disarray, if not breakdown, 
among doctors, patients, and loved ones alike. Those in-
volved rarely admit this to one another, and so all too of-
ten a powerless doctor will confront an equally powerless 
patient with extremely upsetting information about her 
body, and hence her life today and to come, yet can pro-
vide no constructive propositions concerning what hap-
pens after diagnosis.
This kind of diagnosis is not simply informative, it is 
transformative. It transforms each and every actor in-
volved, along with their broader relationships. Nonethe-
less, it can provide relief in some cases, for example, by 
finally putting a name to a set of painful symptoms after 
a long and hitherto fruitless search. Diagnosis then puts 
an end to an uncertainty that is often harder to bear than 
the certainty of suffering from a severe disease or, from 
a medical point of view, the desperate quest for the right 
diagnosis. However in other situations – and this is es-
pecially so for predictive tests, also known as presymp-
tomatic tests, enabled by contemporary genetics – diag-
nosis, or the positive stipulation of a prognosed disease, 
risks becoming a sentence or, to be precise, a curse that 
overpowers not only a person’s present and future but 
also, assuredly and retroactively, her past.
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In such cases, medicine can indeed provide factual, 
scientific answers. It can say whether or not an abnormal 
mutation is present in such and such an organism and 
at such and such a location. However, practitioners are 
often bereft of adequate forms for communicating such 
diagnoses. They lack ways of speaking and of acting that 
might meet the complexity of the knowledge they pos-
sess and its attendant implications. This failing cannot 
be simply chalked up to the shortcomings of individual 
doctors, to a dearth of empathy, or to psychological mis-
adventure. It arises in case after case and should instead, 
I submit, be regarded and interpreted as an effect of the 
epistemological drive inherent to modern medicine, a 
drive which some historical excursions can help clarify.
Diseases and Their Milieu
One of the conundrums of modern medicine is the way 
in which an entanglement of epistemological, ethical, 
moral, and legal features consistently separates facts, 
deemed scientifically objective, from values, deemed 
subjective and unmoored from these same facts. At first, 
this imperative drew strength from medicine’s need to 
assert itself as a scientific discipline, much like physics, 
chemistry, or biology. The demands of patient autonomy 
and enlightened consent, which have been foundational 
categories of medical ethics and law since the 1960s, lent 
subsequent support. Admittedly, such concepts gave pa-
tients (their autonomy recognized at last) the ability to 
refuse treatment advice from doctors (their paternalism 
overcome, at least in theory). Autonomy so construed 
amounted to a reactive veto power. Yet this did not give 
patients the ability to intervene into the reality of the 
disease that befell them, as something with which they 
lived. Expert knowledge over this experience remained 
the privilege of doctors. As historian and philosopher of 
science Alfred Tauber observes:
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Patient autonomy, rather than being corrosive of pro-
fessional privilege, may actually reinforce physician 
authority; autonomy tends to be a negative right (in 
that a person has the right to refuse treatment) rather 
than a positive right (a person cannot generally de-
mand a particular treatment). […] Indeed, physicians 
have incorporated informed consent into their prac-
tice as a means of improving patient satisfaction, and 
perhaps most importantly, shifting responsibility to 
the patient provides a potent tactic to combat mal-
practice suits.2
Pertinent albeit disillusioned as this remark may be, oth-
er practices concerning a wide range of conditions have 
emerged in recent decades. These indicate that diseases 
can transform themselves, for doctors and those affected 
alike. Through know-how and practices that depart from 
science in the strict sense of the term, it is even possi-
ble to alter their so-called natural history. The existence 
of these conditions is undeniable and painful, and yet 
for those living with them what they really are is never 
determined once and for all. Instead, their existence is 
constantly subject to new experiences and new question-
ing. The truth(s) of these phenomena, it turns out, can 
take multiple forms and can vary in relation to the milieu 
in which they unfold. The Intervoice Network provides 
an instructive example. It is an international user initia-
tive that assembles people to whom psychiatry has ad-
dressed a schizophrenia diagnosis.3 In taking up the term 
2 Alfred I. Tauber, Patient Autonomy and the Ethics of Responsibility 
(Cambridge: Mit Press, 2005), 60.
3 The Dingdingdong collective employs the term “users” to refer to 
all of those who participate in a culture of usages with Hunting-
ton’s disease, whether because they are sick, at-risk, loved ones, care-
givers, physicians, etc. See also Emilie Hermant and Valerie Pihet, 




“voice hearers,”4 members of this movement do not sim-
ply reject schizophrenia as a diagnosis. They counter it 
with techniques for seeking constructive ways of living 
with the voices they hear. They have devised a peer-based 
training system, by and for hearers themselves, to better 
share and perfect these techniques. Their initial observa-
tion was that in most cases, only some and not all voices 
heard are unpleasant or threatening. Training therefore 
aims to provide those concerned with the know-how 
needed to cultivate, with discernment, their singular 
ability to hear voices that no one else can – rather than 
reduce them to silence through drastic pharmacological 
treatment, which tends to be minimally effective anyway. 
This network also provides training for psychiatrists, 
with a growing number choosing to participate. This is 
no small measure of the movement’s success. By learn-
ing new techniques from users (in the sense of experts of 
a particular culture of usages), these doctors are hoping 
to enrich their own practice. In such light, voice hearers 
not only transform their own usage of illness but have 
also begun to substantively influence the natural history 
of schizophrenia, including the clinical course of the 
disease. They follow in the wake of other efforts, led for 
instance by Autistic or Deaf people, that also undertake 
user-oriented coproduction in order to intervene upon 
and transform the very reality of what ceases to be a dis-
order – an impairment to be suppressed at all cost – and 
instead becomes a singularity.
User groups nurture genuine expertise. French psychol-
ogist and writer Tobie Nathan demonstrates how these 
collective projects put medicine – and especially psychia-
try5 – to the test. These groups demonstrate that ways of 
4 For an overview of this movement, see Angela Woods, “The Voice-
hearer,” Journal of Mental Health 22, no. 3 (2013): 263–70. 
5 See, for instance, proceedings of the conference “La psychothérapie 
à l’épreuve de ses usagers,” held in Paris October 12–13, 2006, avail-
able online at http://ethnopsychiatrie.net/textcolloq.htm.
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living, co-existing, and making do with sickness – wheth-
er from a clinical or caregiving perspective or one set by 
those directly concerned – do more than transform its 
public perception. They have a profound effect on what 
I term, following Étienne Souriau and Bruno Latour, the 
modes of existence of disease.6 At the same time, they ori-
ent, in deep and lasting ways, the rewriting of the natural 
history of disease. The reality of a particular sickness is 
only partially captured by medico-scientific disease cat-
egories; it is also a thing of lived experience, an illness 
unfolding for a given set of people, at a given time and 
within a given milieu. Indeed, we should consider these 
dimensions of lived experience alongside diagnostic pro-
cedures and frameworks, as constitutive elements of the 
milieu or oikos (household) of diagnosis. Put directly: an 
ecology of diagnosis must account for all of the elements 
that make up its milieu. For example, an “Autism” diag-
nosis is not the same thing when heeding the assumption 
that symptoms express a lack of maternal affection (the 
“refrigerator mother” theory), as it is when heeding calls 
from activist user communities to acknowledge their 
inherent singularity, which includes asserting the exist-
ence of a distinct Autism culture. An Autism “diagnosis” 
is henceforth transformed; it is no more the same than a 
pneumonia diagnosis before and after antibiotics, a dia-
betes diagnosis before and after insulin synthesis, or a 
multiple sclerosis diagnosis before and after the advent 
of pharmaceutical treatment that, although not a cure, 
affords considerable control over how the condition un-
folds.
In such light, diagnosis is not simply a communication 
of knowledge from one person to another or from the lab-
oratory to the consulting room, wherein that knowledge 
6 Étienne Souriau, The Different Modes of Existence (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 2015) and Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into 
Modes of Existence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).
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remains inherently neutral despite its secondary subjec-
tive and psychological effects. Instead, diagnosis must be 
understood as a manifold (complexe) of facts/values made 
up of a condition’s many layers of existence. To study 
these modes of existence, which is to say the milieu of a 
given diagnosis, is, therefore, critical for understanding 
how diagnostic practices that run the risk of becoming a 
veritable curse, overwhelming the creative capacities of 
those concerned, can, instead, become opportunities for 
coproduction, if not of assured vitality then at least of 
metamorphosed vitality in the face of the lived experi-
ence of disease.
Opening the Box
In order to become capable of foregoing a reaction of 
passive disarray in the face of devastating diagnoses that 
threaten to unleash a veritable pox, and to turn instead 
towards actively constructing new possibilities, it is nec-
essary to open the Pandora’s box of diagnosis as a situa-
tion.
Taking a historical and genealogical approach, I will 
first elucidate how contemporary diagnostic systems 
(dispositifs) came to be, the legacies that they bear, along 
with the disciplinary, epistemological, ethical, and legal 
ideals and regulations that they heed. This will provide 
the grounds for constructive criticism of these same fea-
tures. In so doing, my aim is not so much to denounce 
medicine and its practitioners, but rather to heighten our 
sense of the different features through which diagnostic 
situations become so intense as to require a rethinking 
of the ways in which they distribute the capacity to act. 
Consider the mere existence of a range of literature from 
practitioners themselves, such as The Difficult Conversa-
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tion, Breaking Bad News, and so forth.7 These documents 
convey a pressing demand to make sense of the “how to” 
of diagnostic activity on the part of doctors themselves. 
While a sign of genuine good will, above all they reflect 
the need for an undertaking that operates at multiple reg-
isters and gathers together a diverse array of disciplinary 
skillsets, an undertaking that nurtures thinking together, 
fosters a multiplicity of knowledge and practices, and is 
able to produce less stereotypical and reductive versions 
of diseases and their diagnosis.8 There are two precondi-
tions for steadily building such an understanding. Firstly, 
that all actors involved (doctors, caregivers, patients, and 
loved ones) agree to share their respective disarray. Sec-
ondly, that we begin conceiving of practices that can not 
only “dissociate the symptom from the person”9 but can 
also reconnect a person to the attachments and affilia-
tions that make up her world in order to put a stop to the 
process in which she is severed from any consistent real-
ity in the name of the laws of nature.
This book begins by tracing the genealogy of a most 
unusual diagnosis, the predictive test for Huntington’s 
disease, to convey a sense of how its inherent violence 
is made manifest. The second chapter examines the ex-
tent to which such manifestations of violence adumbrate 
a history of modern medicine. I will attempt to recount 
this or rather these stories with a view to better under-
standing the characteristic failings of current diagnostic 
7 Edlef Bucka-Lassen, Das schwere Gespräch. Patientengerechte Vermit-
tlung einschneidender Diagnosen (Cologne: Deutscher Ärzte-Verlag, 
2005); Christian Lüdcke and Peter Langkafel, Breaking Bad News. Das 
Überbringen schlechter Nachrichten in der Medizin (Heidelberg: Eco-
nomica Verlag, 2008). 
8 My use of the concept of “versions” draws on the work of Vinciane 
Despret. For a discussion of this term, see Vinciane Despret, Our 
Emotional Makeup: Ethnopsychology and Selfhood (New York: Other 
Press, 2004).
9 Tobie Nathan and Isabelle Stengers, Doctors and Healers (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2018), 70. 
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practice and identifying the favorable conditions for re-
plenishing this devastated framework. The task, there-
fore, is to elaborate a better understanding of the situ-
ations under consideration in order to problematize their 
attendant difficulties otherwise and thereby orient toward 
new possibilities for becoming with disease. The book’s 
third and final chapter draws upon these stories to de-
velop propositions adequate to a singular setting. This 
setting is characterized by a radical asymmetry between, 
on the one hand, forms of knowledge and power that can 
transform a person in her entirety and, on the other, a 
lack of therapeutic know-how. These propositions must, 
in practice and in effect, prove themselves capable of en-
riching the imagination of those exposed to these situa-
tions, regardless of their position, such that they thereby 
develop new capacities for action. They should add con-
sistency to these diagnostic milieus; in other words, they 
must prove capable companions for the shared construc-




The Many Lives of Testing
 
My wager is that Huntington’s disease provides 
an opportunity to push thinking further.
– Alice Rivières1
Following my encounter with Alice Rivières, and in learn-
ing of her experience with the genetic test for Hunting-
ton’s disease, I felt the pressing need to work towards 
an ecological understanding of diagnosis. “We weren’t 
designed to know our destiny before it happens […] but 
when you have got the option to know anyway, you au-
tomatically become a bit different, as a human being,”2 
writes Rivières in the “Dingdingdong Manifesto.” Some 
years ago, she “succumbed” to the force of attraction of 
predictive genetic testing. “The simple fact the test ex-
isted,” she writes “made it utterly irresistible to me. […] 
Because there was a test, I could not do without it when 
erecting even the slightest of solid foundations for my 
future.”3 The test promised, or at least appeared to prom-
ise, to help her know her future. Yielding to its seductive 
power, she decided to submit (or to subject herself) to the 
process of medical, psychological, psychiatric, and social 
1 Alice Rivières, “The Dingdingdong Manifesto,” this volume, 37.




evaluations that precedes the actual test, and then to un-
dertake the genetic test itself.
Predictive testing for Huntington’s disease (hd) takes 
on singular meaning because of the fact that, to this day, 
the disease remains incurable. Making sense of the many 
difficulties testing raises in such circumstances requires 
a definition of the condition itself. Yet this task raises a 
veritable avalanche of questions for a project like Ding-
dongdong, a collective project committed to thinking, 
inventing, and instantiating counteragents or antidotes 
to ostensibly hopeless representations of the disease. 
How do we introduce Huntington’s disease when the stat-
ed purpose of our collective labor is to actively transform 
it through sophisticated forms of “knowledge coproduc-
tion”? Dingdingdong adopts a critical stance toward the 
reigning definitions, discourses, and practices of Hung-
tington’s disease, given that we aspire to iterate and in-
stitute interesting forms of contact and life with it. Under 
such circumstances, are we able to appeal to biomedical 
knowledge or to genetic and neurological explanations, 
and if so how? Conversely, if our task is to make novel and 
less hopeless versions of hd become true – which means 
making them truly real – had we better not, for now, re-
serve an answer to the question of what this sickness ver-
ily is?
I fear, however, that postponing definition in the 
name of precision would risk jeopardizing the perspicaci-
ty of Dingdingdong’s enterprise, whose very force derives 
from drawing contrasts with established and official ver-
sions of hd. Yet it would be incorrect to assume we aim at 
challenging the accuracy of biomedical knowledge of the 
disease. Rather, we stand against the assumption that life 
with this particular condition, and with disease in gener-
al, can be wholly or largely distilled within scientific and 
medical knowledge thereof.
When it comes to diagnosis, Huntington’s is some-
thing of an exception to the extent that it can be de-
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tected “predictively,” in other words, before the onset of 
any symptoms. By way of a “simple” blood test, at-risk 
persons can receive a practically conclusive prediction of 
whether they will or will not experience the many symp-
toms of this “neurodegenerative” disorder.4 In this same 
way, it is possible to determine whether such persons’ 
children or grandchildren also carry a risk. For if a person 
does not carry the mutation, they cannot transmit it – 
the genetic legacy ends with them. This is because hd 
is autosomal dominant, monogenic, and shows complete 
penetrance. The first characteristic, in the rules of genet-
ics, indicates that any person having one parent who is a 
carrier is at a 50/50 risk of inheriting the defective gene. 
The second means that the disease develops in the pres-
ence of a single modified gene. The third implies that any 
person carrying the relevant genetic mutation not only 
bears a higher than average risk of falling ill but that they 
will inevitably develop symptoms sooner or later – unless 
they happen to die of other causes beforehand.
The American physician George Huntington provided 
the hitherto most complete description of hd’s nosology 
in 1872, and for quite some time the disease was known 
as Huntington’s chorea. It is difficult to find comparisons 
for the condition in light of its symptomatology. This 
includes multiple motor, neural, and behavioral changes 
that manifest over the years, with unpredictable highs 
and lows. People typically present symptoms between 
4 The first long-term studies subsequent to the test’s uptake have 
shown that something of a “genetic gray area” exists, albeit a very 
slim one. See Nayana Lahiri, “The Genetic ‘Gray Area’ of Hunting-
ton’s Disease: What Does It All Mean?” HD Buzz, April 22, 2011, 
http://en.hdbuzz.net/027, and Regine Kollek and Thomas Lemke, 
Der medizinische Blick in die Zukunft. Gesellschaftliche Implikationen 
prädiktiver Gentests (New York: Campus Verlag, 2008). In addition, 
“neurodegenerative” is placed in scare quotes because, after inter-
views with persons with the disease as well as their loved ones and 
caregivers, Dingdingdong holds that patients do not experience a 
strictly linear decline but rather a zigzagging progression.
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the ages of thirty and fifty. Involuntary and sporadic 
muscular spasms termed chorea (from choreia, the Greek 
word for dance) along with psychological disturbances 
and various changes in personality tend to signal the in-
sidious onset of a sickness that only death brings to halt. 
While psychoactive medication such as antipsychotics 
and speech and physical therapy offer partial relief for 
individual symptoms, to this day there is no cure nor sta-
bilizing treatment.
Loss of balance, altered and impaired cognition, 
marked difficulties with vocal expression and aggluti-
nation, as well as various psychological challenges from 
depression to psychosis – this harrowing and extensive 
combination of symptoms mean that hd is often regard-
ed as the “most horrible,” the “most monstrous” and “the 
most cruel” of diseases. It was long known as “Saint Vi-
tus’s Dance” and thereby associated with a state of pos-
session.
The hereditary nature of the disease helps to explain 
this tendency towards demonization, which medical 
practitioners have been known to relay. In point of fact, 
potential hd carriers – so-called “at-risk persons” – can 
observe among family members what they inevitably 
perceive to be heralds or omens of what, for them, is com-
ing. Such is how most persons at risk of developing Hun-
tington’s disease live: well before undertaking their own 
diagnostic or therapeutic treatment, they already live 
with the sickness in various guises through one or more 
loved ones. They live with medicine’s varying degree of 
powerlessness towards them. They regard themselves as 
witnesses of their own future, of their own suffering and 
death, well before they themselves fall ill. Huntington’s 
disease accompanies entire families across generations 
and often leaves the impression – from within as well as 
without – that these families are truly cursed. This dis-
ease therefore plays a significant part in forging the iden-
tity of afflicted families, often taking the form of a taboo 
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with sinister and insistent powers that incontrovertibly 
reveal themselves in the symptoms of parents and grand-
parents, brothers and sisters, aunts, uncles, and cousins. 
All too often, Huntington’s disease is a well-kept family 
secret: it is unspeakable and must go untouched yet it re-
lentlessly pushes its way to the surface and stakes a claim 
to the realm of the visible and the perceptible. It should 
now be apparent that the predictive diagnosis of hd runs 
the risk, because of what it is and what it does, of repli-
cating an existing curse. For this very reason, it requires 
truly careful consideration.
A New Kind of Foreknowledge
Beyond the confines of the molecular biology laboratory 
where facts are made, genetic testing’s technical simplic-
ity meets with a correspondingly complex and troubling 
situation. The very possibility of knowing the future 
calls forth a cascade of questions, which have bearing for 
those directly concerned as well as the physicians, social 
workers, psychotherapists, ethicists, and other actors in-
volved in some capacity with the process leading up to 
the test. One set of questions relates to conditions of ac-
cess. Another concerns how to appropriately handle the 
announcement of a diagnosis, namely the moment in 
which laboratory information becomes subject to trans-
lation within the clinical relationship that binds patient 
to practitioner. hd’s particular genetic and clinical con-
figuration lends a heightened sensitivity to questions 
over the manifold possible and feared effects of such 
translation. Indeed, because of the radical ways in which 
hd brings ethics, morality, family, politics, and the law 
into question,5 physicians and geneticists along with so-
5 Huntington’s disease is one of the only late-onset diseases for which 
early detection is available, although this does not constitute a form 
of “screening,” strictly speaking, given the ongoing lack of curative 
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ciologists, psychologists, bioethicists, and public health 
experts have long pointed and no doubt will continue to 
point to the condition as an exemplary case.
The exact identification of the gene responsible for 
Huntington’s inaugurated the possibility of a direct ge-
netic test for the monogenic disease in 1993, thanks to 
the work of an international consortium of scientists 
who located the gene on the fourth chromosome’s short 
arm. They discovered that greater than thirty-six repeats 
of the cag triplet that encodes the amino acid glutamine 
is an indication of the mutation’s presence and thus hd’s 
future expression at the level of the organism. As its 
name implies, an indirect genetic test came before the 
“direct” one. Preceding the latter by a decade, the former 
followed from the discovery of a marker “coupled with 
the Huntington’s gene.”6 This allowed genetics to “deter-
mine the status of at-risk persons with a high degree of 
probability.”7 However, conducting this indirect form of 
predictive genetic testing required genetic material be-
yond that of the individual at-risk person querying their 
genetic status. Until the gene’s precise location in 1993, 
this earlier form of linkage-testing was only possible 
when cross-generational analysis and comparison within 
the same family could establish whether a person inher-
ited the allele acting as bearer of the genetic marker from 
one parent or another.
As such, the indirect genetic test was only practicable 
in a limited number of cases because its subject’s family 
treatment. The condition remains a source of significant social stig-
ma; following their doctors’ advice, persons who learn of their “posi-
tive” status adopt strategies of secrecy, if only to protect themselves 
and their families against the haunting administrative and financial 
consequences of disclosure.
6 Thomas Lemke, Veranlagung und Verantwortung. Genetische Diagnostik 
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needed to be large enough to furnish the necessary ge-
netic material. Hence, the task’s complexity came to be 
directly correlated with its effects upon and among the 
families it came to involve. This prior form of testing ac-
cordingly highlights the critical function played by fami-
ly in Huntington’s disease, so much so that the condition 
is often fundamental to the identity of those involved 
– albeit negatively – and distinctively connects them 
to the rest of their kin. It should come as no surprise, 
therefore, that family also played a crucial role within 
medicine in distinguishing hd from other diseases. At 
the age of twenty-one George Huntington wrote “On 
Chorea,” an article distinguishing hd from other forms 
of developmental and infectious chorea, referring to it 
as “hereditary chorea.” It was only possible for him to do 
so, however, because he was in possession of reliable data 
drawn from across multiple generations of sick people in 
his town. In fact, both his grandfather Abel Huntington 
and then his father George Lee Huntington had served as 
the local doctor before him. It can be assumed that their 
experiences fed into George’s careful study and analysis 
of the symptoms and modalities of transmission linked 
to what was then known as “Saint Vitus’s Dance” or sim-
ply “that disorder.”8 Because he was able to access medi-
cal histories that had been meticulously maintained for 
the same families across multiple generations, the young 
Huntington was in a position to articulate one of the cen-
tral biological rules of heredity for the disease – unaware 
that he was doing so at almost exactly the same time that 
Mendel was undertaking his landmark study of heredity 
on pea plants. The rule would come to be known as “the 
dominant mode”:
8 George Huntington, “On Chorea,” Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clini-
cal Neurosciences 15, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 109–12.
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But if by any chance these children go through life 
without it, the thread is broken and the grandchildren 
and great-grandchildren of the original shakers may 
rest assured that they are free from the disease.9
In 1872, Huntington worried that his description of hered-
itary chorea would not hold “any practical importance” 
for his colleagues and so offered it “merely as a medical 
curiosity, and as such it may have some interest.”10 A cen-
tury later, however, the disease’s heritability would play 
an essential role in genetic research.
At a 1972 conference held in Ohio to mark the cente-
nary of George Huntington’s article, psychiatrist Ramón 
Ávila-Girón showed a short black-and-white film that his 
colleague Americo Negrette had made in a small village 
situated on the banks of Venezuela’s Lake Maracaibo, at-
testing to the high local incidence of hd. Attending this 
session was Nancy Wexler, a young psychologist from a 
family impacted by hd who would later play a decisive 
role in advancing genetic research on the disease. The 
film’s content and dramatic imagery were striking and af-
fecting, but so too was the fact that the high concentra-
tion of hd in this one area made for an almost natural 
laboratory in which to acquire the breadth of material 
needed to understand its functional mechanisms. In-
spired by research using homozygotes (persons receiving 
a given gene from both parents11) to study family anemia 
resulting from inherited high cholesterol, Nancy Wexler 
and her colleagues launched a research project at Lake 
Maracaibo in 1979 in the hope of finding homozygote car-
riers of the hd gene with and through whom to advance 
9 Ibid., 111.
10 Ibid., 112.
11 The history of genetic research is filled with homozygotes; they fea-
ture so heavily because of their precisely calculable risk for heredi-
tary diseases.
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scientific discovery.12 Thanks to the meticulous collection 
of genetic and clinical material at the site, the extend-
ed group of researchers was able to identify the genetic 
marker for hd in the years that followed – the initial hy-
pothesis, it turned out, was a generative one.13
It should be said, however, that although the new in-
direct test became available for use, it tended to produce 
inaccurate and even more frequently “uninformative” 
results – meaning that they were too inconclusive and 
therefore unreliable or uncertain to reveal to at-risk per-
sons. Nancy Wexler, Michael Conneally, David Housman, 
and James Gusella, all members of the team that discov-
ered the marker, insisted this was only the beginning. It 
was to be the beginning of a long journey towards the 
complete understanding of Huntington’s disease, an un-
derstanding they manifestly hoped would play an im-
portant role in the fight against it. Looking back, Carlos 
Novas offers a penetrating analysis of the implications of 
this “journey”:
The journey which they speak about involves the 
search for a potential treatment or cure, a journey 
which may hopefully not only alleviate the suffering 
caused by this disease, but also transform predictive 
genetic testing into a gateway for access to therapeutic 
regimes, and not, as it is at present, a complex technol-
12 The idea for the Venezuelan project came up in the context of the 
Congressional Commission for the Control of Huntington’s and its 
Consequences, which Nancy Wexler continues to lead. She is also 
the president of the Huntington’s Disease Foundation, established 
by her father Milton Wexler.
13 I am weaving this story from the extraordinary retelling provided by 
Alice Wexler, a historian and Nancy’s sister. See Alice Wexler, Map-
ping Fate: A Memoir of Family, Risk, and Genetic Research (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1996). I would also like to warmly thank 




ogy for the management of genetic fate by those who 
are at risk.14
Despite locating the gene for Huntington’s disease in 
1993, the journey was far from over. This was because the 
discovery itself did not bring about any preventative or 
therapeutic solutions.
The genetic research boom of the 1980s and 1990s 
gave new hope to geneticists, physicians, patients, and 
their loved ones. They hoped to take effective control of 
biologically predetermined fate, a fate whose unfolding 
could now be foretold. Yet these hopes remain largely un-
realized to this day, in the case of Huntington’s disease 
and many other quarries of the genetic sciences.15 Ge-
netic knowledge provided and provides but a rudimen-
tary starting point for developing effective therapeutic 
practices. What’s more, even in these early days there 
was hardly a scientific consensus on wishful thinking. 
Consider how, as early as in 1992, Nancy Wexler describes 
the dramatic consequences of the asymmetry between 
genetic knowledge and its inability to produce clinical 
advances:
The natural trajectory of human genome research is 
toward the identification of genes, genes that control 
normal biological functions and genes that create ge-
netic disease or interact with other genes to precipi-
tate hereditary disorders. Genes are being localized 
far more rapidly than treatments are being developed 
for the afflictions they cause, and the human genome 
project will accelerate this trend. The acquisition of 
14 Carlos Novas, Governing “Risky” Genes: Predictive Genetics, Counselling 
Expertise, and the Care of the Self (Boston Spa: British Library Docu-
ment Supply Centre, 2003), 200.
15 Even though today more and more promising fundamental-research 
projects as well as clinical trials, experimenting on the possibilities 
of gene-therapy, are on their way. 
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genetic knowledge is, in short, outpacing the accumu-
lation of therapeutic power – a condition that poses 
special difficulties for genetic knowing.16
To be sure, the detection of disease continues to achieve 
greater breadth, speed, and accuracy. Yet in most cases 
such knowledge hardly ever comes with power, whether 
preventative or therapeutic, directly or indirectly. Wex-
ler’s penetrating insights draw attention to this asym-
metry, which she considers foundational to genetics as a 
field; with the completion of the Human Genome Project 
in 2003, this asymmetry became dramatically obvious to 
the public at large.
Regardless, it is no longer possible to think Hunting-
ton’s disease outside of a world in which such forms of 
knowledge are available and whose mere existence in-
fluences the sickness and those it touches. No sooner 
was the gene located than everything changed. There-
after, any and all at-risk persons have no choice but to 
take a position when it comes to the possibility of predic-
tion, even if they oppose the test and decide they do not 
want to know. By making such a decision they become 
a moral actor – whether they like it or not.17 Hence, not 
only does the test’s mere existence refashion medicine’s 
relationship to hd. It also dis- and reorganizes practices 
of knowledge sharing around risk that families had de-
veloped over generations. While often oblique, gestural, 
and uncertain, such practices gave rise to careful ways of 
16 Nancy Wexler, “Clairvoyance and Caution: Repercussions from the 
Human Genome Project,” in The Code of Codes: Scientific and Social Is-
sues in the Human Genome Project, eds. Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy E. 
Hood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 211–43, at 218. 
Emphasis mine.
17 The work of Lotte Huniche explores this question in depth. See, for 
instance, her “Moral Landscapes and Everyday Life in Families with 
Huntington’s Disease: Aligning Ethnographic Description and Bio-
ethics,” Social Science & Medicine 72, no. 11 (2011): 1810–16.
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experimenting with half-truths about one’s status – and 
even outwitting it. In light of this test, important ques-
tions abound about the right to know and not to know 
and the anonymity of those involved.
In her book Mapping Fate: A Memoir of Family, Risk, and 
Genetic Research, published in 1996, Alice Wexler, historian 
and sister of Nancy, offers a simultaneously fascinating 
and sensitive account of the many upheavals accompany-
ing this new form of knowledge and its attendant person-
al and ethical dilemmas. Like her sister, Alice Wexler has 
first-hand experience of the emotional ordeal (épreuve) 
and the anguish that comes with the status of being a 
person at risk of developing Huntington’s disease. Alice 
and Nancy’s mother began presenting symptoms in the 
1950s and died from the disease in 1978. Hence, like her 
sister, Alice is not writing from a position of neutrality or 
indifference. Instead, she deploys her involvement with 
her subject matter as a convincing method for conduct-
ing historiographical and genealogical research.
Particular passages taken from her journals of the 
time, like those chronicling the period in 1983 when the 
indirect test was being developed, as well as the ensuing 
confusion, are particularly relevant to our current con-
cerns. These passages reveal the extent to which both sis-
ters had awaited this moment with impatience and even 
hope, one at the vanguard of medical research and the 
other from the vantage of historical inquiry. Yet in no less 
striking fashion, they also convey the veritable panic that 
takes hold as soon as such knowledge is at hand: “The im-
mensity of it scares me shitless. The idea of really know-
ing – and what if it is ‘positive’? Or if Nancy is? Once we 
know, there is no going back.”18
So long as the existence of testing remained hypo-
thetical, both sisters were convinced they would want to 
undergo it forthwith. Put directly, they were convinced 
18 Wexler, Mapping Fate, 224.
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they wanted to know. However, the situation was entirely 
different from the moment abstract hope became real op-
tion. Especially as it was now obvious that far, from ad-
dressing the test subject as an isolated individual, such a 
form of knowledge would strike their entire community, 
an inherently violent proposition:
Dad says he’s quite happy with things as they are, he 
could live the rest of his life very content, feeling con-
fident we don’t have the illness. He told Diane (a 60 
Minutes journalist)  “What I have now is joyousness. If 
I knew they were free of the disease, I’d feel ecstasy. It’s 
not that great a gain. But there’s an immense differ-
ence between joy and discovering one of them carried 
the gene. It’s not worth the gamble.” Diane kept asking 
about the value of certainty, the importance of knowl-
edge for its own sake. Nancy says, “Yes, I’ve always be-
lieved in knowledge for its own sake. And it is ironic 
that after working for precisely that, I’m now finding 
it much more complex than I ever thought it would 
be.” Diane:  “Did you think you’d take the test when 
the linkage was discovered?” Nancy:  “Absolutely. Yes. I 
never doubted it. And now I’m not sure.”19
For the Wexlers and other members of the Huntington’s 
community, it turned out that a gulf stretched between 
the abstract idea of a person having the power to know 
some aspect of their future and the concrete possibility 
of accessing this knowledge. In fact, when the test did be-
come available to the public, following organizing efforts 
by Huntington’s associations themselves, only a small 
number of at-risk persons chose to take the opportunity 
19 Ibid., 233. Only very recently, in March 2020, Nancy Wexler has 
revealed that she has indeed inherited the mutation in an inter-
view published by the New York Times. See Denise Grady, “Haunted 




and get tested.20 This large-scale shift away from enthu-
siastic advocacy to limited use demonstrates unambigu-
ously that the existence of the predictive test fundamen-
tally transformed Huntington’s disease.
Testing consisted of a new kind of foreknowledge that 
simultaneously upset existing practices towards hd – 
whether familiar, medical, or ethical – along with the 
social relations held by those involved. Put differently, 
it displaced them. In terms of users’ family relations: 
more or less explicit ways of bringing up the disease 
had evolved over generations; with the advent of this 
new machine for producing foreknowledge, these were 
turned on their head. From a clinical perspective: the 
three-act play of “diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis” 
that normally frames the relationship between patient 
and doctor cannot hold in this new context. The struc-
ture of this play rests upon the assumption that an open-
ended narrative exists, tends towards a positive outcome 
and requires practiced elaboration. There’s the rub. In the 
script provided by predictive testing, when the result is 
unfavorable the future comes to stand in for a narrative 
with no exit. Its outcome is always necessarily negative. 
Furthermore, by thus compromising the foundations of 
the doctor/patient relationship, the existence of the indi-
rect and then direct test displaces medical epistemology 
itself. Finally, in ethical terms, this new kind of medical 
foreknowledge calls for a radical rethinking. As discussed 
later in the book, it demands that at least two of bioeth-
ics’ core premises be examined anew: autonomy and in-
formed consent.
20 While precise statistics remain sorely lacking, it can be said that in 
the course of their lives at most 20 per cent of at-risk persons decide 
to undergo the procedures required for conducting the test, and that 
only a fraction of this group then follows through to complete the 
test. See Novas, Governing “Risky” Genes, and Nikolas Rose and Car-
los Novas, “Genetic Risk and the Birth of the Somatic Individual,” 
Economy and Society 29, no. 4 (2000): 485–513.
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Testing before Testing
Two fields emerged in the 1950s and ’60s that would un-
lock a better understanding of Huntington’s disease: neu-
roscience and molecular biology, following Watson and 
Crick’s elaboration of the double helix structure of dna 
in 1953. Both soon underwent spectacular development. 
The first center for neurobiology was established at Har-
vard in 1966, followed by the Society for Neuroscience in 
1968. These burgeoning institutions and networks fos-
tered a promising new angle of research into neurotrans-
mitters. Neurotransmitters are chemical substances such 
as dopamine, serotonin, and endorphins sent from one 
nerve cell to another. Evidence began to show that, de-
pending on their quantity and quality, they could accel-
erate or block intercellular electrical messaging.
During this period, research into the neurotransmit-
ters involved in Parkinson’s disease demonstrated that 
when the condition developed in patients their brains 
concurrently displayed a fall in dopamine release. Be-
cause dopamine is an excitatory neurotransmitter its 
absence would account for a range of Parkinson’s symp-
toms including shaking, rigidity, and difficulty initiating 
movement. Simply replacing patients’ lack of dopamine 
by way of synthetic dopamine injections proved inef-
fective. Evidently, the chemical substance was unable to 
cross the blood-brain barrier. However, an intermediary 
dopamine substance that would come to be known as 
L-Dopa proved to be an effective substitute as the body 
would convert it into dopamine that the brain could then 
metabolize: 
If the L-dopa is administered in high enough doses, 
it can lead to a dramatic reduction of the symptoms. 
From a catastrophic illness that is seriously debilitat-
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ing and often fatal, Parkinson’s became an illness that 
can be partially controlled, even if it cannot be cured.21
Neurologists then discovered that when they treated 
Parkinson’s patients with too high a dose of L-Dopa they 
tended to present symptoms akin to those experienced by 
Huntington’s patients.22 Consequently, dopamine inhibi-
tors gave some measure of control over hd’s motor symp-
toms. As for whether Huntington’s patients produced too 
much dopamine or were hypersensitive to it, the jury was 
out. Brain autopsies of deceased patients gave no indi-
cation that dopamine levels were higher than those of 
neurologically healthy individuals. Regardless, the clini-
cal configuration mediating neurologists’ simultaneous 
encounter with Parkinson’s and Huntington’s diseases 
gave rise to the idea that the two conditions shared a 
symmetrical relationship.
This inverse symmetry then prompted the hypoth-
esis that would lead to hd’s very first experimental pre-
dictive test (not to be mistaken for the aforementioned 
and largely forgotten indirect genetic linkage test). Put 
simply: “administering L-dopa to people at risk for Hun-
tington’s might produce chorea-like symptoms in those 
who actually carried the gene.”23 At the start of the 1970s, 
neurologists André Barbeau and Harold L. Klawans inves-
tigated this hypothesis in an experiment involving thirty 
persons at risk of but not yet manifesting hd symptoms 
and a control group of twenty-four persons who were 
not at risk. During the experiment, all subjects received 
high doses of L-Dopa. The result was that a third of at-
risk subjects developed transitory symptoms of chorea, 
21 Wexler, Mapping Fate, 28.
22 L-Dopa is the same substance that produced effects on patients suf-
fering from “sleeping sickness” in the late 1960s, as Oliver Sacks re-
counts in the fascinating book Awakenings (New York: Harper Peren-
nial, 1990).
23 Wexler, Mapping Fate, 99
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while none of the control group did. Later in the decade, 
more limited experiments on the effects of L-Dopa were 
conducted on homozygotes (children with both parents 
from Huntington’s families).
Barbeau and Klawans’s experiment merits discussion 
in light of the debate surrounding its results published in 
the British Journal of Medicine in 1972. This debate was not 
just integral to the historical milieu in which the indirect 
genetic test emerged in 1983. In addition, the arguments 
dominating these discussions, along with the assump-
tions and value judgments they carry, were able to cast 
fresh light on the Guidelines for the Molecular Genetics Pre-
dictive Test in Huntington’s Disease, whose first version was 
published in 1990.
By June of 1973, the Hastings Center Report published 
Michael Hemphill’s response to the published results of 
Barbeau and Klawans’s experiment in an article titled 
“Pretesting for Huntington’s Disease: An Overview.”24 
Hemphill began with criticism of perceived inaccura-
cies in the protocols used to convey experimental results 
to at-risk persons involved. When the L-Dopa triggered 
choreic movements “were [patients] told the disease was 
now inevitable?” And conversely, that they were “off the 
hook” when it didn’t?25 The centerpiece of the article is 
a list of arguments for and against the general availabil-
ity of an invasive, predictive test derived from L-Dopa. 
In brief, the three arguments for the test – which he as-
sumes his peers share – are as follows: first, if everyone 
who tested “positive” did not reproduce or were [“con-
strained from doing so”], the disease would only occur 
as the result of a novel and exceedingly rare mutation. 
Second, at-risk persons should not have to live with ei-
ther false hope or uncertainty any longer than necessary. 
24 Michael Hemphill, “Pretesting for Huntington’s Disease: An Over-




And third, “for ethicists” he remarks, placing himself at 
a remove from what is to come, “such knowledge would 
be regarded as good per se because it increases the car-
rier’s humanity. An analogy to the state of lost innocence 
could be made – where one could previously act without 
full knowledge of the consequences and thus avoid re-
sponsibility, one is now given the necessary knowledge to 
act responsibly. Thus to some to be fully human is to be 
responsible in this sense.”26
Hemphill then lists counterarguments. First, diagno-
sis can be justified in cases where effective therapy or 
prophylaxis is available – which is not the case for Hun-
tington’s disease. In such a view, knowing or not know-
ing makes no difference to reality. Second, the test is 
questionable in that it provides patients with premature 
knowledge of their symptoms at the level of inner experi-
ence. Third, confusion surrounds the psychological mo-
tivations of those opting for the test. Finally, test results 
may prompt obstacles for obtaining medical insurance as 
well as access to education and employment. Hemphill 
ends by calling for careful scrutiny of the implications 
of predictive testing for Huntington’s prior to making it 
generally available. In his view, it is reasonable to worry 
that people will ask for the test in order to learn they have 
been spared and will be unable to cope with the opposite 
outcome: “ultimately, the question is one of minimizing 
suffering in a situation with very few alternatives to suf-
fering. Our responsibility for the ethical issues at hand 
is to ensure that all the parameters for decision-making 
are explored and that human sensitivity is not blunted 
by our concern to assimilate data or diagnose disease.”27
A few months later, in the September issue of the Hast-
ings Center Report, Frank R. Freemon published a reply to 
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[Hemphill’s] rejection of early diagnosis and prognosis 
damns much of modern medicine.”28 Freemon contends 
that rejecting Barbeau & Klawans’s experiment because 
of the ethical and psychological issues it brings to light 
is a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
By extension, entire areas of modern medical practice 
would be null and void for walking the very same ethical 
tightrope. This he simply cannot abide. Furthermore, he 
argues, Hemphill takes a widely held but mistaken view 
of medicine that overemphasizes its therapeutic role. He 
counters with the following: “[A]ctually the doctor’s role 
as a counselor is just as important as his role as pharma-
cologist or surgeon. Accurate and early diagnosis is im-
portant because then we can give accurate prognosis.”29 
The reader quickly learns, however, that in Freemon’s 
view such a “counseling” capacity does not refer to a 
mutually beneficial exchange of insights among doctor 
and patient, but rather to a one-way street in which the 
doctor lectures the patient on what’s what. According 
to him, unwitting patients and their loved ones, ill-in-
formed by rumor and word of mouth, are “sometimes so 
terrified of the unknowns of the illness as to be virtually 
paralyzed with hysteria” and so need to be reassured if 
not hushed by doctors bearing prognoses that neither 
minimize nor dramatize the situation but offer up its 
objective assessment. According to Freemon, the doctor 
achieves this by, among other things, “always holding out 
a ray of hope, usually based on future research.”30 Staking 
your hopes on an uncertain future sits in stark contrast 
to ideas about self-determination or today’s notions of 
“empowerment,” wherein patients are capable of activity 
and activation through forms of collective commitment 
28 Frank R. Freemon, “Pretesting for Huntington’s Disease: Another 





to building strategies and tactics for living as well as pos-
sible with a diagnosed disease.
In effect, hope such as this sets up a strict separation 
between ignorant patients and knowledgeable doctors 
who can heal them, at least in theory. In so doing, the 
author perpetuates understandings of medicine and re-
search as the only way of knowing disease. He never con-
siders the possibility that sickness could be the result of 
a co-constructed and experimental exploration, forged 
from tips and techniques shared by doctors and patients 
alike, an exploration that can itself bring relief to the 
sick person. Far from it, the doctor’s first responsibility 
according to Freemon is protecting their patients from 
the dangers of a “naïve” attitude: “an understanding and 
frank discussion allows the patient and his family to pre-
pare for the future, to stop the endless rounds of special-
ist after specialist, and to minimize the patient’s natural 
tendency to squander his resources on faith healers and 
charlatans.”31 Real hope should be placed in true science, 
even if its results don’t quite yet exist. Only true science 
is authorized to heal for the “right reasons.” The second 
part of this book will turn to the substantive genealogy 
of this proposition.
Well before 1983, debate over the possibility of a pre-
dictive test for Huntington’s was underway. It presents 
two other striking features: enduring and ongoing de-
pictions of the disease as a horror story, and frequently 
explicit recourse to eugenic arguments. Hemphill, for 
instance, writes that “in the late stages of dementia the 
patient presents the pitiful picture of the complete ruin 
of a human being.”32 While painting the horror in sub-
tler hues, S. Thomas channels eugenicist ideology to even 
more devastating results in a 1982 article published in the 
British Medical Journal. He writes:
31 Ibid.
32 Hemphill, “Pretesting for Huntington’s Disease,” 12.
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The distress and inefficiency of those counseled in the 
first stages of their illness make some of them inca-
pable of using effective measures of birth control. On 
this view, as on the view that the urge and determina-
tion to procreate in the face of the possibility of the 
disease is almost a prodromal symptom of the disease 
itself, any reduction in family size as a result of coun-
seling is likely to come preferentially from those who 
do not have the mutant gene.33
Not content to depict persons with hd as deeply irra-
tional and lacking judgment, he charges them with a 
pathological urge to reproduce. He pinpoints this urge 
within a liminal phase of the condition lying between 
presymptomatic status and symptomatic onset. During 
this “prodromal” phase, patients are typically considered 
quite capable of good judgment. And of course, this argu-
ment only holds to the extent that “reduction in family 
size” – a sophisticated turn of phrase that obfuscates a 
fundamentally eugenic position – has been agreed upon 
as a moral norm. To be sure, the need for such a reduction 
comes across as especially convincing when Hunting-
ton’s disease is simply, simultaneously, and unequivocally 
demonized. At the time such views, albeit implicitly eu-
genic for all intents and purposes, were evidently accept-
able, at least when it came to hd, as reflected in these 
recommendations from Husquinet, Franck, and Vranckx 
concerning L-Dopa experiments on monozygotic twins 
published in 1973:
We would add that a prediction test is useful only 
for those who have to choose between marriage and 
celibacy, procreation or interruption of the line of de-
scendants, since no preventive medical treatment can 
33 S. Thomas, “Ethics of a Predictive Test for Huntington’s Chorea,” 
British Medical Journal 284, no. 6326 (May 1982): 1383–85.
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yet be recommended to potential choreic individuals. 
Bearing this in mind, application of the test to a 50 
year old woman seems useless.34
Guidelines
But prophetic speech announces an impossible future, or makes the 
future it announces, because it announces it, something impos-
sible, a future one would not know how to live and that must upset 
all the sure givens of existence. When speech becomes prophetic, it 
is not the future that is given, it is the present that is taken away, 
and with it any possibility of a firm, stable, lasting presence. 
– Maurice Blanchot35
In 1983, before completion of the first phase of research 
into the genetic marker for Huntington’s disease, debate 
surrounded the possible risks and consequences flowing 
from wider availability of a predictive test for the condi-
tion. The advent of indirect genetic testing as a real pos-
sibility launched a phase of more or less (un)controlled 
use in the shape of clinical studies aimed at assessing the 
test’s reliability. The resulting situation soon led doctors 
and representatives of the Huntington’s community to 
the conclusion that recommendations for the use of test-
ing were needed. The initial version of these collectively 
designed recommendations appeared in 1990, published 
in quick succession in the Journal of Medical Genetics and 
Neurology.36 They were re-edited with minor revisions in 
34 H. Husquinet, G. Franck, and C. Vranckx, “Detection of Future Cases 
of Huntington’s Chorea by the L-dopa Load Test: Experiment with 
Two Monozygotic Twins,” Advances in Neurology 1 (1973): 301–10.
35 Maurice Blanchot, The Book to Come, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 79.
36 “Ethical Issues Policy Statement on Huntington’s Disease Molecular 
Genetics Predictive Test,” Journal of the Neurological Sciences 94, nos. 
1–3 (1989): 327–32, and Journal of Medical Genetics 27, no. 7 (1990): 34–
38.
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1994, in response to the arrival of the direct test.37 The 
decision to formalize such recommendations was made 
during conferences of the International Huntington As-
sociation and the World Federation of Neurology in the 
French city of Lille in 1985; the first version was tabled 
four years later in Vancouver in July 1989. The “Guidelines 
for the Molecular Genetics Predictive Test in Hunting-
ton’s Disease” were intended to provide “recommenda-
tions concerning the use of a predictive test for the early 
detection of Huntington’s disease”38 As signaled in the 
introduction in 1990, they aimed at establishing “real-
istic, ethical principles based on current knowledge and 
techniques in molecular genetics” in order to “govern the 
application of the predictive test” and “protect at risk 
subjects.”39 The first revision in 1994 added a new item: 
“the guidelines are also intended to assist clinicians, ge-
neticists, and ethics committees as well as lay organiza-
tions [i.e., user groups] to resolve difficulties arising from 
the application of the test.”40 Considering that the L-Do-
pa testing debate had set the stage, it follows that, above 
all, the guidelines also endeavored to limit the damage 
caused by a discursive milieu dominated by eugenic ide-
ology.
The “Guidelines” are divided into nine sections each 
containing their own sub-sections, with the document 
split into two columns, recommendations on the left and 
related comments on the right. Aside from adjustments 
37 “Guidelines for the Molecular Genetics Predictive Test in Hunting-
ton’s Disease,” Neurology 44, no. 8 (1994): 1533–36, and Journal of Medi-
cal Genetics 31, no. 7 (1994): 555–59. An updated version published in 
2013 did not introduce any major changes. See “Recommendations 
for the Predictive Genetic Test in Huntington’s Disease,̦” Clinical Ge-
netics 83, no. 3 (2013): 221–31.
38 “Ethical Issues Policy Statement on Huntington’s Disease Molecular 
Genetics Predictive Test,” Journal of Medical Genetics, 34.
39 Ibid.
40 “Guidelines for the Molecular Genetics Predictive Test in Hunting-
ton’s Disease,” Journal of Medical Genetics, 555.
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to the order of the text and new data regarding the dis-
covery of the exact location of the Huntington’s gene, the 
language remains more or less consistent in all versions.41 
In particular, the guidelines give a precise definition of 
who testing is available for, and when and under what 
conditions. They also suggest a set of roles and functions 
that should arise in the overall course of testing, in other 
words, before, during, and after the genetic test itself. 
The first recommendation is short: “All persons who may 
wish to take the test should be given up to date, relevant 
information so that they can make an informed, volun-
tary decision” (555). The second one stipulates that “[t]he 
decision to take the test is the sole choice of the person 
concerned” (ibid.) and that only those having reached 
the age of majority have the right to take the test – with 
the exception of prenatal testing. Hence, from the outset 
the authors draw upon the principles of patient auton-
omy, the right to know (or not to know), and informed 
consent, all fundamental to the ethics of medicine as it 
emerged in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. 
They also elevate another principle: “Persons should not 
be discriminated against in any way as a result of ge-
netic testing for Huntington’s disease” (556). A further 
recommendation calls for specially trained “counselors” 
to accompany persons throughout the testing process. 
They are to be fully-fledged members of multidiscipli-
nary teams that include geneticists, neurologists, social 
workers, psychiatrists, and specialists in medical ethics. 
In addition to these roles, at-risk persons have the op-
tion of nominating a “companion” to accompany them 
throughout all stages of the process. Sections three and 
four describe the counselor’s role within this constella-
tion of actors. “The counselling unit should plan with 
41 Hereafter, I will refer to the 1994 version, which is used to this day, 
as printed in the Journal of Medical Genetics. Page references are given 
between parentheses in the main text.
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the participant a follow up protocol which provides for 
support during the pre- and post-test stages, whether 
or not a person chooses a companion” (ibid.). Moreover, 
the counselor is responsible for recommending the par-
ticipant touch base with a local Huntington’s association 
and for explaining, in concert with the medical team, the 
technical aspects of the test as well as the ongoing lack of 
either prevention or cure for the disease. There is explicit 
language indicating that this discussion must include 
“information on alternatives the applicant can adopt,” 
such as the possibility “[n]ot to take the test for the time 
being” (558). Sections six and seven are less relevant to 
the present analysis; they cover the possible need for pre-
liminary neurological testing along with pre-natal diag-
nosis. Section eight, however, is significant. Under the 
heading “The Test and Delivery of Results” (559) it stipu-
lates that prospective test participants must heed a mini-
mum waiting period of one month between initial con-
sultation and the decision to take the test. It also insists 
that once participants undertake the test, they must re-
ceive the results as soon as possible at a time set up in ad-
vance: “The manner in which the results will be delivered 
should be discussed between the counselling team and 
the person” (559). Finally, the ninth section states that 
in the post-testing period, the counselor should keep in 
regular contact with the test participant for a minimum 
of one month. During this time, lay organizations should 
also expect to play an important role.
Hence, the “Guidelines” are a response to the many 
psychological, generational, ethical, economic, and 
public health questions brought about by the existence 
of predictive testing for hd. To this day, at least in the 
United States and in Europe, they continue to provide a 
common orientation for the clinical organization of test-
ing procedures. Nonetheless, exactly how they are ap-
plied in concrete terms, within a variety of institutions 
and across different health systems, depends on a whole 
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set of parameters. The most decisive of these is the ques-
tion of who takes on which of the roles designated in 
the guidelines – particularly that of the counselor – not 
simply at the level of the individual but also at the level 
of their disciplinary affiliation. Much like the staging of 
a play, interpretation therefore varies from country to 
country and institution to institution.
In a French clinic in the mid-2000s, Alice Rivières 
found herself exposed to a performance of the guide-
lines that was truly devastating, as clearly rendered in 
her Manifesto. It was as if the whole process was stuck 
in a routine. Among the multidisciplinary team, the 
psychologist appointed to the role of the counselor ap-
peared to be there not to offer support but provide an as-
sessment based on strict criteria of whether Alice would 
be able to receive a potentially adverse test result:42 “[the 
psychologist responds] that I appear quite unemotional, 
that I should let my feelings out.”43 Along with the rest 
of the multidisciplinary team, Alice ends up dealing with 
throughout the process, the psychologist conveys the fol-
lowing sense to her:
It feels like a driving test: I have to prove who I am, 
they have to think I’m strong enough to quell their 
fears that I’ll kill myself because of them, yet I also 
have to appear upset enough not to come across as 
emotionally shut down. It’s a tricky line to walk, but 
I end up pulling it off and they allow me to get my re-
sults two months after the start of the testing process, 
the hallmark of a successful applicant. They draw two 
42 This kind of assessment largely serves to allow medicine to insure 
itself against its own transformative power. In such circumstances, 
the object of assessment is above all the likelihood that the person 
seeking to know their genetic status could commit suicide.
43 Rivières, “The Dingdingdong Manifesto,” 25.
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vials of blood, because the results have to be double-
checked by two different labs.44
On the day she learns of the result, she does not go alone 
but rather, as advised, accompanied by her two closest 
friends. Her account of this day speaks volumes: the neu-
rologist
delivers the sentence as my cag number (cag stands 
for Cytosine-Adenine-Guanine. More than 36 repeats 
of this glutamine on the 4th chromosome indicate the 
presence of the gene responsible for Huntington’s dis-
ease): 44. No need for a second opinion. […] She then 
turns to [Alice’s friend] Emmanuelle and tells her how 
dreadful it will be for family and friends, and that she 
needs to quickly start getting help herself. Not content 
with cursing me, she dunks my friends in her pox as 
well.45
What emerges from Alice’s retelling is that the real injury 
does not stem from the sole reference to a CAG count of 
44, and thus the unequivocal fact that she bears the mu-
tation, inherited from her mother, herself at an advanced 
stage of the disease, which she inherited from her father, 
who inherited it from his mother, and so on. Rather, the 
violence prominently resides in the gestures and sen-
tences surrounding this information. The doctor turns 
away from her to turn toward the friend accompanying 
her, in order to inform her of the unbearable nature of 
the coming situation, for Alice along with all of her loved 
ones. The veritable curse is not – or at least not exclu-
sively – to be found in the fact that Alice inherited the 
“bad” gene, but rather in the fact that next to this defini-





define or prescribe in equally absolute terms exactly how 
this legacy will come to pass. The future has already hap-
pened. The gene’s effects will simply be destructive and 
catastrophic. They will diminish her little by little. There 
is nothing that can be done about this because at the end 
of the day, at least for now, there is no treatment avail-
able for Huntington’s patients. The radical and ravag-
ing violence of this situation of diagnostic and predic-
tive prophesying is contained in the utterance of a total 
inability to act: “The test is a destiny-making machine. 
Going through with it means witnessing the radical and 
immediate transformation of your inner truth, that con-
stantly quivering kaleidoscope, into the simple truth of 
a medical definition.”46 Diagnostic situations like this 
one, at least when they are conducted in this way, effec-
tively give those involved the idea that when the result is 
“positive,” there’s only one thing left to do: wait for the 
beginning of the end. Instead of uncertainty or a puzzle 
needing to be worked through together, the only thing 
on the table is acceptance in the face of certain disaster. 
Well before the first signs of any symptoms emerge, the 
person now tested becomes a patient in a literal sense, a 
suffering person who can only wait in patience.
To be sure, this particular story of diagnosis and its 
fateful character cannot be generalized. It does, how-
ever, highlight the danger of transforming international 
recommendations into institutionally reified routines, 
which is to say, into processes that are neither up for dis-
cussion nor negotiation by their very participants. What 
is in danger, properly speaking, is the truth of a disease 
and its diagnosis alongside the ability of people to func-
tion psychosocially, the very same people said to enjoy 
autonomy, informed consent and the right to know. The 
tragedy of the process, as Alice Rivières recounts it and 
which culminates in the disclosure of the result, lies in 
46 Ibid., 28.
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how, once endless, the many forms a life can get win-
nowed down to a single one. Moreover, the form that life 
then takes is a cruel and hopeless one; it becomes binding 
and nobody can influence it in any way – not the doc-
tor, not the tested person and not their loved ones. This 
kind of medical truth, bearing no therapeutic knowledge 
and yet presenting itself as the sole legitimate author-
ity over disease, is freighted with a particular kind of vio-
lence. This violence, says Alice, stems from the fact that, 
in spite of its own inability to act, medicine claims the 
authority to crush any and all other possible truths.
Alice’s story places us before a distinctly problematic 
situation. While inviting rigorous and in-depth analysis, 
this situation throws up an initial temptation to rush to 
judgment and unreservedly denounce the medical estab-
lishment, its associated disciplines, and their practition-
ers. The real challenge this situation and others like it 
raise is, I submit, to go one step further and interrogate 
the propositional potential of conceptual, historical, and 
empirical research itself. To put things somewhat more 
modestly: can we interrogate the resources such research 
provides for moving past a standstill, for learning not to 
complain about difficult and unbearable situations but 
to take them as a starting point for constructing well-
articulated problems? If so, what does a “well-articulated 
problem” look like, and what kind of problematization 







A New Species Called the Test;  
Or, How to Construct a Problem
Oh, Frankenstein, be not equitable to every other, and trample 
upon me alone, to whom thy justice, and even thy clemency and 
affection, is most due. Remember that I am thy creature; I ought to 
be thy Adam; but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest 
from joy for no misdeed. […] You, my creator, abhor me; what hope 
can I gather from your fellow-creatures, who owe me nothing?
–Mary Shelley1
“A problem does not exist, apart from its solutions. Far 
from disappearing in this overlay, however, it insists and 
persists in these solutions. A problem is determined at 
the same time as it is solved,” writes Deleuze drawing 
on the philosophy of Henri Bergson.2 Problem and solu-
tion coexist according to this logic, even though the one 
does not envelop the other and cannot be reduced to it 
either. “[The problem’s] determination is not the same as 
its solution: the two elements differ in kind, the deter-
1 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (Boston: Sever, 
Francis, & Co., 1869), 78–79.
2 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London 
and New York: Continuum, 1994), 163.
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mination amounting to the genesis of the concomitant 
solution.”3 Taking Deleuze’s proposition seriously, it fol-
lows that there is no such thing as a problem without 
a solution. In other words, a problem only warrants the 
name “problem” when it is well constructed, which is to 
say, constructed with a view to a solution. When a prob-
lem can exist beyond solution, he refers to it, following 
Bergson, as a “false problem.” Bergson and Deleuze both 
insist that the role of philosophy is not to suffer (subir) 
a problem “as it is posited by language.”4 For, as Bergson 
puts it, if philosophy was, in truth, nothing other than 
the repetition of predetermined problems then it would 
be
condemned in advance to receive a ready-made solu-
tion or, at best, simply to choose between the two or 
three only possible solutions, which are co-eternal to 
this positing of the problem. One might just as well 
say that all truth is already virtually known […] and 
that philosophy is a jigsaw puzzle where the task is to 
construct with the pieces society gives us the design 
it is unwilling to show us. One might just as well as-
sign to the philosopher the role and the attitude of the 
schoolboy, who seeks the solution persuaded that if he 
had the boldness to risk a glance at the master’s book, 
he would find it there, set down opposite the question. 
But the truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere 
it is a question of finding the problem and conse-
quently of positing it, even more than of solving it.5
Bergson and Deleuze therefore enjoin us to trust in the 
capacity of thought – not so much to respond to prob-
3 Ibid.
4 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, 




lems existing prior to it, but to participate in producing 
new possibles, insofar as constructing good problems 
shifts and revitalizes reality. Consequently, no matter 
how difficult and unbearable it may be, a situation is no 
more a problem than a question is. Indeed, when positing 
a question or confronting a situation, we depend entirely 
upon reality as it presents itself to us. To move beyond 
the question/situation as given, and beyond its mere cri-
tique as well, and to shift into an active force with which 
we might intervene into reality, it will not do to simply 
glance at the master’s book – for there is no answer sheet 
drawn up ahead of time. The work of problem construc-
tion can instead be compared with landscape painting, 
the staging of a play, or storytelling; these practices, in 
positioning (posant) various elements, write them into 
relations of inclusion and exclusion or influence and cau-
sality, and thereby compose (composent) newly arranged 
(disposés) spaces in which to act.6
When it comes to Huntington’s disease, it may be that 
medicine focuses on a false problem, a “distressing and 
insoluble”7 problem: incurability. Its primary concern is 
therefore its own inability to act as a curative art towards 
the disease, which is to say, a situation that, for the time 
being at any rate, admits no solution. The falsity of the 
problem results from placing the “curable” in contradis-
tinction to the “incurable.” Medical solutions, according 
to common understanding, must be therapeutic in kind 
or, for chronic diseases, at the very least resemble treat-
ment. When this is lacking, “we work our way backwards 
from one cause to another; if we stop somewhere along 
the way, it is not because our intelligence seeks noth-
ing further beyond, it is because our imagination ends 
6 See Claude de Jonckheere, 83 mots pour penser l’intervention en travail 
social (Geneva: Éditions ies, 2010), 321–24.
7 Bergson, The Creative Mind, 64.
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up averting its gaze, as though from an abyss, to avoid 
dizziness.”8
To help clarify why we must open the imagination and 
our other senses in order to construct an otherwise in-
soluble and dizzying problem/solution well, consider the 
so-called “camel problem.” This story has intrigued many 
thinkers,9 including two of Dingdingdong’s founding 
members, Vinciane Despret and Isabelle Stengers. It is of 
particular pertinence to a disease that centers questions 
of heredity.
Before his death, the desert prince Ali decides to be-
queath his pack of seventeen camels to his three sons. 
But to this inheritance he hitches a riddle: half the be-
quest will go to the eldest, a third to the middle son, and 
a ninth to the youngest. Before saying his final goodbyes, 
Ali makes his sons promise not to kill any of the animals 
and to share them out through strictly peaceful means. 
Ali dies and his sons find themselves faced with an im-
possible division; a struggle over succession seems inevi-
table. The three sons therefore seek out a wise man from 
the neighboring village and ask him for advice. He says 
to them: “I cannot solve the problem. All I can do is give 
you my camel. He is old, skinny, and not very brave, but 
he will help you share out your inheritance.” And so the 
three brothers find themselves with eighteen camels: the 
oldest takes half, or nine of them, the middle son a third, 
or six, and the youngest a ninth, or two – and they return 
the remaining camel to the wise man.
The father left his sons with neither a vast fortune 
nor a simple and humble inheritance; he left them with a 
riddle (énigme). The riddle is not of a strictly mathemati-
8 Ibid. Translation modified.
9 See Pierre Ageron, “Le partage des dix-sept chameaux et autres 
arithmétiques attributes à l’immam ’Alî: Mouvance et circulation de 
récits de la tradition musulmane chiite,” Revue d’histoire des mathéma-




cal nature. It also summons them to think through what 
they can do with what they have been given. They must 
prove themselves worthy of the confidence their father 
placed in them by leaving them with something they 
would have to construct. Only upon doing so will they 
be able to claim their inheritance. Thus, what is at stake 
here is to construct a fertile milieu for the bequest and to 
do so without cheating. The sons do not simply inherit 
seventeen camels, as these are rather the vehicle and the 
outcome of an inheritance that simultaneously – thanks 
to the eighteenth camel – transforms itself into a prob-
lem.10 Hence, they do not pull off this transformation 
all by themselves. When they open up to the wise man, 
when they socialize their complicated situation by con-
fiding in an outside party who can add something to the 
family arrangement, only then are they able to become 
their father’s heirs.
Problems aren’t just out there; they don’t come ready-
made. To the contrary, constructing a problem takes care-
ful and creative work whose outcome – the problem it-
self – bestows all actors implicated or involved with the 
ability to act on it. This is the sense in which a problem’s 
construction and solution always go together. Although 
lacking concrete or defined contours, it is a solution, as it 
were, that orients all work on a problem and secures com-
mitment from those it gathers together.
If effective therapeutic or prophylactic treatments for 
hd had become available at the same time as the genetic 
knowledge behind predictive testing, then some kind of 
balance between medical theory and practice would no 
doubt have been found, as has been the case with multi-
ple sclerosis in recent decades. Yet because of therapeu-
tic non-knowledge in the case of Huntington’s disease, 
10 I am largely indebted to Vinciane Despret for this rereading of the 
riddle. Cf. Our Emotional Makeup: Ethnopsychology and Selfhood, trans. 
Marjolijn de Jager (New York: Other Press, 2004).
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things turned out differently. Rather than just a passing 
phase or a side effect, predictive testing has come to dom-
inate the frame since the 1980s, to the point of becoming 
a force of its own. By 2000, Nancy Wexler came to speak 
of the test with lingering apprehension: “sometimes I ask 
myself what sort of creature we’ve put into the world.”11
Taking heed of Wexler’s choice of words means reck-
oning with predictive testing as a new creature, a being to 
be added to conventional forms of epistemological and 
ethical know-how, one whose presence dares these forms 
of knowledge and practice to transform themselves. As 
when a new, hitherto unknown species appears within a 
biological milieu, involving this creature in the construc-
tion of well-posited problems means adopting an ecolog-
ical perspective. As with ecosystem ecology, an ecology 
of diagnosis is tasked with “questions of process, namely, 
those likely to include disparate terms. Ecology can and 
should, for example, take into account the consequences, 
for a given milieu, of the appearance of a new technical 
practice just as it does for the consequences of climate 
change or the appearance of a new species.”12
In order to approach predictive testing for hd as the 
ecologist would a new species emerging within different 
ecosystems or milieus (the family, clinical practice, eth-
ics), which is to say by taking the measure of the ensu-
ing consequences, the formation of these same milieus 
must first be reconstructed. Such a historical perspective 
helps draw into view the kinds (espèces) of practices and 
concepts that this test-creature displays and displaces. 
11 In interview with Swiss science journalist Reto U. Schneider, first 
published in NZZ-Folio and available here: Reto Schneider, “Wis-
sen ist Ohnmacht,” Die Zeit, October 12, 2000, https://www.zeit.de/ 
2000/42/Wissen_ist_Ohnmacht. Translation and emphasis mine.
12 Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics I, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 33. The following reflec-




It aims at acquiring an understanding of the values and 
modes of evaluation and meaning making of these prac-
tices and concepts, by accounting for the ways in which 
they matter to someone speaking and acting in their 
name. In this sense, thinking through practices ecologi-
cally presents neither the prospect of judgment (ground-
ed in general hypotheses, at a remove from the world of 
facts and values proper to the practice at hand) nor of 
tolerance (wherein “anything goes”). Rather, the ecolo-
gist’s task when considering a given practice is to take its 
requirements and obligations seriously, to recognize its 
value and perhaps even to evaluate it accordingly – not 
on the basis of general ideals of rationality, thereby dis-
missing what counts for the practice itself.
The picture of diagnosis given by Alice Rivières is in-
disputably ruinous; it is tempting to hold medicine alone 
responsible, or more specifically those medical practi-
tioners directly involved. The ecological point of view 
presents the distinct advantage of forcing a moment’s 
pause, producing an interruption, and calling for a clos-
er look in lieu of hastily offered judgment (or blame). It 
dares the critic to approach the creature, treading ever 
so carefully, and to take up the many perspectives of all 
actors present (and of their practices) – namely those for 
whom, in one way or another, the creature matters.
Thus, the creature’s particular, unruly features become 
open to questioning. What is there to it that so disturbs 
otherwise well-honed forms of knowledge and practice? 
What would it take to fabricate a milieu worthy of a diag-
nosis such as this, namely one with the necessary primers 
with which those involved (doctors, caregivers, patients, 
and loved ones) might shift from a position of powerless-
ness to one of active problem construction? How to cul-
tivate an ecology of diagnosis that could place all actors 
involved in situations where they become capable of act-




So begins the search for camels, camels that will contrib-
ute something to the milieu of the creature known as the 
predictive test for hd, something with which to welcome 
it, to learn to love and foster it and, at the same time, 
to tame it. Such camels will have a constructive purpose, 
one that does not amount to damage control, to curbing 
the test’s destructive power once the deed is done and 
the results are in. Instead, it involves reorganizing this 
entity’s milieu with a view to the future.
Where might such creatures be found? They tend to 
be hard to retrieve, dwelling in remote places. In order 
to investigate this unfamiliar field with its many nooks 
and crannies, it will be helpful to anchor the thread of my 
investigation on a strategic pivot, unfurling it behind me 
as I go so as to always remain in a position to return to my 
initial point of departure. I will take the moment Alice 
Rivières learned of her test results as this anchor point, 
taking it to be an exemplary scene whose milieu is made 
from the stuff of modern medicine:
She delivers the sentence as my cag number: 44. No 
need for a second opinion. The number is well above 
the threshold that separates those carrying the disease 
from those who do not. She then turns to Emmanu-
elle and tells her how dreadful it will be for family and 
friends, and that she needs to quickly start getting 
help herself.13
The “pure” genetic information hidden beneath the 
number 44 indicates the following: forty-four repeats of 
the dna sequence are to be found on the small arm of 
Alice’s fourth chromosome and this, to be specific, at the 
location of the gene for Huntington’s disease. Accord-
13 Alice Rivières, “The Dingdingdong Manifesto,” this volume, 27.
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ingly, this means she carries the disease. The three per-
sons present all share this knowledge; it needs no further 
explanation. What happens next, with a simple gesture 
and without shift in register, when the neurologist turns 
away from Alice, towards Emmanuelle, announces that 
things will become unbearable for everyone involved, and 
counsels them to seek help immediately, actually converts 
genetic information about Alice’s status as a carrier into 
an announcement regarding this same status’s coming 
effects. This conflates “44” as genetic information and 
the lived experience of hd’s symptoms, as if these be-
longed to the same order of factual, invariable knowledge 
whereas, in reality, both the onset and experience of hd’s 
symptoms vary widely on a case-by-case basis. Hence the 
bequest being made is neither given nor received as a rid-
dle, as something leaving open the manner and means 
with which those involved are to claim and cultivate it. 
Instead, the number 44 takes the form of a curse presag-
ing cruel consequences.
The distinction between performative and constative 
utterances, owed to the British philosopher and founder 
of speech act theory John L. Austin, is particularly help-
ful for making sense of this situation. In Austin’s view, 
what characterizes a constative utterance is that it names 
something essentially verifiable. Accordingly “when re-
ferring to the future, the statement becomes a progno-
sis. […] By contrast, a performative utterance, although it 
also reports something, is neither verifiable nor tempo-
rally identifiable.”14 In doing something rather than just 
saying something, what defines a performative speech act 
is that “the issuing of the utterance is the performing of 
an action.”15 Performative utterances are neither true nor 
14 Herbert Marks, “Der Geist Samuels. Die biblische Kritik an prognos-
tischer Prophetie,” in Prophetie und Prognostik, eds. Daniel Weidner 
and Stefan Willer (Berlin: Fink, 2013), 99–121. Translation mine.
15 John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1962), 6.
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false but rather successful and unsuccessful, or as Aus-
tin puts it “happy” and “unhappy.”16 Whereas a constative 
speech act accounts for a reality independent of itself, a 
performative speech act does not. No doubt the most well 
known performative is the sentence “I now pronounce 
you husband and wife,” which, when announced by a 
priest or civil servant, is immediately and simultaneous-
ly accompanied by the transformation of its addressees 
into spouses. When it comes to the announcement ad-
dressed to Alice Rivières, a surreptitious confusion takes 
place between these two types of fundamentally distinct 
utterances. In light of this ambiguity, some measure of 
control should obtain over the performative power of 
diagnostic-constative speech that runs the risk, at least 
in the context in question, of becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.
The danger of the power of prophetic speech is per-
haps most plainly revealed in a passage in the Old Testa-
ment. The Book of Jeremiah focuses on the question of 
the difference between true and false prophecy. Jeremiah 
announces to Hananiah that he shall die: “Therefore thus 
says the Lord; Behold I will cast you off the face of the 
earth: this year you shall die.”17 Two months later, Hana-
niah dies. For this reason, writes the comparative litera-
ture scholar Herbert Marks, Jeremiah’s prophecy at first 
appears to be a “prognostic prophecy.”18 Such a prophecy 
reports (constate) something ahead of time, that will hap-
pen no matter what and of which only God’s emissary can 
have foreknowledge:
Upon further consideration, however, it appears that 
what Jeremiah puts on display is less his informed 
knowledge of the future than his linguistic superi-
16 Ibid., 14.
17 New King James Version, Jer 28:16.
18 Marks, “Der Geist Samuels,” 105. Translation mine.
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ority. For it is unclear whether Hananiah would still 
have died had Jeremiah not announced his prophecy. 
[…] The prophecy is already fulfilled in and through 
words that relate to Hananiah personally, words that 
Jeremiah does not so much address to but rather aim 
at Hananiah. Uttering them means immediately en-
acting them.19
For prophets not only speak of the future, evoking that 
which comes ahead (pro), they also speak for (pro) or in 
the name of someone or something, whether a divine 
power or science itself, that authorizes and legitimates 
their speech.
It is possible to decry the manifestly hapless com-
munication skills of the doctor facing Alice Rivières, to 
denounce and to criticize this medical practitioner, and 
thereby explain this diagnostic situation’s failure as a 
matter of personal shortcomings. Instead, I would like 
to offer a symptomatic reading of the situation that at-
tempts, carefully and precisely, to take into account the 
regimes of knowledge and information governing it. The 
gesture of turning away from Alice indicates a shift, or 
at least the potential for a shift, from constative speech 
(“44”) to performative speech. Unlike Jeremiah (who 
knows that he speaks in God’s name and can therefore 
trust in the performative power of his utterance), the 
practitioner is seized by a professional duty to provide 
“objective” information to their interlocutors and so slips 
surreptitiously into the performative register.
The vocational literature written by and for doctors, 
which I have mentioned earlier, confirms the habitual na-
ture of such poor judgment when it comes to distinguish-
ing between registers. From Breaking Bad News to The Dif-
ficult Conversation, these publications all present a blind 
spot that, I submit, stymies the ability of practitioners 
19 Ibid., 107. Translation mine.
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to reflect upon their own practice. Briefly put, it is the 
implicit assumption that the knowledge awaiting com-
munication is made up of fundamentally neutral facts, 
even though these have undeniably value-laden effects. 
This assumption presupposes that diagnosis is appropri-
ately expressed in constative speech acts. Currently con-
tained in guidelines as well as legal and ethical obliga-
tions surrounding informed consent, the patient’s right 
to know follows the same logic. It assumes that doctors 
are in possession of diagnostic knowledge, a quintessen-
tially neutral thing and the objective product of science, 
something that their patients are to receive unaltered, 
accompanied if need be with information about different 
treatment options.20 Of course this does not mean that 
the way in which these facts are communicated makes 
no difference. On the contrary, doctors are required to 
demonstrate empathy, sensitivity, and attentiveness to 
patients when delivering such information. But when it 
comes to dangers haunting this scene other than objec-
tive facts, responsibility falls upon a practitioner’s psyche 
or, to be precise, their psychological aptitude. Medicine 
itself is relieved of these troublesome companions. In 
fact, when diagnoses are viewed as information, which 
is to say as neutral entities, and when they are treated as 
such in practice, then the only appreciable difference lies 
in the individual skill required to communicate them, 
which varies greatly from doctor to doctor. To be sure, 
there is wide recognition today of the need to learn (or 
relearn) a form of closeness with patients or to adopt 
an empathic attitude and approach. Indeed, efforts a re 
made to teach these qualities to medical students, e.g., 
through pedagogical role-playing games. Notwithstand-
20 Such thinking reflects the modern separation of sick person and dis-
ease that physician and philosopher Georges Canguilhem describes 
as the foundational gesture of medicine as a scientific discipline. Cf. 
Writings on Medicine, trans. Stefanos Geroulanos and Todd Meyers 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2012).
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ing these good intentions, to me this seems to be more a 
consolation than a veritable desire to push thinking further, 
as Alice might say, through situated encounters. This will 
no doubt remain so, so long as medicine holds firm to an 
understanding of knowledge borrowed from physics and 
chemistry and continues, moreover, to model itself upon 
them.
In view of this, it is no longer sufficient to attribute to 
psychological ineptitude the way in which Alice’s doctor 
collapses, in one fell swoop, genetic information and its 
attendant terrifying storyline. In light of a range of fea-
tures central to the history of modern medicine and to 
the history of diagnosis, this gesture proves to be riddled 
with a series of assumptions that have become implicit. 
By deciding to analyze and read this scene from an his-
torical perspective, I am in no way seeking to justify or 
downplay the behavior of this particular doctor in this 
particular situation. Rather, I am committed to thinking 
about such behavior as the expression of particular op-
erations foundational to the production of modern medi-
cal knowledge that, having come to pass as natural and 
self-evident, risk vanishing from view.
First Site: Separating the Sick Person from the Disease
“With an efficacy we cannot but appreciate,” writes 
Georges Canguilhem, whose writings on the history of 
medicine orient the coming discussion, “contemporary 
medicine is founded on the progressive dissociation of 
disease and the sick person, seeking to characterize the 
sick person by the disease, rather than identify a disease 
on the basis of the bundle of symptoms spontaneously 
presented by the patient.”21 More specifically, what began 
as a heuristic dissociation of disease and the sick person 
in the name of diagnostic and therapeutic method cul-
21 Ibid., 35. Translation modified.
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minated in an impersonal way of identifying patients. A 
telling expression of this is the manner in which doctors 
readily speak to one another about “the pneumonia case 
in room 12” or “the appendicitis op in the recovery theat-
er.” There is nothing self-evident about this dissociation, 
so how did it come to be? Premodern medicine and its 
attendant conceptualizations of disease addressed sick 
people in their singularity. The symptoms of the latter 
guided the methods of the former – whether diagnos-
tic or therapeutic. In its endeavors to become a science, 
however, modern medicine gradually reorganized itself 
around the central aim of defining, naming, and catego-
rizing diseases as stable entities that, by consequence, 
were relatively independent of the sick person.
When medicine strove to become a science like any 
other, diseases became entities endowed with a life of 
their own and with a relatively independent mode of ex-
istence when it came to the bodies let alone the persons 
they affected. Under these conditions, the universalizing 
claims of medical knowledge gained a foothold. Mean-
while, each patient became a case in the proper sense of 
the word, the grounds for deducing universal truths, spe-
cifically, the objective nature and clinical course of such 
and such a disease – its natural history. Once a disease 
was described as unambiguously and comprehensively as 
could be, its definition meant it could be recognized from 
its symptoms and its signs. Conversely, as new cases gave 
rise to new findings, these definitions could be further 
extended, refined, and sometimes refuted.
Over time and to this day, people within the medical 
field itself have repeatedly spoken out and questioned 
whether medicine is consistent with a model of knowl-
edge production borrowed from physics and chemistry. 
Historian of science Charles Rosenberg explains that in 
1827 the physician John Robertson remarks: “whether a 
nosological arrangement, the fruit of modern pathology, 
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is a hopeless expectation, remains yet to be seen.”22 He 
goes on, “the degree to which diseases are modified by 
constitution, season, climate, and an infinite variety of 
accidental circumstances, renders it at least doubtful.” 
Such a view, however, did gain traction. By according 
lesser significance to the influence of the environment, 
to a disease’s many milieus, or to the singularities of its 
manifestation in a given organism, person, place, and so 
on, medicine staked its success on the pivotal role of ac-
curate and independent etiology and nosology. As early 
as 1804, British doctor Thomas Trotter argued that “the 
name and definition of a disease are perhaps of more im-
portance than is generally thought. They are like a cen-
tral point to which converging rays tend: they direct fu-
ture inquirers how to compare facts, and become, as it 
were, the base on which accumulating knowledge is to 
be heaped.”23
However, composing and ascribing these names and 
definitions could only happen from a base of clear clini-
cal signs, identified as causes, and with corresponding 
diagnostic methods. Directly cast in the image of physi-
cal and chemical experiments, they were meant to be of 
universal value, independent of space and time, of the 
experimental personnel involved, or of doctors and their 
patients. This implied the development of methods and 
technologies that could push doctors’ subjective deter-
minations into the background and limit patients’ in-
sights to mere suggestions, rather than allowing them 
a central role in knowledge-making. Patients were to be 
regarded as objects and doctors were to adopt a distanced 
attitude, like experimenters in a laboratory, earning them 
the credibility owed to the producer of neutral and au-
tonomous facts.
22 Charles E. Rosenberg, Our Present Complaint (Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press: 2007), 17.
23 Cited in ibid.
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Since Galileo’s time, if not before, a distanced attitude 
is constitutive of the modern definition of the irrefutable 
scientific experiment. Indeed, the moment at which the 
experimenter withdraws from the experimental appara-
tus she has designed is a crucial one. This move author-
izes the experiment to become a truthful event. With-
drawal also serves to demonstrate that the experiment’s 
success in no way requires the experimenting person – 
nature must speak for herself.24
As soon as the diagnostic and therapeutic process 
submits to this scientific ideal of neutrality, the doctor 
takes up the role of the experimenter in the strict sense 
of the word. She must therefore make herself as trans-
parent as possible in relation to the object being exam-
ined. Although she may be the one who sets up a par-
ticular knowledge apparatus (by prescribing a drug, for 
instance), she soon withdraws to wait and observe. With 
this same move, the patient is transformed into a piece of 
nature. It is her body that speaks for her, expressing the 
drug’s effects in the form of visualizations generated con-
tinuously by various measuring devices – cardiograms, 
blood pressure readings, and respiratory frequencies.
Instead of the patients and their experiences of suf-
fering, what lies at the center of such an approach are 
the entities that diseases have become, with their own 
functional mechanisms and ways of responding to thera-
peutic alternatives for overcoming them. As Canguilhem 
writes:
Disease refers to medicine rather than to evil. When 
a doctor speaks of Basedow’s disease (that is, of goiter 
exophthalmia), he designates a state of endocrine dys-
function whose presentation of symptoms, etiological 
diagnosis, prognosis, and therapeutic decision making 
24 Cf. Isabelle Stengers, The Invention of Modern Science, trans. Daniel 
Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
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are all supported by a succession of clinical and ex-
perimental studies and laboratory tests, in the course 
of which patients are treated not like subjects of their 
disease, but like objects.25
Initially, the “thingification” Canguilhem raises here 
appears to be some sort of unwanted side effect of an al-
most indisputably effective epistemology. In fact, in lieu 
of speaking of the “thingification” of human subjects, 
with the term’s patently pejorative connotations, a more 
neutral characterization no doubt could apply: patients 
are no longer, strictly speaking, the veritable objects of 
medicine.26 For the methods – and attendant material 
– that enable the production of generalizable facts also 
lead to a greater distance of doctor from patient. These 
methods require less direct contact between the two, and 
so this distance is purely technical at first. The distance 
grew in the second half of the 19th century with the in-
troduction of precision instruments such as stethoscopes 
and thermometers. It stretched further with blood and 
urine tests, microscopy, and the clinical–pathological 
conference, which established systematic correlations 
between the symptoms presented by a sick person dur-
ing their lifetime and the results of pathology or autopsy. 
The clinical–pathological conference “underscored the 
ultimate meaningfulness of discrete disease entities 
and the social centrality of their diagnosis by focusing 
on the connection between clinical signs during life and 
postmortem appearances.”27 From the 1920s onwards, it 
gained further depth with the advent of instruments 
for measuring blood pressure, electrocardiograms and 
electroencephalograms, radiography, then pH measure-
25 Canguilhem, Writings on Medicine, 35.
26 The television drama House offers an illustration of this approach 
taken to its limit.
27 Rosenberg, Our Present Complaint, 18.
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ments, blood counts, and ultimately genetic testing. This 
suite of techniques simply reinforced the separation of 
patient from disease, a separation lucidly analyzed by 
Canguilhem and today seemingly self-evident, repro-
duced anew in case after case. Indeed, these diagnostic 
methods and techniques are founded on the hypothesis 
that the bodily fragment, biopsy, urine sample, blood 
drawing, or visualization of internal organs make disease 
detectable independently of a given organism while rep-
resenting this organism at the same time. “The medical 
act’s scientificity [scientificité] bursts forth with the sym-
bolic substitution of the laboratory exam for the consult-
ing room. Meanwhile, the scale of the representational 
plane of pathological phenomena shifts, from the organ 
to the cell, the cell to the molecule,”28 and then, the mol-
ecule to the gene.
Second Site: Diagnosis, a “Dating” Gesture.
Ever smaller entities refer to disease or draw attention to 
it via their specific states or configuration. They are, how-
ever, only in a position to represent an organism in its 
totality because a mechanistic understanding of disease 
took shape alongside diagnostic methods derived from 
these same entities. This also shapes expectations of di-
agnostic speech from within this medical logic: diagnosis 
becomes an exercise in dating, in marking a patient’s ar-
rival within the timeline of the natural history of a given 
disease.
In premodern times, disease identification relied on 
the individuated presentation of symptoms that there-
fore remained inaccessible and unreliable. “Diseases were 
seen as points in time, transient moments during a pro-
cess that could follow anyone on a variety of possible 
28 Georges Canguilhem, Études d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences con-
cernant les vivants et la vie (Paris: Vrin, 2002), 418. Translation mine.
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trajectories.”29 Towards the end of the 19th century, dis-
eases had become well-defined entities in two respects: 
the relatively thorough identification of their underly-
ing mechanisms and the determination of their clinical 
course. This way of seeing took shape in relation to the 
medical establishment’s growing interest in infectious 
diseases. Thanks to bacteriological advances, notably 
those of Louis Pasteur in France and Robert Koch in Ger-
many, medicine began to effectively counter the func-
tional mechanisms of this kind of disease. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, germ theories consti-
tuted a powerful argument for a reductionist, mech-
anism-oriented way of thinking about the body and 
its felt malfunctions. These theories communicated 
metaphorically the notion of disease entity as an ideal 
type, abstracted from its particular manifestations.30 
Soon this conception came to be a model for other kinds 
of disease. For every disease described well from a no-
sological point of view there corresponded a “natural his-
tory that – from both the physician’s and the patient’s 
perspective – formed a narrative.”31 Accordingly, the ideal 
diagnostic act consisted in dividing the patient up into 
parts with which to then situate her in relation to the 
more or less settled chronology of a particular disease or, 
as it were, in relation to its natural history.
This evolution can also be interpreted as a shift in di-
agnostic attention from symptoms to discrete signs: 
The invention of the stethoscope and its use in auscul-
tation as codified in [Laënnac’s] De l’auscultation medi-
ate of 1819 led to the eclipse of the symptom by the 





sign. A symptom is something presented or offered by 
the patient; a sign, on the other hand, is something 
sought and obtained with the aid of medical instru-
ments. The patient, as the bearer and frequent com-
mentator of symptoms, was “placed in parentheses.” A 
sign could sometimes reveal an illness before a symp-
tom led to its being suspected.32
This early form of predictive diagnostic reconnaissance 
throws into sharp relief the changes that transpired 
within the patient as a person: as an individual, as a per-
son suffering from an illness, the patient’s importance 
is on the wane, at least when it comes to the construc-
tion of medical knowledge and its epistemological status. 
This trend increases when considering the discovery of 
typhus at the turn of the 20th century and with it a new 
kind of patient – the otherwise healthy disease carrier. 
This notion came to have still greater bearing through 
genetics. Effectively, people of this kind appear to be like 
time bombs, whether for themselves and their loved ones 
or for their progeny, like “infected individuals without 
symptoms, ‘hidden’ vectors that must be detected.”33 In 
such light, the object of preventative hygiene is no longer 
the individual but a population requiring statistical man-
agement. Hence, in the name of focusing on the disease 
itself along with preventative hygiene, “placing the pa-
tient in parentheses,” to take up Canguilhem’s terms, is 
one of the conditions of possibility for the existence of 
modern, scientific medicine.
Consequently, within this regime of knowledge, a dis-
ease state can be diagnosed and described if and only if 
it obeys a causal and mechanistic logic, irrespective of 
32 Georges Canguilhem, A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings from Georges 
Canguilhem, ed. François Delaporte, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New 
York: Zone Books, 1993), 141. Translation modified.
33 Jean-Paul Gaudillière, La médecine et les sciences. XIXe et XXe siècles (Par-
is: La Découverte, 2006), 44. Translation mine.
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whether it is already manifest in the form of discrete 
symptoms or signs. Disease states that fail to conform 
to such a logic are deemed “imaginary” or “psychoso-
matic” (a term in use since the 1930s) and referred on 
to psychology. Equally troubling are diseases that have 
been detected and explained without any therapeutic 
treatment in existence “yet”; so too are those conditions 
having advanced to a terminal stage meaning that the 
sick person is also dying. Such conditions ought to force 
medicine to reckon with its own limits. All too often, 
however, such diagnoses do not prevent the staging of 
extensive, demanding yet ultimately pointless attempts 
at treatment. Already in 1873, Littré and Robin’s Diction-
naire de medicine warned against needless aggravations 
of patient suffering. The entry for “cacothanasia” (more 
commonly referred to today as “therapeutic obstinacy”) 
reads: “A tendency among some physicians to exhaust 
all pharmaceutical means, up to and including the most 
intensive of these, and even in the absence of the slight-
est probability of saving the patient, thereby bringing 
torment upon them in their final moments and mak-
ing their death more difficult.”34 In such circumstances, 
the struggle against disease, understood to be carefully 
separated from the patient, risks turning into a struggle 
against rather than for the sick person.
With the development of new therapeutic frameworks 
in the first half of the 20th century came further institu-
tionalization of the imperative of scientific neutrality. At 
this time, the “double blind study” became the norm for 
the clinical phase of pharmacological studies. This new 
approach worked in tandem with efforts to conscript 
most if not all sick people into cohorts in the service of 
clinical experimentation. If the double blind study marks 
34 Émile Littré and Charles Robin, Dictionnaire de médicine de chirurgie, 
de pharmacie, de l’art vétérinaire et des sciences qui s’y rapportent, 13th edn. 
(Paris: J.B. Baillière et fils, 1873). Translation mine.
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the zenith of the separation of sick person and disease, 
it also dramatically heralds a parallel phenomenon, 
which Canguilhem calls the interruption of dialogue be-
tween patient and physician. For “under this model of 
maximum control and outsourced judgment, physicians 
would see patients but ceased making decisions about 
particular treatment options and their sequencing, or 
even the analysis of their effects.”35
Medical rationality, as Canguilhem remarks, only 
achieves its highest form when it manages to recognize 
its own limits, which should be “understood not as the 
failure of an ambition having proven its legitimacy time 
and again but rather as an obligation to shift register. […] 
It must be conceded that the sick person is more than 
and different from a grammatical subject qualified by 
some attribute taken from the going nosology.”36 Can-
guilhem here issues a warning against the would-be un-
bridled rationalization of medical practice within which 
he detects a decisive aspect of the “claim to individual au-
tonomy regarding health’s appreciation and handling.”37 
Up to this point, I find Canguilhem’s claims to be compel-
ling. I demur, however, when he submits that such con-
clusions make him fear a “revival of pre-rational forms of 
medicine.”38 Such misgivings, it seems to me, are sympto-
matic of an epistemology claiming to be the “rearguard”39 
of scientific knowledge processes: the one following in 
the other’s footsteps, it risks making the same mistakes. 
Hence the persistent suspicion towards any and all prac-
tices that successfully treat disease by means other than 
those of Western allopathic medicine, whether in terms 
35 Gaudillière, La médecine et les sciences, 90. Translation mine.
36 Canguilhem, Études d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences, 408–9. 
Translation mine.
37 Ibid, 404. Translation mine.
38 Ibid. Translation mine.
39 François Bing and Jean-François Braunstein, “Entretien avec Georg-
es Canguilhem,” Interdisciplines 1 (1984): 21–34.
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of curing disease or caring for a person’s relationship with 
disease. It is as if medicine becomes scientific “at long 
last” – in aiming to define itself in opposition to forms 
of medicine thereby deemed “premodern” and in per-
manently escaping charges of irrationality. In so doing, 
however, it finds it has no choice but to integrate its arch 
nemesis into its own methods, turning it into a specter 
that haunts medicine to this day. As the next section 
shows, the separation of disease and sick person and the 
attendant interruption of meaningful dialogue between 
doctor and patient culminate in the procedures under-
lying clinical and pharmaceutical double-blind studies. 
When viewed from this new perspective, it turns out that 
the fulcrum of these practices is forged from a morbid 
fear of irrationality and, more specifically, from the terror 
of being duped.
This threat is made flesh in the disobedient and ir-
rational bodies of patients on the one hand, and in the 
unscientific healers henceforth relegated to the ranks of 
quackery on the other. Overcoming this threat calls for 
sophisticated defensive spells with the ability to defeat 
(as conclusively as possible) these enemies who continue 
to make life difficult for medicine. Such a defeat would 
turn medicine into the universal bearer of credible expert 
knowledge of disease. However, borne upon the terror of 
being duped and the will to dominate knowledge, this de-
fensive spell comes at a price: the a priori dismissal of a 





One thing is clear to me these days, there is a sinister inductive 
relationship between a fatal diagnosis being revealed and its 
being fulfilled, especially when it comes to so-called incurable 
diseases. […] I was lucky enough, soon after taking in poisonous 
words, to get antidote words. They came from a realm beyond 
my own upbringing, from the mouth of renowned Fula healer 
Thierno Sadou Baa […]: ‘Where I come from, in Africa, this bad 
thing has already been in existence for a long time; some live 
their whole lives with it whereas others die from it quickly. White 
people have only just discovered this invisible thing with their 
instruments and this vision’s revelation will kill more people 
than the bad thing itself, from the fear that it unleashes.’
– Julie40
The modern sciences created their own evidentiary cri-
teria. Indeed, what characterizes the trustworthiness of 
their material witnesses is that no sooner have they ac-
quired the status of knowledge objects than they take on 
an autonomous and atemporal mode of existence, one 
independent of their creators along with the circum-
stances of their making. The laws of motion, of atomic 
physics, and more recently entities like the neutrino or 
dna are examples of this kind of experimental achieve-
ment, which Isabelle Stengers contends is “the invention 
of the power to confer on things the power of conferring 
on the experimenter the power to speak in their name.”41
I have already alluded to Galileo’s experiment with the 
inclined plane, a crucial experiment that would lead to 
a formulation of the laws of motion. A closer examina-
tion of this experiment will help draw attention to the 
40 Julie, writing on Dingdingdong’s website, discusses testing “posi-
tive” for hiv in the 1980s: Julie, Dingdingdong, July 9, 2013, https://
dingdingdong.org/temoignages/julie/.
41 Stengers, The Invention of the Modern Sciences, 88.
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difficulties that arise when transposing the experimental 
ideals of physics onto the life sciences, especially when it 
comes to the notion of the pathological. Like all modern 
experimental setups (and functioning to this day as the 
model thereof), Galileo’s was highly artificial. In effect, 
the task was not to observe a falling body but to create 
a situation through which to make a judgment about 
how to characterize the motion of a body’s fall: a per-
fectly smooth inclined plane upon which well-polished 
balls would roll (friction had to be at a minimum). This 
apparatus made it possible to vary the ball’s descent. It 
transformed falling as a “natural” motion into a control-
lable phenomenon, which allowed it to be actively inter-
rogated.
What Galileo thereby invented was the first 
experimental apparatus, in the modern sense of the 
term, an apparatus of which [he] is the author, in the 
strong sense of the term, as it consists of an artificial, 
premeditated setup that produces “facts of art” – arti-
facts in the positive sense. The singularity of this ap-
paratus […] is that it allows its author to withdraw, to let 
the motion testify in his place.42 
Hence, once the variables are set (e.g., the ball’s point of 
departure, the slope of the plane, etc.), Galileo withdraws. 
He lets the ball’s motion answer all of the questions. It’s 
up to nature to do what’s left of the experimental work 
all by itself. What is conferred upon the experimental sys-
tem, therefore, is the power of producing a fact of which 
the experimenter will subsequently attempt to convince 
her colleagues. According to such an approach, scientific 
facts are conceived of as neutral, universal, and independ-
ent of all opinions or personal interpretation. Because by 
withdrawing and making herself transparent in this way, 
42 Ibid, 83. Translation modified.
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the experimenter proves that not only is her experiment 
a success but, what’s more, this success itself is in no way 
contingent upon her.
This kind of experimental neutrality, it should be not-
ed, is not incompatible with the high degree of artifice 
within all experimental systems and the facts they pro-
duce. It is even more important not to conflate the impli-
cations of such artificiality – that facts are made or con-
structed – with the relativist position whereby facts are 
merely constructed. To the contrary, it is precisely because 
they are special arte-facts, ambitious in technical and 
historical terms, that they should not be considered less 
true or effective but rather hypereffective, in the sense 
of having efficacy. Events that bring “a new being or new 
method of measurement into existence”43 deserve to be 
held in high regard if not celebrated, following Stengers, 
as products of a new kind of efficacy and a new kind of 
importance. But what would such a celebration look like? 
It might resemble what Bruno Latour calls the cult of 
factishes – a portmanteau of fact and fetish.44 As Latour 
demonstrates, people who venerate fetishes harbor no il-
lusions about the constructedness of their cult objects.
By introducing this neologism, Latour reminds us 
that, contrary to the Moderns’ enlightened assumptions, 
practitioners of systems of so-called superstitious be-
liefs, for whom fetish worship plays a crucial role, are by 
no means dupes with respect to the constructedness of 
their cult objects. On the contrary, they are highly aware 
of the regulations that underlie the making of such ob-
jects, regulations that they follow and transmit. It is in 
this sense that we could learn from them, because they 
could teach us how to orient to celebrating well-made 
43 Stengers, Cosmopolitics I, 32.
44 Bruno Latour, On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods, trans. Heather 




artifacts without discrediting them. The successful pro-
duction of scientific facts might therefore be the cen-
terpiece of a cult (read: culturing [mise en culture]) that 
honors successful (read: efficacious) scientific artifacts. 
At the same time, such a cult would be tasked with heed-
ing the ways in which these facts are situated in context, 
and thus with heeding their limits. The by-product of 
artful experimenting, this cult would broach constructed 
facts with breezy detachment but hold them in the high-
est regard. In the process, it could become a promising 
defense mechanism against the universalizing claims of 
the modern scientific attitude, in other words, against 
the idea that facts produced in such and such a context 
are correct and therefore automatically relevant to any 
and all cases. Because this move, which accompanies the 
so-called Modern attitude, amounts to discrediting all 
practices that do not fit this mold. It is about celebration 
without denunciation, celebrating the concrete existence 
of the novel artifact as a world-changing force without 
denouncing all others in return.
Such a cult would prevent us from forgetting that no 
fact enjoys an autonomous existence: each and every fact 
requires careful attention to endure and to find its true 
value in the practical relations people maintain with it, 
and not in the way these fall away. Hence, scientific facts 
or factishes have an unstable mode of existence not un-
like that of the pharmakon, the Greek term concurrently 
referring to a poison, illicit substance, and medication. 
Depending on the state the person receiving it is in, on 
her environment but also the dosage she receives, a phar-
makon can be toxic or therapeutic. Similarly, the trans-
formative force of an artifact constitutively depends 
upon its ability, within a particular milieu, to contribute 
an active, compatible, and pertinent feature. This is why 
the factish cult should also additionally and simultane-
ously be a cult of the pharmakon, a cult pursuing the task 
of valuing the sophisticated and situated culture of sci-
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entific practice, with all its accompanying requirements 
and obligations, without in the process elevating these to 
the status of universal norms.
When a practice loses sight of the situated existence 
of its productions and positions itself as sole bearer of 
knowledge about the “true” nature of the pharmakon, it 
inevitably becomes “incapable of what it is asking for, 
that is, a culture of usages.”45 This kind of culture is al-
ways situated and relational, as it demands a high degree 
of technical sophistication – the result of collective ex-
perimentation and development. That having been said, 
the judgment criteria for a usage practice or, put differ-
ently, evaluations of what it renders possible, cannot be 
determined a priori but only in the future anterior: “it 
will have been possible.” The specifically Western prob-
lem that accordingly emerges is not, in the strict sense, 
the intrinsic instability of the pharmakon, its constitutive 
permanent openness, but rather the dread that this poly-
semy brings into being. The distinctiveness of this tradi-
tion inheres in its 
intolerance […] towards this type of ambiguity, the 
dread it arouses. There has to be a fixed point, a foun-
dation, or a guarantee. There has to be a stable distinc-
tion between helpful medication and harmful drug, 
between rational pedagogy and suggestive influence, 
between reason and opinion.46
As Stengers carefully demonstrates, the case of Anton 
Mesmer (1734–1815) is typical of the risk of denuncia-
tion and discrediting, a risk brought by medicine upon 
practices whose effects cannot be clearly ascribed. In 
1784, Mesmer subjected his particular healing practice, 
45 Tobie Nathan and Isabelle Stengers, Doctors and Healers (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2018), 155. Translation modified.
46 Stengers, Cosmopolitics I, 29. Translation modified.
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animal magnetism, to evaluation by the Académie Fran-
çaise. Having conducted a whole range of experiments, 
the committee tasked with passing judgment arrived at 
the following conclusion: “the fluid is powerless without 
imagination, while the imagination without the fluid 
is able to produce the effects that are attributed to the 
fluid”47 Put simply, they proclaim that the fluid does not 
exist and turn Mesmer into a quack because his success, 
in their view, could only be credited to the imagination. 
The fluid, as it proved incapable of being transformed 
into a trustworthy witness, was deemed purely fictional 
and disqualified accordingly. To be sure, Mesmer did heal, 
in fact this was the finding their experiments produced. 
Evidently, however, he healed through fantastical means, 
with doubtful cause and effect relationships, and thus for 
the “wrong” reasons. There was no way of locating these 
“wrong” reasons. It was impossible to establish whether 
they took root in the healer’s practices, in the patient’s 
imagination, or in the relationship between the two.
We could tell a similar story from around the same 
time about Samuel Hahnemann (1755–1843), who tried to 
make room for homeopathy within the process of modern 
medicine’s progressive establishment. From the outset, 
his principle that “like is cured by like” (similia similibus 
curantur) by way of almost imperceptibly low dosing – 
that he developed, what’s more, through self-experimen-
tation – went against the epistemological grain of une-
quivocal causal logic. Albeit for different reasons than in 
Mesmer’s case, homeopathic healing practices also faced 
and continue to face repeated refusal from representa-
tives of modern medicine. A German encyclopedia pub-
lished in the 1880s carries an entry for homeopathy that 
reads as follows:
47 Nathan and Stengers, Doctors and Healers, 93.
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We would need to go to great lengths to delineate this 
mystical system, which systematically contradicts the 
experiments of chemistry, physics, and pathology and 
which, in lieu of findings, is based entirely on unfound-
ed beliefs. Moreover, it would be simply impossible to 
provide a faithful account of the many changes that 
homeopathy undergoes daily. […] This sample should 
be enough to show that homeopathy places a greater 
burden on the healthy mind than on the sick body.
These two cases show how, from the outset, modern 
medicine based its identity on positing the refusal of the 
practices of “quacks” such as Mesmer, Hahnemann, and 
many others who healed for the “wrong” reasons. Along-
side this sits a general opposition towards the body of the 
sick person, her living and suffering body. Patients them-
selves rarely coincide with preexisting categories. Hence 
when their conditions improve for reasons unaccounted 
for within a knowledge regime staked upon neutrality 
and objectivity, they are nothing other than the quack’s 
accomplices. Whereas other sciences such as physics are 
constructed on the achievements of their practitioners, 
what makes modern medicine distinctive is its founda-
tional frustration: frustration over the way living bodies 
tend to refuse to behave like reliable witnesses, namely 
unequivocally and consistently, and also frustration over 
the manner in which patients as well as physicians hold 
interests, ideas, and aspirations that risk uncontrollably 
overwhelming the therapeutic process.
The committee that evaluated animal magnetism ad-
vanced three reasons for explaining Mesmer’s success 
despite the observed non-existence of the fluid: first, the 
healing powers of nature; second, the fact that Mesmer’s 
patients stopped previously prescribed and highly toxic 
medication; third, the trust that patients placed in Mes-
mer’s practice. The third reason is of particular interest 
to medical practice today, as it represents the driving 
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force behind the procedures leading up to formal rec-
ognition of a novel compound. Known as “the placebo 
effect,” the therapeutic power (force) of trust, hope, and 
salutary faith constitutes an integral component of con-
temporary protocols surrounding decisions to authorize 
the distribution of novel forms of medication. Current 
medicine therefore officially recognizes these therapeu-
tic effects, yet it does so in a negative mode. Indeed, the 
double-blind study, where neither patient nor physician 
know whether the treatment underway is the experi-
mental medication (verum) or the placebo, is specifically 
aimed at drawing a clear distinction between effects that 
can be attributed to patients’ beliefs or aspirations and 
those due to the chemical compound itself. This triage 
allows for the simultaneous conjuring and control of the 
dangers of subjective influence that threaten the forward 
progress of medicine. The strategy behind double-blind 
studies therefore amounts to incorporating the enemy so 
as to master it once and for all. The placebo effect is the 
quack’s counterpart, as it were, within modern medical 
pharmacology.
Medical historian Philippe Pignarre has demonstrated 
that the problematic nature of the placebo has little to do 
with its methodological function as an innocuous com-
pound deployed as a point of reference and comparison 
in clinical studies for novel treatment options. Instead, 
the method of the double-blind study became genuinely 
troubling when it evolved from a technical and methodo-
logical reality into a political technique.48 But what does 
48 Pignarre’s publications on medication are not yet available in Eng-
lish translation. Major texts include Les deux médecines. Médicaments, 
psychotropes et suggestion thérapeutique (Paris: La Découverte, 1995); Le 
grand secret de l’industrie pharmaceutique (Paris: La Découverte, 2003); 
and, in collaboration with François Dagognet, 100 mots pour compren-
dre les medicaments. Comment on vous soigne (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de 
penser en rond, 2005). While not its central concern, some key as-
pects of Pignarre’s critical theories on treatment and healing can be 
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he mean by this? The prevailing understanding of the 
placebo dates back to the early 19th century, yet despite 
this the wide-scale use of double-blind studies only took 
off in the 1970s. Within the pharmacological research 
community, it soon became clear that the placebo’s pre-
sumed null effect was not absolute. In fact, it turned 
out that patients given a placebo tended to be in better 
health after the end of an experimental study than those 
given no treatment at all. Such findings inevitably raised 
the question of who was responsible for these “irrational” 
improvements. There was an easy answer: “We are – us 
doctors! It’s our doing, it’s our influence!” This answer 
turns the placebo effect into a political formula: not only 
does it authorize modern Western medicine’s representa-
tives to reevaluate the importance of their role in curing 
patients but it also disqualifies anew any way of practic-
ing treatment otherwise and anyone who would do so. 
Moreover, the formula holds a new assumption: “You 
claim to hold secret knowledge allowing you to intervene 
upon the bodies of your patients. We can do exactly the 
same thing.” Modern medicine therefore claims two pow-
ers for itself. It can heal in the same way traditional medi-
cine heals and, at the same time, there is nothing secret or 
ambiguous about it thanks to scientific measurement. 
A duty falls upon modern medicine as a result of this 
capture: to “enlighten” gullible patients and warn them 
against all the quacks whose practices amount to noth-
ing more or less than a repackaged placebo effect. Which 
brings us to posit the following questions:
If there are practitioners out there who know how to 
“maximize” the placebo effect, does it not deserve an-
other name? It warrants consideration in terms that 
found in a volume written with Isabelle Stengers: Philippe Pignarre 




don’t disqualify it from the outset, does it not? It is 
up to us to strive to follow these practitioners and un-
derstand their practice in its specificity rather than 
dismissing it out of hand, is it not? Are there no cul-
tures out there that have devised ways of sharing these 
techniques?49
Is it not the case that the risks that this disqualifying 
move brings on augur far graver consequences, at every 
level, than the risks that arise from plainly recognizing, 
as Canguilhem suggests, the “limits of medical rational-
ity”? In truth, what is at stake is the disappearance of a 
whole range of practices. These practices know how to 
do a lot of things about which we still have so much to 
learn. Stemming from Western and non-Western tradi-
tions alike, they can be the stuff of inspiration precisely 
because, as Tobie Nathan explains, they “think things 
through against the medical grain, if you will, often taking 
disease to be a form of ordination, both the message and 
first move of a process of initiation into personhood.”50 A 
good place to start might be to learn how to constructive-
ly compose a life with a disease that modern medicine 
deems incurable and so puts off as a subject for future 
study. In putting things off to an indeterminate future 
horizon, what medicine displays is, above all, confusion 
over its own limits. It imagines these limits represent a 
passing phase when they are, in fact, an organizing prin-
ciple. It goes something like this: “We do not yet know, 
we cannot yet heal this disease – but this will pass! It is 
just a matter of keeping calm and carrying on until a set-
tled therapeutic treatment comes to market.” To be sure, 
adopting a defensive attitude towards absent knowledge 
49 Pignarre and Dagognet, 100 mots pour comprendre, 250. Translation 
mine.




helps drive and renew interest in medical research: the 
horizon beyond knowledge is a frontier awaiting con-
quest. From this perspective, however, we would overlook 
the fact that all new discoveries, no matter how revolu-
tionary, inevitably conjure fresh knowledge remnants 
and yearnings. Medicine could take another path and, in 
addition to medical research, turn its attention to a time 
beyond the limit of its own horizons and remain open 
at the level of practice to collaborations and perspectives 
coming from other fields.
When it comes to the predictive diagnosis of incurable 
disease, bioethics may seem to be the most compelling 
direction at first. Yet I do not believe it is the most prom-
ising. Indeed, Niklas Luhmann makes a convincing argu-
ment when he writes that bioethics is a “sedative” and 
that society writes its own prescriptions “while moralists 
themselves have gone crazy.”51 Despite its best intentions, 
this sedative often clouds the “clear vision” we might have 
of new technologies and their dangers, and even tends 
to legitimate them, albeit in a roundabout way. Follow-
ing Luhmann, German philosopher Petra Gehring writes: 
“far from destroying faith in technoscientific ‘possibili-
ties,’ [bioethics] reaffirms it.”52
Understanding why we need to take another direction 
entirely calls for something more than these few lines of 
criticism. In order to go a little further, I submit that two 
of bioethics’ underlying assumptions merit question-
ing. Firstly, bioethics aims at “shedding light” (éclairer) 
on matters, which positions it within the Enlightenment 
tradition, consequently addressing itself to sovereign, 
conscious, autonomous subjects – in a word, solitary 
51 Niklas Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990), 697. Translation mine.
52 Petra Gehring, “Fragliche Expertise. Zur Etablierung von Bioethik 
in Deutschland,” in Wissenschaft und Demokratie, ed. Michael Hagner 




ones. It is precisely this inheritance that makes bioethics 
incapable of cultivating a situation from within, which 
is a practice that goes hand in hand with collective ac-
tion. Secondly, because bioethics came about in response 
to technological innovation, it only tends to fulfill its role 
after the fact, as an agent for regulating and curtailing 
“collateral damage.” In other words, bioethics is content 
to track down solutions for “ready-made” problems that 
others put before it. This kind of orientation explains 
why bioethics all too often lacks imagination, or rather, 
the ability to let itself imagine things otherwise. Hence, 
it belongs to an epistemological and institutional logic 
that prevents it from finding a way to construct its own 
problems rather than reacting to preexisting ones.
For these reasons, I believe that in order to begin 
building a more appropriate milieu – one more richly 
populated and ready to make our creature, the predictive 
test, welcome – it is worth turning our attention to ho-
rizons beyond bioethics. In this second chapter, we have 
traversed a range of historical and conceptual domains 
that provided greater purchase on some moments of bi-
furcation, moments when other things, paths, or prac-
tices might have been possible. By taking such stories in, 
we will have equipped ourselves with the means to begin 
spotting camels, that is to say, with the tools to begin 
constructing problem-solutions anew. Unfortunately, 
what is before us is not the one good camel that can solve 
things once and for all. Rather, it is the beginning of a 
collection of camels, who will need to be nourished, cared 
for, and tamed from within the very practices under cul-
tivation.
In the third and final chapter, I will attempt an initial 
proposition for a more satisfactory construction of these 
problems. The perspectives discussed next are not in any 
way intended as recipes. I will not attempt to write up 
a new version of the “Guidelines for Molecular Genetics 
Predictive Test in Huntington’s Disease.” My propositions 
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will have completed their journey once they manage to 
enrich the imagination of the actors who find themselves 
entangled in some manner or another in the predictive 
test for hd, or, to put things differently, once they man-
age to populate our creature’s milieu with less moribund 






Stories are much bigger than ideologies. In that is our hope.
– Donna Haraway1
When you search for “Huntington’s disease” on YouTube, 
two kinds of results come up. The first are short films pro-
duced in the style of an infomercial: in the most dispas-
sionate of tones, they explain hd by way of diagrams that 
indicate symptoms, clinical progression, and the care 
options available. The second type of content douses the 
viewer with countless private clips. For the most part, the 
production quality of these clips is basic and they bear all 
the hallmarks of the horror story. Picture a room, covered 
in dust: a frightfully thin woman appears, wanders about 
like a crazy person, her obvious distress is upsetting to 
behold, she flails about, falls, staggers and sways. Such 
footage is cut together with tales of people with early-
onset or juvenile hd. You can watch adorable little kids, 
running all over the place and yet transforming, slowly, 
into invalids, agitated at first and then becoming list-
less, the whole thing accompanied by commentary shot 
1 Donna J. Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People and 
Significant Otherness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 17.
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through with fear and despair from scared parents, chil-
dren, brothers, and sisters. The hd imagery and discourse 
circulated by medicine and the public turns the disease 
into a monstrous and inescapable form of current day 
possession, and it reaches new intensities in testimonials 
from the very people concerned by the disease, whether 
these testimonials are intended as pedagogy and expla-
nation or whether they are simply direct manifestations 
of solitude and plight.
In October 2013, an altogether different kind of vid-
eo joined this content: “A Message from Doctor Olivier 
Marboeuf.”2 It is a video monologue given by a neurolo-
gist in which he recounts the founding of an experimen-
tal, multidisciplinary research unit dedicated to hd and 
its associated tests, conceived collectively by those giving 
as well as receiving care. Doctor Marboeuf begins his tale 
by relating how, in light of the position he holds within 
a French center offering predictive testing, he often finds 
himself having to announce test results to at-risk per-
sons. He sits throughout the video in his practice, behind 
his desk. Evidently, he is addressing an audience of his 
medical “peers” on the one hand and, on the other, people 
who are concerned with the sickness in some way: at-risk 
persons, family members, or caregivers.
He explains that he wants to relate his encounter with 
a patient and her sister along with the effect this meet-
ing had on him. One year earlier, these two women had 
set a challenge for him that he had never faced before: to 
call his own practice into question along with everything 
he believed he knew about Huntington’s disease itself, 
its symptoms, its tragic nature, and its clinical progres-
sion. It all started when he confronted the young woman 
with the revelation of her unfavorable genetic status, 
2 Unité Expérimentale Alice Rivières, “#1 Dr Marboeuf sur la maladie 




first announcing her cag count, then going on to provide 
her with the usual information about the psychological, 
medical, and social assistance she could receive. This pa-
tient reacted in a way that no other patient had before: 
she burst into rage. In terms both harsh and to the point, 
she told him that never again under any circumstances 
did she wish to be in contact with him or anyone from 
his team, nor did she wish to take up their offers of assis-
tance. And then she left, slamming the door behind her, 
leaving him utterly thrown.
A few months later, Doctor Marboeuf explains, this pa-
tient’s sister called him and scheduled an appointment. 
The two women turned up together, but it was the sister 
who led the discussion. She too gave him explicit criti-
cism, taking him on time and again: “How do you know 
what will happen to my sister?” “How do you know exactly 
what will happen to my sister in particular?” He relates 
how he tried to justify himself, by replying that it was his 
duty as a specialist to inform patients with precision, to 
be clear, to not raise false hopes and so on and so forth. 
The sister shot back: “but why don’t you say that you don’t 
know?” It would not be appropriate given his role as a 
physician, he said. She pressed the point: “There are peo-
ple who say that they don’t know.” This is what happens, 
she went on to explain, in the Dutch city of Apeldoorn 
at the Atlant Center. She went for a visit and the treat-
ment options she observed were, in her view, nothing 
short of amazing. People with Huntington’s in residence 
at the center were in no ways in a pitiful state despite 
the advanced nature of their condition. They seemed to 
be living happily. When, at the end of the conversation, 
he bid adieu to the two women with an “I hope to see 
you soon,” the sister plainly laid down their terms: “We 
will only come back once you are able to tell us that you 
don’t know.” Frustrated, and a little irritated, he let them 
go, saying it was unlikely the day would come when he 
would see them again.
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He goes on to explain in the video that these encoun-
ters nonetheless piqued his curiosity. In June of 2013, he 
made the most of a conference in the Netherlands to stay 
an extra day and pay a visit to Apeldoorn and the Atlant 
Center. “I have to admit, it is impressive,” he concedes. 
Patients’ day-to-day lives and care were organized, he 
noted, in a tailored fashion. Upon returning to France, 
Doctor Marboeuf wondered what he could do. To be sure, 
given what he had experienced at the Atlant Center, the 
demands his patient and her sister had made seemed dis-
tinctly less egregious. The sister, he has to admit, “is not 
wrong.” At this point – and with this his creation story 
draws to a close – he decides to take a proposal to his 
managers, to initiate a small experimental research unit 
dedicated to various aspects of Huntington’s disease and 
its test, a co-construction to be undertaken in concert 
with patients and their families. In September 2013, man-
agement authorized the creation of the unit bearing the 
name of Alice Rivières. Since March 2014, patients and 
their families have been working together with caregiv-
ers and doctors and, as Doctor Marboeuf announces at 
the end, this is just the beginning!
Where the closing credits would role, a single sentence 
flashes up: “Communication posted on YouTube on the 
17th of September 2014, from a possible world to be built 
together.” This sentence alone reveals that the film is not 
a documentary but a fabulation. First of all, because of 
the date stamp: the video was initially presented in the 
context of a world congress on Huntington’s disease held 
in September 2013 in Rio de Janeiro before being upload-
ed to YouTube. Doctor Marboeuf’s story would have had 
to unfold in the future. And if you search a little harder, 
you will find no sign of the Alice Rivières Unit other than 
this video. Is it therefore a hoax? No, it’s a lure!
This film is the outcome of a collaboration between 
filmmaker and Dingdingdong member Fabrizio Ter-
ranova and storyteller-cum-performance artist Olivier 
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Marboeuf. As I have in this book, these two artists took 
Alice Rivières’s story as their starting point, relaying it 
in their own way, in keeping with the operating princi-
ple that drives Dingdingdong, a collective dedicated to 
coproducing knowledge about Huntington’s. This princi-
ple holds that we actually must “lather” the ideas that 
animate us, taking them up again over time from various 
perspectives and thus lending them consistency, a thick-
ness of their own. I have no doubt that this work of tak-
ing and retaking, of successive acts of giving form (mise 
en forme) is needed to arrive at the point where concepts 
are sufficiently specified and, thereby and thereupon, 
made to become ever more real. While Alice’s story put 
an obligation before me – to dive into the histories of 
predictive testing and modern medicine the better to 
understand their stakes – for Terranova and Marboeuf it 
presented an opportunity to cultivate a new kind of nar-
rative: “speculative narration.” The ways of doing and the 
strategies that this narration deploys aim, quite literally, 
“to gather together the conditions of possibility for mak-
ing an idea, one for which there can be no guarantees, 
become true.”3 This is not intended in a general sense but 
rather in relation to concrete and specific situations of 
conflict and powerlessness. Speculative narration there-
fore intends to contrast “predetermined” paths with sto-
ries of how things could be otherwise; the latter rub the 
former against the grain and influence them.4 Unlike 
what usually happens in science fiction, the story Mar-
3 Thierry Drumm, personal communication, 2014.
4 This approach is altogether different from so-called “narrative eth-
ics.” Narrative ethics derives ethical or moral maxims from the anal-
ysis of more or less canonical literary texts. Here, the filmmakers 
explicitly conceive of their video as a form of ethical and political 
engagement within the field of presymptomatic diagnosis itself. 
Moreover, they take up “speculative narration” beyond this par-
ticular context and are, especially in the case of Fabrizio Terranova, 
committed to developing this form of practice. See Didier Debaise 
et al., “Speculative Narration: A Conversation with Valérie Pihet, Di-
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boeuf recounts does not take place in a faraway future, 
whether in temporal or situational terms. Rather, it takes 
a real situation as its starting point and spins, threads, or 
weaves it by introducing slight adjustments and prudent 
additions that, although minor, prove decisive. Hence, no 
gulf separates historical reality from storytelling reality. 
Nothing improbable or impossible happens. The point is 
neither to sketch out a utopia (a non-place) or a uchronia 
(a non-time), nor to conduct a thought experiment ex-
trapolating upon the effects of various counterfactuals.
Instead, Olivier Marboeuf (the storyteller), a.k.a. Doc-
tor Marboeuf (the narrator), fabulates a situation for the 
camera based on a future soon to come. In this situation, 
a number of true-to-life elements – the anger of test 
subjects, notions of the right to know and not to know, 
experiences gleaned from Apeldoorn’s Atlant Center – 
conspire to lay the groundwork for the possibility of cre-
ating a research laboratory with the task of inaugurating 
and investigating new versions of Huntington’s disease. 
His story foretells every step of the journey needed to 
achieve this kind of encounter. The strategy he adopts, 
therefore, is one of narrative awareness raising. Although 
fashioned from the future, it remains faithful to known, 
situated, and contested reality. At the same time, by way 
of an equally situated and effective process of thinking 
through, this story strives to make the disease and test-
ing for it awaken to another life.
To be sure, the narrator constructed his account from 
elements that were “given” to him. Olivier Marboeuf did 
not know about hd before undertaking this work and 
drew on to what we told him. However, by taking this 
as a basis for improvisation, he managed to reconfigure 
these elements on his own terms and produce an original 
story with the power to surprise his tutors and give their 




thinking new purchase. A noteworthy example is the cru-
cial proposition that the sister intervene and specifically 
demand that the doctor must recognize he cannot know 
what will happen to his patient. This demand constitutes 
the piece’s narrative center and can be understood in 
three different ways.
Firstly, it is the expression of a refusal to become the 
passive victim of medical knowledge held up as absolute 
truth. Doctor Marboeuf must not act as if the predictive 
knowledge he is conveying amounts to the “definitive an-
swer to a question posed once and for all.” Instead, the 
sister makes a demand that forces Doctor Marboeuf to 
treat his announcement like an “indeterminate answer 
to a question prompted and created by a provisional de-
sire to know,”5 an answer providing a direction, yet which 
should in no way be taken as an exclusive explanation.
On another level, the sister pushes Doctor Marboeuf 
to support the idea that hd’s course varies from one per-
son to the next. A fortiori, she enjoins him not to con-
fuse objective knowledge about a condition with the 
subjective experience of living with this condition. The 
distinction the English language draws (and the French 
does not) between the concepts of “disease” and “illness” 
makes this crucial difference plain to see. Whereas “dis-
ease” designates sickness as a medically defined entity 
and this “by contrast with other diseases,” the concept 
of “illness” refers to the concrete and personal perspec-
tive of the sick person, to “what patients live through and 
describe.” While sickness as “disease” is the ready object 
of medical diagnosis, “illness” evokes “the subjective feel-
ing of lack of health that a person holds.”6 Taking stock 
5 Paul-Loup Weil-Dubuc, “Les servitudes du droit de savoir: Autour 
du diagnostic présymptomatique,” La Vie des Idées, 15 October 2013, 
http://www.laviedesidees.fr/les-servitudes-du-droit-de-savoir.
html. Translation mine.
6 Henrike Hölzer, “Die Simulation von Arzt-Patienten-Kontakten in 
der medizinischen Ausbildung,” in Szenen des Erstkontakts zwischen 
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of this distinction (and hence the multiple meanings or 
plural character of all disease) means coming to terms 
with some changes. A first consequence is the need to 
adopt a perspective whereby it becomes possible to take 
seriously and accompany patients as they suffer from 
symptoms even in the absence of a recognized, objective, 
or causally scripted condition in the sense of a “disease” 
(for example, some forms of chronic pain).7 Moreover, the 
disease/illness distinction makes it possible to conceive 
of and even to conjure situations in which the disease is 
lived through in less dramatic terms than those predict-
ed by diagnosis or prognosis. In fact, calls to systemati-
cally distinguish illness from disease, particularly within 
the field of nursing and care studies, are often motivated 
less out of ontological than pragmatist concerns where 
the aim is to produce concrete effects.8 Giving full weight 
to this distinction makes it possible to put all relevant 
actors in a position to collectively compose diverse kinds 
of know-how about their sickness, know-how that need 
not privilege medical or scientific knowledge. According 
to this logic, patients (from the Latin “to suffer” or “to 
put up with”) no longer have to passively endure the dis-
ease whose active “management” is the sole preserve of 
medicine. They can instead take up an expert role when it 
comes to at least one fundamental aspect: how illness is 
experienced and what its usages are in their everyday life, 
a form of knowledge that they alone can convey. Such a 
perspective is paramount: it is a prerequisite to any co-
Arzt und Patient, eds. Walter Bruchhausen and Céline Kaiser (Bonn: 
Bonn University Press, 2012), 107–17, at 112. Translation mine.
7 Regarding “medically unexplained symptoms,” see Monica Greco, 
“The Classification and Nomenclature of ‘Medically Unexplained 
Symptoms’: Conflict, Performativity and Critique,” Social Science & 
Medicine 75 (2012): 2362–69.




construction of knowledge about Huntington’s and other 
conditions.
The well-known slogan, “My womb belongs to me,” 
could certainly be discussed for its simplicity and in-
dividualism. But if we understand what started the 
women moving, it was move like “My womb does not 
belong to you,” and there any individualist simplifica-
tion disappears. It is a real “hands off!” shouted at all 
those who, in the interests of the state or of morality, 
want to charge of women’s wombs.9
In the same way, thinking with the distinction between 
“disease” and “illness,” we can hear a nuance in the de-
mand made upon Doctor Marboeuf: “at least admit that 
the truth of our disease does not belong to you or, at any 
rate, not only to you.”
There is a third reading of this demand. It can be un-
derstood as a way of standing the much-debated at-risk 
person’s right not to know on its head. This right, when it 
comes to Huntington’s disease, is conveyed in the Guide-
lines discussed earlier through the explicit recommenda-
tion not to undertake prenatal testing for hd unless the 
parents are sure they will terminate the pregnancy should 
the embryo test positive. This would otherwise amount 
to depriving the child brought into the world of the right 
not to know, for she would be born in the knowledge she 
was a gene-carrier rather than an at-risk person. In nar-
ratively assembling an inversion of this right together 
with his patient’s rage, Marboeuf fabulates an interesting 
version of the doctor’s duty to not only be aware of the 
limits to his own knowledge but also to expressly convey 
these to his patients. He will only become worthy of his 
patients when he is ready to heed this twofold duty.
9 Tobie Nathan and Isabelle Stengers, Doctors and Healers (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2018), 151.
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One of the strengths of Marboeuf’s monologue lies in 
that he seizes upon what is at stake in our exploration. 
He does so by refraining from presenting the doctor’s 
re-orientation as a sudden conversion, instead dramatiz-
ing it as an arduous and protracted process. Indeed, as 
he tells it, Doctor Marboeuf approaches the demand that 
he say, “I don’t know,” with the skepticism of a medical 
professional. For this requirement runs against his de-
ontological allegiances. He insists that he must inform. 
For him, this is a professional duty. He thus reminds us 
of the existence of a conflict, one in which doctors often 
find themselves embroiled, “conflicts of interest between, 
for example, the individual physician’s duties to a patient 
and his loyalty to the profession, as when his conduct is 
criticized as ‘unprofessional’ for harming, not his clients, 
but rather his colleagues.”10 Marboeuf’s story therefore 
draws its speculative power specifically from the fact that 
it does not wantonly dismiss the duties felt by the doctor 
towards the medical profession, duties that make sense 
to him and guide his practice – duties that he would ne-
glect were he to be overcome with compassion or were he 
to say or even just whisper the words, “I don’t know.” A 
new possibility can only emerge when Doctor Marboeuf 
allows the sister’s provocation, which leaves him bereft 
at first (“We will only come back when you are ready to 
say, ‘I don’t know’”), to resonate and give him pause. In 
the end, we cannot know whether or not he says, “I don’t 
know.” What is truly significant, however, is the narrative 
shift that resulted in his appropriating this injunction 
and giving it the authority to become his vocation, his 
calling. He dedicated the time and effort needed to a pro-
ject that allowed him to transform this provocation, lit-
tle by little, into the cornerstone of a research laboratory 
organized in a truly coproductive manner. From within 
10 Stephen Toulmin, “How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics,” Perspec-
tives in Biology and Medicine 25, no. 4 (1982): 736–50.
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the hospital milieu itself and together with representa-
tives from all involved parties, he decided to examine the 
merits of the professional, familial, and moral duties and 
demands felt by one and all, along with their reciprocal 
influences. In short, the research unit that Marboeuf fab-
ulates on the basis of a possible world to be built together 
is one based on the experience that a person might need 
to place themselves in jeopardy (se compromettre), to let 
go of “what they hold dear,”11 if what counts is becoming 
respons-able, that is becoming capable of answering for 
one’s own practice and its objects.12
Rewriting Natural History
The moral or political concern running through pragmatism 
is precisely to preserve, as much as can be, the subject’s abil-
ity to act, her confidence in a possible action in the world.
– Didier Debaise13
At first, it seems curious that this fabulation should 
choose the very caregivers of an establishment dedicated 
to Huntington’s to say the line “we do not know.” After 
all, it would seem reasonable to assume that the experi-
enced personnel working there would have a particularly 
keen and thoroughgoing understanding of what happens 
after presymptomatic testing and particularly regarding 
the initial onset of symptoms. When it comes to the col-
lective task of apprehending hd differently, the very crux 
of the Dingdingdong project, everyone brings their own 
11 Émilie Hache, Ce à quoi nous tenons (Paris: La Découverte, 2011).
12 For a discussion of the notion of “response-ability,” see Donna J. 
Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008).
13 Didier Debaise, “La pensée laboratoire: Une approche pragmatique 
de la connaissance,” in Éduquer dans le monde contemporain: Les savoirs 
et la société de la connaissance, eds. Ali Benmakhlouf and Nicolas Piqué 
(Casablanca: Le Fennec, 2013), 63–74, at 69.
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ways of pursuing an inquiry and conveying it. Hence, 
such inquiries are often communal. They are something 
of a spring into which no one ever wades alone because 
each of us is always connected to the rest of the group, 
even if only to fuel our appetites with fresh data and 
experiences, putting them to collective work. Accord-
ingly, Marboeuf’s video drew in particular on two field-
work trips to Apeldoorn along with the discussions and 
interactions we had with personnel and patients there. 
If Apeldoorn seemed like “paradise for Huntington’s” 
to us, it was not because the disease became something 
pleasant there. Rather, it was because the care this place 
achieved, through perpetual coproduction with sick peo-
ple and their kin, was remarkable for always tending to-
ward the general wellbeing of those known there as “resi-
dents” rather than toward the management of “patients” 
and their symptoms.
At Apeldoorn, they cultivate the art of caring, an art 
whose theory and practice is made to measure. From our 
two visits, we were able to glean some aspects of this art 
that will, I hope, show how it is strategically accompa-
nied by a form of “non-knowledge” about hd. Marboeuf 
the storyteller, following the lead of his patient’s sister, 
finds among Apeldoorn’s caregivers the ability to admit 
not knowing what will happen for such and such a gene 
carrier. In so doing, he translates a whole range of obser-
vations about the details of their practices, of clues and 
experimental ways of composing something from hd’s 
puzzles that form the caregivers’ very modus operandi. 
The fact remains that the manner in which people live 
with Huntington’s at Apeldoorn brings about a less dra-
matic, tragic, and cruel version of the disease. At Heem-
hof, which is the Atlant Center’s long-term assisted liv-
ing center for Huntington’s patients, everything is staked 
on ensuring that patients, who are admitted when their 
condition reaches a particularly advanced stage, have the 
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opportunity to remain or become the creators or protago-
nists of their own disease.14
In this chapter, I have decided to describe the obser-
vations and discussions we had at Apeldoorn in some 
detail. This choice follows from my conviction that all 
caregiving situations play a decisive role in lending con-
sistency to the milieu surrounding the test-creature, as 
much so as the epistemological and ethical prescriptions 
that structure the medical field. In any case, it is easy 
enough to imagine that a future with Huntington’s is 
less terrifying if you foresee staying at a place like Heem-
hof, rather than ending up, by default, in either a nurs-
ing home, which is ill-equipped to deal with a condition 
that affects relatively young people, or an institution for 
people born with severe disability, which risks being just 
as inadequate. Unfortunately, to this day, in France and 
many other Western countries, these are by far the most 
common outcomes for hd patients (although the trend 
may be turning around thanks to the combined efforts of 
caregivers and patient associations).
The forms of support and care the Atlant Center pro-
vides, which manage to make it possible to not only to 
live with the experience of hd but to live well with it, 
are the fruit of many years of experience. The center was 
founded some forty years ago, the Huntington’s unit 
in 1992, and it continues to improve upon its practices, 
many of which were devised here. These practices have a 
range of temporalities. The relationship with a new “cli-
ent” usually and preferably begins at a time when they 
are still in the early stages of being sick. In fact, quite of-
ten at this time it is the loved ones who desire support, 
whereas the sick person often plainly refuses contact 
14 Even though Apeldoorn serves here as a model, there are, of course 
other facilities (e.g., Hôpital Marin de Hendaye, in France) that tire-




with the medical services on offer. “Here, they perfectly 
understand that helping loved ones to help sick people 
provides the same amount of relief to both groups and 
helps to avoid many crises.”15
The most active people during this phase are so-called 
“case managers.”16 They act as an interface between pa-
tients, families, and the institution itself. The nature of 
their work, in other words, is above all diplomatic. They 
keep in touch with the family, undertake home visits, and 
help loved ones prepare the sick person for the need to 
receive support. “There is always a solution to be found,” 
says R., whose business card simply reads: Case manager, 
Huntington. R. operates on a case-by-case basis according 
to “a veritable casuistry: turning each case into an event.”17 
To achieve this, she must use her imagination and find 
the tone and gestures suited for each situation. For in-
stance, she recounted the case of a sick person who re-
fused to have any contact whatsoever with her but whose 
family sought her help. As she knew he would regularly 
go into town for groceries, she decided she would cross 
paths with him one day as a way of making an initial 
contact. “There is always something you can help with, 
even if it’s just something tiny. From there, you can build 
something.” At first glance, this might seem to be quite 
an intrusive way of intervening, one that goes against 
the ethics of consent. Surely you shouldn’t follow a sick 
person out getting groceries after they have refused to 
be in contact with you? If we take a closer look however, 
15 Alice Rivières, “Apeldoorn 2012,” Dingdingdong, December 5, 2012, 
https://dingdingdong.org/reportages/apeldoorn-2012. Translation 
mine.
16 This role has recently been introduced in France for people with 
Alzheimer’s disease. A quite distinct version of this duty, known as 
the “coordinator for a program of care” (coordinateur de parcours 
de soin), is beginning to emerge for hd and other diseases whose 
oversight is particularly challenging.
17 Rivières, “Apeldoorn 2012.”
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what emerges is the careful and discrete construction of 
what anthropologists Antoine Hennion and Pierre Vid-
al-Naquet in their inquiry into home care refer to as a 
“situational ethics.” Such an ethics achieves expression 
“within the course of acting itself. […] To put it crudely, 
‘ethics is already within.’ Actors are moral actors, even if 
they do not follow principles that can be articulated in a 
detached, general, or absolute fashion.”18 In effect, every 
situation of care is shot through with demands we would 
rather shy away from. It falls upon caregivers to guar-
antee the security and wellbeing of dependents and to 
respect their autonomy. At the same time, there is no es-
caping the fact that people receiving care regularly have 
to be made to do things they refuse to do or find point-
less. Hence, in concrete practice, white lies, tricks, and 
workarounds frequently sustain the gestures and moves 
leading to a given goal.19 Procedures such as these are 
pragmatist in the proper sense insofar as they character-
ize a practice whose effects are not measured against ab-
stract principles: “not an unprincipled action, the justifi-
cation for which changes randomly from one situation to 
the next, but an action whose principles are actualized in 
the course of its very enactment.”20
In another stage in which the sick person, their loved 
ones, and staff from the Atlant Center come together, the 
18 Antoine Hennion and Pierre A. Vidal-Naquet. “‘Enfermer Maman!’ 
Épreuves et arrangements: Le care comme éthique de situation,” Sci-
ences sociales et santé 33, no. 3 (2015): 65–90. See also Antoine Hen-
nionet al., Une ethnographie de la relation d’aide: de la ruse à la fiction, ou 
comment concilier protection et autonomie, report for MiRe-DREES/CSI-
Cerpe, 2012, http://hal-ensmp.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00722277.
19 Since the original publication of Testing Knowledge, Dingdingdong 
has achieved an inquiry that dives into the details of the incred-
ible creativity invented by hd-patients, their families, and close 
ones. See Émilie Hermant and Valérie Pihet, Le chemin des possibles. 





sick person has agreed to work with caregivers but con-
tinues to live at home. At this point, their case manager 
works with them to craft a personalized program of home 
care, with both emotional and material components. 
Aside from help with washing, housework, and cook-
ing, consideration is also given to occupational therapy, 
speech therapy, and psychiatric or psychological support. 
This is also the time when a discussion happens about 
equipment that will be useful but need to be ordered in: 
medical bed, walking frame, wheelchair, shower chair, 
etc. During this period, some choose to take up the of-
fer of day care, another option Apeldoorn provides, with 
various support services and activities. This period is by 
no means conflict-free. R. must make sure to keep her 
practice fluid and open as order never lasts long. She has 
to pay constant attention to what is happening in order 
to spot and identify the slightest mishap and, as quickly 
as possible, conjure a corresponding proposition. Invaria-
bly, it is impossible to guarantee ahead of time that these 
propositions will succeed. They will prove their worth 
through their effects, as they are enacted as so many op-
portunities or “living hypotheses”21 for better facing up to 
the situation at hand. If they fail, then another direction 
must be found. This thoughtful, pragmatist approach 
constantly makes do with uncertainties and, as it were, 
with non-knowledge.
In many cases, the question arises of whether a sick 
person is ready to move into Heemhof in order to receive 
care corresponding with their symptoms’ progression 
and also to relieve their loved ones. Entering Heemhof, 
which is at a slight remove from the city of Apeldoorn 
itself, prompts immediate surprise. Nothing about the 
lighting, the smell, or the soundscape recalls the feelings 
21 The expression is William James’s, from The Will to Believe and Other 




that tend to go with hospitals or support centers. Resi-
dents’ individual rooms, kitchens, three large common 
rooms, entertainment areas, and various technical spaces 
open onto a square arrangement of wide corridors bathed 
in light. Residents can move about freely, they make their 
way through the corridors on foot or in electric wheel-
chairs, gaze into the distance, or smoke on the balconies 
appointed for this purpose. Each of them can arrange 
their room as they see fit, with their own furniture and 
selection of wall colors. It is even possible to keep small 
pets, provided the sick person or their family takes care of 
them – we made out rabbits, hamsters, and parakeets. We 
learn that there are as many caregivers working at Heem-
hof as there are patients in residence. If we take their 
working schedule into account, this means that during 
the day there is at least one caregiver for every three pa-
tients. Heemhof receives roughly three hundred Euros 
per patient per day in public funding; patients and their 
families make up the difference on an income-adjusted 
sliding scale.
Let us consider three aspects of the practices of living 
and caregiving that unfold at Heemhof: the color-coded 
system for collective crisis management, the use of Video 
Interaction Guidance (vig)22 and the multitude of objects 
invented to improve ordinary living. These techniques 
are elaborated as a veritable art of “listening, respect-
ing, nourishing, and even enjoying [jouir] finite bodies.”23 
M., one of the psychologists, explains the three-color 
system to us. Working closely with Heemhof’s caregiv-
ers and case managers, he supports residents as well as 
home care patients and their families. In his view, the 
three-color system enables full time staff to collaborate 
22 See the comprehensive website of the British Association for Video In-
teraction Guidance UK, https://www.videointeractionguidance.net/.
23 Annemarie Mol, The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient 
Choice (London: Routledge, 2008).
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effectively with doctors, psychologists, and loved ones. 
Imagine a traffic sign: when everything is fine it shows 
green, hence green markings appear in the resident’s file, 
updated daily. When small things start to go wrong and 
signs of frustration, anger, or impatience emerge the 
light turns orange. Red signals a full-blown crisis situ-
ation. The most important of the three colors is orange: 
it indicates the moment that calls for attention from the 
team and loved ones, forcing them to think in order to 
understand exactly what is happening and to agree on 
what needs to be put in place to avoid crisis if possible 
and turn things green again. Going on a walk, organiz-
ing a session with the psychologist, a trip to the city, a 
weekend at home – these different initiatives will each 
have to prove themselves against a situation bearing the 
mark of the notorious orange color. The three-color sys-
tem therefore constantly accompanies loved ones and 
the multidisciplinary team, it allows and calls for careful, 
daily evaluation of each resident’s situation and serves 
as an effective machine for collectively anticipating and 
averting crises.
Another form of crisis management is the regular use 
of vig techniques. Dutch psychologist Harrie Biemans 
and his colleagues developed this method in the 1980s, 
which was then conceptually refined and extended by 
University of Edinburgh ethologist Colony Trevarthen. 
Biemans was interested, above all, in early interactions 
between parents and their children. He attempted to un-
derstand how dysfunction set in within this prelinguistic 
relationship and find ways of responding to it.
Since then, the method has gained traction primarily 
in England, the Netherlands, and Canada, each time in a 
version adapted to its local context of use: schools, hos-
pitals, or workplace relations. Here is how it works: action 
sequences unfolding in a given setting (domestic or in-
stitutional) are first recorded and then prepared for view-
ing by someone referred to as a “guider.” Then, most if not 
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all the people involved in the sequence watch the footage 
with the guider and analyze it together. From the foot-
age selection phase onwards, however, the focus is less 
on moments of crisis or failure than on moments of suc-
cessful communication or interaction. Notably, the usage 
of video technology allows for the possibility of rewind-
ing, for instance, from a relaxed scene in which mother 
and child are laughing together. By going back in time, it 
becomes possible to better understand and make explicit 
the steps leading up to this pleasant but potentially rare 
situation, the attitudes, gestures, or words that brought it 
about. By giving participants the means to take stock of 
the ways in which some of their interactions are success-
ful, over time they become able to produce and stabilize 
some of their behaviors in situ, with a view to multiply-
ing such felicitous moments.
At Apeldoorn, this method is put to two ends: first, to 
focus participants’ attention on the times when their in-
teractions succeed and, second, to turn the times when 
they experience serious difficulty into learning opportu-
nities. If a given family laments repeated crises, a vig-
trained team is sent in to try and record one such situ-
ation. Then, the sick person along with the family, the 
team of caregivers, and the guider watch and discuss the 
video all together in order to understand what led to the 
crisis and what role each of them played in it. In such 
cases, the recordings become a source of inspiration the 
better to think through failed interactions with a given 
resident and to put in place strategies adapted to their 
needs. The process is repeated as many times as neces-
sary. New caregivers also take part in these VIG sessions 
and train themselves through the collaborative screen-
ing and discussion. For privacy reasons, the videos are 
destroyed after analysis.
Finally, living with Huntington’s at Heemhof is differ-
ent in light of the material resources on hand. Residents 
have an impressive array of equipment at their disposal. 
142
testing knowledge
This allows them to keep up a surprisingly broad range 
of physical activities for as long as possible. Along with 
standing bicycles for going on walks with their loved ones 
and many other sophisticated devices (electric wheel-
chairs, walking aids, a variety of winches fitted to beds, 
showers, and baths), each sick person gets a “personal 
communicator.” This is a “smart” touchscreen tablet with 
accessibility options allowing its continued use into the 
advanced stages of illness. If desired, the device accom-
panies Huntington’s patients from the earliest stages and 
thus constitutes a kind of externalized memory. By way of 
a digital voice encoder, it enables them to continue to ex-
press themselves vocally and converse long after analog 
speech is no longer an option, using a sophisticated and 
effective system.24 The team endeavors to convince resi-
dents to take up using this communication technology 
as well as electric wheelchairs as early as possible. In-
deed, from their experience, the longer a person waits, 
the harder it is to learn these skills. If a person makes a 
few regular trips in an electric wheelchair while they can 
still walk, these skills are conserved much longer, even 
into the advanced stages of the disease. During our visits, 
we also encountered a resident at Heemhof who decided 
to undergo gastrostomy, that is to make use of a gastric 
tube to feed himself. Having serious difficulties with 
swallowing and suffocating – which are frequent issues 
at advanced stages and made each of his meals time-con-
suming, unpleasant, and nutritionally inadequate – this 
intervention allowed him to once again savor the tastes 
he most enjoyed. While he now feeds himself almost 
exclusively via gastric tube (for his caloric intake), he is 
free to eat and drink small quantities of the things that 
make him truly happy. In other words, he removed what 
amounted to obligatory force-feeding from his daily life 
24 hd’s motor symptoms lead to difficulties with the vocal apparatus, 
notably elocution and swallowing problems.
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and, without it being systematically associated with the 
danger of “doing the wrong thing,” he rediscovered the 
pleasure of enjoying his favorite meal: fries and a cold 
beer! In so doing, he teaches us that it is possible to situ-
ate this move not within a context of palliative care and 
its systematic association with “end of life” but instead 
within a context of living, plain and simple.
Alongside these high-tech tools, more mundane ob-
jects made on site play a vital role in everyday life. Con-
sider the ashtrays. Wrought from salvaged materials, 
they are astounding creations. A metal ring is welded 
onto the rim of a conventional ashtray. A cigarette is 
held firmly in the ring so that ash falls safely into the 
ashtray. The filter tip of the cigarette is connected to the 
end of a gastric probe approximately twenty centimeters 
in length, which is connected in turn to a rectal probe 
of about the same length. The plastic tip at the end of 
this tube becomes the new filter for the smoker who can 
inhale their smoke thanks to this pseudo-hookah made 
of various found objects from the institute’s supply cup-
boards. The ashtray thereby constructed, stamped with 
the name of its owner, is screwed into a table. Thus, even 
at an advanced stage and despite violent jerky motions, 
sick smokers can sit at tables on their balcony and enjoy a 
cigarette without running the risk of burning themselves 
or accidentally starting a fire.
It should now be clear, I hope, that at the Atlant Center 
care is not just about providing alternative treatment to 
Huntington’s disease that would, itself, remain the same 
as it ever was. On the contrary, at Apeldoorn, another ver-
sion of hd is cultivated and made real. What takes place 
is an intervention into its natural history, not only met-
aphorically but also in the strictly medical terms of its 
clinical course. This effect can be most clearly observed 
in relation to two symptoms, anosognosia and dementia. 
In the clinical literature, these come across as two more 
symptoms of a person with hd’s lot. Anosognosia re-
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fers to a lack of self-awareness regarding symptoms and 
it is thought to be present, to a greater or lesser degree, 
throughout the entire evolution of the disease. As for de-
mentia, it allegedly accompanies the condition’s most ad-
vanced stages. What emerges, however, from discussions 
with caregivers at Apeldoorn is that none of them has 
observed either of these symptoms among residents. It 
is true, they say, that they grow slower and slower and 
that caregivers must have a great deal of patience to get 
answers to the questions they pose. But as to whether 
residents are anosognosic or demented, they answer no, 
not in the least. It is hard to resist the impression that if 
these symptoms are lacking it is above all because they 
are given no quarter at Apeldoorn, because hd patients 
are never addressed as if they were demented or anosog-
nosic. Quite the opposite, staff at the Atlant Center al-
ways strive to take things from above, which is to say, to 
give as many opportunities as possible to their clients “to 
preserve, as much as can be, [their] capacity to act,”25 to 
articulate themselves as actors in relation to what is hap-
pening to them – giving us a powerful and moving site of 
pragmatist morals and politics in action.26
25 Debaise, “La pensée laboratoire.”
26 It must be noted that there is at least one important precursor to 
the care-philosophy practiced at Apeldoorn: The tireless us-Amer-
ican expert in hd-care, Jimmy Pollard – who has rendered his ex-
periences public in a book called Hurry-Up and Wait! A Cognitive Care 
Companion: Huntington’s Disease in the Middle and more Advanced Years 




To the children [her nephews, who are all HD carri-
ers], I say: be proud. You are extraordinary. You have 
a rare, unknown disease. You are extraordinary.
– Catherine27
From a historical standpoint, the autonomy concept, 
which is foundational to the right to know as well as to 
the concept of informed consent, is a consequence of 
mounting and warranted distrust of modern medicine 
and its practitioners. As described in previous chapters, 
since its very beginnings, the epistemological and meth-
odological regime of modern medicine has tended to dis-
solve the bond between sick people and their conditions 
while, at the same time, placing distance between doc-
tors and their patients. All too often, doctors treat sick-
ness as a diagnostic entity (disease28) and not sick people 
themselves with their distinct and diverse experiences 
(illness29). This trajectory has been further cemented since 
the second half of the 20th century, with the technologi-
cal know-how of intensive care, medical transplants, and 
reanimation. It reaches new heights with contemporary 
systems of social security and health insurance, which 
produce precise prescriptions of the quantum of finan-
cial support to be allocated to such and such a diagnosis, 
treatment option, or provision of care.
27 Excerpt from an interview conducted with Catherine, a woman from 
a family experiencing Huntington’s across three generations. “Com-
poser avec Huntington: La maladie de Huntington au soin de ses us-
agers,” a report on exploratory research conducted between 2013–15 
into experimental knowledge about hd, Dingdingdong, January 23, 
2017, https://dingdingdong.org/a-propos/composer-avec-hunting-
ton/.
28 In English in the original text.
29 In English in the original text.
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In the United States, as far back as the 1960s, a protest 
movement formed in response to an increasingly tech-
nological approach to medicine beholden to the laws of 
the market, dogmatic and “dehumanized,” and giving less 
and less room to empathy, intimacy, or any acknowledg-
ment of the values embedded within clinical acts. The 
new field of biomedical ethics was both the outcome 
and one of the driving forces behind this protest move-
ment. It pushed for requirements concerning patient au-
tonomy and the right to informed consent, which remain 
fundamental notions to this day. Autonomy emerged as 
the self-explanatory founding principle of a movement 
that followed in the footsteps of similar efforts within 
political and juridical circles. Guaranteeing patient au-
tonomy, moreover, appeared to constitute a self-evident 
and robust response to mounting distrust of modern 
medicine: “Whereas trust had hitherto been the implicit 
moral understanding governing physician behavior and 
patient delegation of authority in the age of Johnson and 
Nixon, patient confidence required both new definition 
and novel substitutes.”30
Nevertheless, upon closer inspection the autonomy 
concept is problematic in a number of different ways, 
sometimes even counterproductive. It rests upon an un-
derstanding of the patient that defers to the model of the 
rational, sovereign, and adult citizen, an individual who 
is able to decide and to act, consciously and with self-
mastery – in other words, a non-relational being. Hence, 
to put it directly: the autonomy concept encourages ten-
dencies within modern medicine identical to those it 
aims to critique. Indeed, “autonomy as configured in its 
individualistic stance facilitates the isolation required 
for positivism to operate freely.”31 Furthermore, bioethics 
30 Alfred I. Tauber, Patient Autonomy and the Ethics of Responsibility 




discourse risks fashioning liberal subject-patients enti-
tled to make rights claims against untrustworthy medi-
cine, much like citizens would against the State. The dis-
trust initially circulating among patients thus began to 
spread; doctors are now wary of their patients who have 
become possible future claimants. This is why doctors 
seek to protect themselves from the threat of legal action, 
which includes giving patients qua autonomous subjects 
a document detailing the risks accompanying treatment 
(for instance, a particular surgery) awaiting a signature as 
confirmation they have carefully read and understood it.
A similar reversal of fortunes occurred in relation to 
the patient’s right to know, which is closely connected to 
the patient autonomy concept. In effect, this right tends 
to transform itself, surreptitiously, into an instruction or 
an imperative to know. Within this framework, a subject 
can only prove herself to be morally responsible if she 
transforms a genetic risk (e.g., the risk of having Hun-
tington’s or conditions such as high cholesterol, Alzhei-
mer’s, or various myopathies) into certainty. She does so 
by availing herself of testing and, accordingly, drawing 
conclusions as to appropriate life choices.
Another entity that emerged from dissatisfactions 
created by the health system has had, since the 1960s, a 
much more fascinating evolution in my view. This entity 
is the patients’ association or, to be more accurate, pa-
tients’ collectives of a very particular sort: those whose 
actions go beyond fundraising for medical and pharma-
ceutical research, which would otherwise limit them to 
operating within a resolutely hierarchical logic of knowl-
edge production about a disease. Instead, they have 
opened the way to other forms of action that consist in 
cultivating their own skills in relation to the conditions 
that bring them together. We have already considered the 
example of the Hearing Voices Network. In recent dec-
ades, Deaf people, Autistic people, the aids-movement, 
people with Parkinson’s, and many others have increas-
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ingly organized collectively.32 Heeding the call for “Noth-
ing About Us Without Us,” these movements place the 
user at the heart of their thinking and their actions – not 
in the sense of being a “consumer” of medical services 
but rather a co-constructor of the collective project of 
making a “user culture” for their given disease or differ-
ence of ability.
The user culture, in contrast to instrumental, diagnos-
tically justified uses, is a problem of collective interest 
that needs collective knowledge. We can call it a col-
lective experience, in the old sense where the expertise 
first designates knowledge coming from experience 
and is cultivated in its relations with experience. […] 
And this experience has a vital need for its own kind 
of knowledge that user associations can construct. 
This knowledge is valuable in itself, but in addition it 
can make other knowledges recognize that they are all 
gathered around something – a being? a power? – that 
belongs to no one, that no one can appropriate or rep-
resent.33
The making of such collective know-how about what is 
the liveliest life possible with a given condition does not 
necessarily aim at calling medical knowledge into ques-
tion. Rather, it exists in addition to it, so as to rank among 
expert knowledge formations as a distinctive yet no less 
pertinent genre. Instead of placing themselves in the po-
sition of the victim, those engaged in such a task take 
32 For questions concerning the movement and notion of disabil-
ity pride, see Elisabeth Barnes, The Minority Body (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016). For more recent developments in disability 
studies, see Katie Ellis et al., eds., Manifestos for the Future of Critical 
Disability Studies, Vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 2018) as well as the next 
volume by the same editors, Interdisciplinary Approaches to Disability: 
Looking towards the Future (London: Routledge 2018).
33 Stengers and Nathan, Doctors and Healers, 154–55.
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charge, collectively, of setting the stage for their own fu-
ture. And given the interest they grant themselves along 
with their own sickness or disability, given the manner 
in which they conjure ways of doing things with it, they 
also manage to awaken the interest of others as to what, 
from their perspective, matters most. This is what hap-
pens when psychiatrists ask for training from the Hear-
ing Voices Network. The truth that such collectives bring 
to light is therefore not limited to their ability to draw 
attention to the tragedy of the disease or syndrome that 
befalls them. Rather, this truth appears “in the process-
es by which [these people] become, on their own terms, 
something other than victims; it is in their way of med-
dling with the processes that make victims out of them 
and thereby creating futures and fabulations rather than 
complaints or resentment.”34
A brief outline of the Atlant Center allowed us to un-
derstand that both the autonomy concept and that of 
informed consent can hinder rather than help with situ-
ations of care. For care is precisely not developed in rela-
tion to an isolated subject but instead through a constant 
back-and-forth between patients, caregivers, doctors, and 
their kin, something that takes into account all of the ac-
tors and their various interests, needs, and interdepend-
encies. None of them is, strictly speaking, autonomous. 
They each learn with and through one another, from 
within a strongly relational and co-constructed practice 
of care. Furthermore, the autonomy concept appears to be 
ill suited to what patient collectives such as voice hearers 
or people with Autism enact when, pointedly, they draw 
strength and energy from making what brings them to-
gether into a collective thing. At the risk of generalizing, 
it could be said that the autonomy concept tends to aim 
34 “Une politique de l’hérésie. Entretien avec Isabelle Stengers,” Vac-




either too high or too low. Too high, insofar as creating 
the necessary conditions for the relative wellbeing of sick 
people in care means repeatedly constraining their “au-
tonomous” will, in the strong sense of the term. Too low, 
because the notion of informed consent, often used as 
a synonym for autonomy, falls short of the work of pa-
tient collectives who lay claim to a culture of their own 
making. If we are to retain the autonomy concept in spite 
of everything we have just considered, does it not follow 
that it should go hand in hand with the making of tools 
with which to think, tools that might help put medical 
knowledge in its place (relativiser), in the literal sense of 
connecting this know-how to other know-how making 
practices like those of user groups?
What Do the Oracles Tell Us?
A divinatory apparatus is always a creative act. 
It institutes the interface among universes; it 
makes them palpable and then thinkable.
– Tobie Nathan35
Comparisons with ancient oracles and seers often arise 
unprompted in discussions about testing for hd and 
other techniques of predictive testing. Media represen-
tations frequently draw on such imagery when describ-
ing and analyzing genetic knowledge about the future. 
It comes up regularly, however, in specialist literature as 
well. Consider, for example, that in 2001, before the com-
pletion of the human genome project, the German parlia-
mentary committee evaluating the consequences of this 
technology produced a report titled The Genetic Oracle: 
An Overview of Current Usage of Genetic Testing for Prognosis 
and Diagnosis. Leading hd researchers themselves make 
use of images of oracles and divination to think through 
35 Stengers and Nathan, Doctors and Healers, 10
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the kind of knowledge they deal with and bring forth. 
Hence, between 1983 and 1993, Nancy Wexler published 
at least three articles on predictive genetic testing for 
hd whose very titles drew this connection: “The Oracle 
of dna,” “Clairvoyance and Caution,” and “The Tiresias 
Complex.”36 Here is how the last of these, published in 
1992, begins: “The blind seer Tiresias confronted Oedipus 
with the quintessential dilemma of modern genetics: ‘It 
is but sorrow to be wise when wisdom profits not.’”37
All of these references index the tragedy predicted by 
ancient prophetic practices, the curses they would pro-
duce and human powerlessness before them. The asso-
ciation, therefore, is an almost exclusively negative or pe-
jorative one. In this book’s final section, I wish to pursue 
a hunch that oracular practices and predictive medicine 
might be connected in deeper, more interesting ways 
than these metaphorical transpositions suggest. I sub-
mit that a closer look at ancient oracles can heighten our 
sensitivity and provide instruction as we face up to the 
challenge of constructing a milieu better suited to wel-
coming the creature of predictive testing. Making this 
claim intelligible means following in the footsteps of the 
concrete practices of oracles. Specifically, we must pay 
the utmost attention to the many precautions and trials 
attached to oracular predictions, and which surrounded 
all those at Delphi and other sites where knowledge of 
the future was produced and relayed.
36 Nancy Wexler, “The Oracle of dna,” in Molecular Genetics in Diseases of 
Brain, Nerve, and Muscle, eds. L.P. Rowlandet al. (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1989), 429–42; Nancy Wexler, “Clairvoyance and Cau-
tion: Repercussions from the Human Genome Project,” in The Code of 
Codes: Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project, eds. Dan-
iel J. Kevles and Leroy Hood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1992), 211–43; Nancy Wexler, “The Tiresias Complex: Huntington’s 
Disease as a Paradigm of Testing for Late-Onset Disorders,” FASEB 
Journal 6, no. 10 (1992): 2820–25.
37 Wexler, “The Tiresias Complex,” 2820.
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The most effective way of bringing into view the piv-
otal role that precautions played in the construction of 
prophetic knowledge within ancient divination practices 
is, without doubt, to recount what happens when con-
sulting an oracle fails. Sometime in the 80s or early 90s of 
the first century, a tragic accident took place in the tem-
ple of Apollo at Delphi, leading to the death of the Py-
thia, the high priestess who transmitted the word of the 
deity. During a consultation with the oracle, the Pythia 
began screaming and yelling as if possessed, and rushed 
out of the temple’s innermost shrine, the adyton, toward 
the exit. She died a few days afterward. This incident 
provoked considerable emotion among the residents of 
Delphi. It deeply disturbed the temple’s servants as well 
as families in the city who entrusted their daughters to 
the temple to be become Pythias. This, at least, is the 
conclusion Plutarch comes to in On the Obsolescence of the 
Oracles, his friend Nicander having held the priesthood 
in the sanctuary at the time. Clearly very affected despite 
the many intervening years, he recalls the incident as fol-
lows:
Finally she became hysterical and with a frightful 
shriek rushed towards the exit and threw herself down, 
with the result that not only the members of the dep-
utation fled, but also the oracle-interpreter Nicander 
and those holy men that were present. However, after 
a little, they went in and took her up, still conscious; 
and she lived on for a few days.38
38 Plutarch, Moralia, Volume V: Isis and Osiris. The E at Delphi. The Oracles 
at Delphi No Longer Given in Verse. The Obsolescence of Oracles, trans. 
Frank Cole Babbitt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), 499. 
My analysis builds on historian Dominique Jaillard’s examination of 
this incident in Plutarch’s moral writings. See Dominique Jaillard, 
“Plutarque et la divination: La piété d’un prêtre philosophe,” Revue 
de l’histoire des religions 2 (2007): 149–69.
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What culminates in this dramatic event? What events 
led up to it? What caused the Pythia’s violent and terrify-
ing unraveling, which horrified those present and chased 
them from the temple, and brought about the Pythia’s 
own demise? Plutarch, who himself would later enter the 
Delphic priesthood and practice for some thirty years, 
goes beyond mere conjecture. In his judgment, the Py-
thia’s death is the clear and direct effect of an infringe-
ment committed by the temple’s servants against the 
rules of the sacrificial ritual preceding consultation.
As it happened, a deputation from abroad had arrived 
to consult the oracle. The victim, it is said, remained 
unmoved and unaffected in any way by the first li-
bations; but the priests, in their eagerness to please, 
went far beyond their wonted usage, and only after 
the victim had been subjected to a deluge and nearly 
drowned did it at last give in.39
As often happened at Delphi, a delegation went to the 
temple to ask the oracle about matters of State. What’s 
more, it would appear that the envoys enjoyed the privi-
lege of consulting the Pythia before everyone else who 
had come seeking advice. There was an evident desire 
to not disappoint these important political figures by 
making them wait for a subsequent consultation, even 
though the signs were not favorable, meaning that the 
divinatory powers of the Pythia were compromised.
The so-called preliminary rituals, the preparations 
and preliminary precautions taken before all consulta-
tions with the Pythia, had an essential place and signifi-
cance within Delphic liturgy. They entailed a series of 
steps that bring into full relief the deep sacredness of any 
act of divination, an act demanding cautious and atten-
tive preparation and accompaniment. The first of these 
39 Plutarch, Moralia, Volume V, 499.
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Delphic preliminaries was setting the date of consulta-
tion. Whereas, in the oracle’s early years, “it was but once 
a year, on the god Apollo’s birthday, when the oracles 
were given,”40 a more frequent tempo was later observed. 
Thereafter, the Pythia could be consulted on the seventh 
day of each month and, in summer, on the days following 
as well. “In addition to this, it was also possible to arrange 
‘special meetings,’ always on condition that the sacrifices 
were favorable and thus indicated that the god was ready 
to form a relationship with the priestess.”41 To ensure 
that the signs were favorable and that the oracle could 
be “operational,” so to speak, before all consultations an 
animal would be offered in sacrifice. However, other ritu-
als preceded this step, rituals during which each animal 
was subjected to a specific trial that served to determine 
whether or not it was to be sacrificed.
For what is to be offered in sacrifice must, both in body 
and in soul, be pure, unblemished, and unmarred. In-
dications regarding the body it is not at all difficult to 
perceive, but they test the soul by setting meal before 
the bulls and peas before the boars; and the animal 
that does not eat of this they think is not of sound 
mind. In the case of the goat, they say, cold water gives 
positive proof; for indifference and immobility against 
being suddenly wet is not characteristic of a soul in a 
normal state.42
If the goat flinched, its neck hair standing on end, if the 
bull ate the meal or the boar the peas, only then was it 
possible to conclude that the signs were favorable for a 
consultation. The sacrifice could only commence once 
40 Marion Giebel, Das Orakel von Delphi. Geschichte und Texte (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 2001), 16. Translation mine.
41 Ibid.
42 Plutarch, The Obsolescence of Oracles, 495.
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the animal had given its consent by way of these signs. 
The Pythia was then in a position to make contact with 
the god Apollo and he, for his part, was ready to confer 
the requisite predisposition upon the priestess, namely 
the “inspiration” or breath he transferred to her. Never-
theless, before she could truly be interrogated, those who 
came seeking advice had also to submit to a series of pre-
liminary rituals. They had to purify themselves, burn a 
sacred wafer, and, at a later period, give an offering to the 
priest for another prior sacrifice. Only upon completing 
all of these rituals were they admitted into the adyton 
of the temple of Apollo. Finally, the Pythia herself had 
to undertake a series of ritual acts before assuming her 
position atop the tripod in the temple. “She would take 
a ritual bath in the Castalian Spring, drink the waters of 
the Cassotis, chew laurel leaves and light incense”43 These 
preparatory measures were integral to undertaking the 
Delphic oracle. The sacrifices themselves had a divina-
tory value, indexing whether the conditions were right 
for allowing the Pythia to fulfill her function and, with 
Apollo’s aid, answer the questions brought before her. If 
one of the conditions was not met, no demand should 
rightfully take place.
Whenever, then, the imaginative and prophetic facul-
ty is in a state of proper adjustment for attempering it-
self to the spirit as to a drug, inspiration in those who 
foretell the future is bound to come; and whenever the 
conditions are not thus, it is bound not to come, or 
when it does come to be misleading, abnormal, and 
confusing.44
On the day when the Pythia fled the adyton in the mid-
dle of a consultation, the goats awaiting sacrifice failed, 
43 Giebel, Das Orakel von Delphi, 18
44 Plutarch, The Obsolescence of Oracles, 499.
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as Plutarch told us, to flinch. Despite this, the temple’s 
servants took the risk of authorizing the consultation. 
No sooner had the session begun than those present took 
note of the Pythia’s disturbed inspiration:
She went down into the oracle unwillingly, they say, 
and half-heartedly; and at her first responses it was 
at once plain from the harshness of her voice that she 
was not responding properly; she was like a labouring 
ship and was filled with a mighty and baleful spirit.45
This story exposes the dangers of trying to conjure fore-
knowledge by forcing a laboring Pythia to take up her 
position within the holy of holies. The gift of “the im-
aginative faculty” or of divine inspiration then swiftly 
becomes a poison. This pharmacological quality of the 
foretelling of future events draws successful colloquy 
with the divine and its failed and death-dealing counter-
part into striking proximity, the two separated by a mere 
difference in dosage. Promising prediction (maintain) and 
speech that is uninspired, mad, and dangerous (mania) 
are frightfully close to one another. Divinatory art’s Janus 
face was constitutive of the Delphic oracle’s protocol. 
It is for these reasons that they guard the chastity of 
the priestess, and keep her life free from all association 
and contact with strangers, and take the omens before 
the oracle, thinking that it is clear to the god when she 
has the temperament and disposition suitable to sub-
mit to the inspiration without harm to herself.46
In such light, any consultation with the Pythia came 
with the additional risk of unraveling the relationship 





prophetess), this latter being the one who speaks (-phete) 
for (pro-) another, who speaks in their name. For even on 
days when the signs were favorable and when the Py-
thia did not resemble “a labouring ship […] filled with a 
mighty and baleful spirit,” it was clear to see that the la-
bor of divination was, as Plutarch explains, exhausting: 
“the Pythia regains calm and tranquility once she has left 
her tripod and its exhalations.”47 The duty of the priest 
and the rest of the temple’s servants was to make sure 
that the risky relationship between the god Apollo and 
the Pythia, between divine foresight and its foretelling, 
would unfold as serenely as could be. This presumed fol-
lowing the liturgical rules to the letter. Forcing the Pythia 
to answer a question, to foretell the future and offer ad-
vice, despite all of the signs indicating she was incapable 
of responding (that she was, literally, ir-respons-able) was, 
therefore, playing with death.
It is easy to imagine that the broken rules that lead to 
the Pythia’s death not only endangered the seer’s exist-
ence but everyone else’s as well. On one hand, because the 
consultants would endeavor, after the consultation had 
concluded, to ensure that their actions, whether personal 
or political, lined up with the oracle’s “harshly” spoken 
words. This alone could produce fatal consequences in 
some cases. It was not unheard of, for instance, for the 
Delphic oracle to influence major decisions about war-
fare. On the other, wild and demonic divine entities had 
thus been unleashed, without having been tempered or 
tamed by ritual techniques; they had been provoked by 
transgressions of those rules that should have been re-
spected when making contact with divine beings. The 
danger was therefore that they, in turn, would violently 
47 Plutarch. Moralia, Volume IX: Table-Talk, Books 7–9. Dialogue on Love, 
trans. Edwin L. Minar, F.H. Sandbach, and W.C. Helmbold (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 365–67.
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take possession of those who had invoked them. The dan-
ger, in other words, was becoming possessed.
Other oracular practices were subject to strict rules 
and called for circumspect usage. Whether it was observ-
ing birds in flight, interpreting the motion of oil beads 
on the water’s surface, or reading the entrails of animals 
sacrificed for fortunetelling, “advising was a skill that 
corresponded to a reading ability.”48 This ability needed 
to be learned carefully. Entrails, for instance, were cast 
in clay or bronze and stamped with the correct marking. 
Novices could practice anatomy on these and also pursue 
inquiries into the correspondences between micro-signs 
read in the entrails and their implications for the world.
As in medical discourse, the symptoms were con-
densed into diagnoses and the diagnoses into progno-
ses. […] The results were to be analyzed and carefully 
preserved. Indeed, it was not unusual that an advisor 
who erred would earn cruel punishment. According 
to a story related by Herodotus, among the Scythians, 
failed seers were strapped to a cattle cart and burned 
alive using bundles of willow branches, the same ma-
terial with which they would practice divination.49
In light of the threat brought about through false predic-
tion, “advisors tried, very early on, to dissociate the qual-
ity of their advice from the consequences of the actions 
they recommended.”50 For this reason, most of the time at 
Delphi and elsewhere, advice and prophecy took the form 
of a riddle. Doing so ensured that the prediction would 
be followed by an interpretive phase, one for which the 
48 Thomas Macho, “Was tun? Skizzen zur Wissensgeschichte der Be-
ratung,” in Think Tanks: Die Beratung der Gesellschaft, eds. Thomas 
Brandstetter, Claus Pias, and Sebastian Vehlken (Berlin: Diaphanes, 





oracle itself had no responsibility. The advice was disso-
ciated in two steps: “first came the giving of transcend-
ent, charismatic, or medium-like commentary and then 
came the interpretation of this commentary.”51 While the 
actual seer (e.g., the Pythia or the Sybil whom the gods 
inspired) spoke in riddles, a whole host of specialists in 
reading, translating, and interpreting riddling speech 
acts stood at the ready around Delphi and in other oracu-
lar places. A real prophecy only acquired its meaning and 
momentum once it had passed through many hands: af-
ter it became, as it were, collectivized. In so doing, it was 
imperative that the proper division of labor was main-
tained, for this simultaneously distributed responsibility 
for the ensuing prediction. In this context, the produc-
tion of ever-fragile foreknowledge therefore relied upon 
the strategic proliferation of actors and functions, for 
both preliminary and subsequent purposes. Without the 
coordinated intervention of these various roles, it would 
not, in fact, be possible to produce this knowledge at all.
The oracles therefore draw our attention to at least 
two aspects of diagnostic predictions. First, whenever 
a predictive practice allows itself to subject the person 
questioning the oracle to scrupulous examination with-
out taking into consideration the concrete circumstanc-
es of the ecological situation, it will inevitably become 
extremely dangerous. In addition, while it is true that 
informed production of knowledge about the future re-
quires prophetic speech, at the same time, it calls for a 
sophisticated and technically refined interpretive art. 
Plutarch’s description of the Pythia’s death offers a strik-
ing demonstration. This analysis takes on a particular 
contemporary hue if we consider it in relation to non-
Western divinatory healing practices, whether ancient or 
contemporary. For these practices do not pin symptoms 




to beings requiring careful identification.52 A “diagno-
sis” corresponds, above all, to the identification of such 
a being: what is its nature, what are its intentions, how 
might it be tamed? The answers to these questions are 
integral to the treatment and rely as much on the heal-
er’s expertise as the cultural group to whom the latter 
belongs. As such, there is no difference in kind between 
diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment in such a framework. 
They form an ensemble involved in ever-renewed ways of 
collectively practicing the demanding art of negotiating 
with the invisible.53
Plutarch’s text engages a broader set of concerns. A se-
ries of interlocutors who happen to be at Delphi give voice 
to Plutarch’s own thoughts on the matter. These various 
interlocutors assemble to examine the reasons why, un-
like what happened under the Greeks, oracles began dis-
appearing one-by-one during Roman rule. Decreasing 
population in the areas of major oracular sites would 
have led to a more limited demand for their services, but 
also to the withdrawal of the beings in charge (daimones) 
from their sanctuaries. We would have “unlearned” how 
to correctly handle the oracle along the way, much like we 
forget how to use a musical instrument that we leave idle 
too long. The Pythia – whose speech reveals a “harsh-
ness of her voice” and who rushed out of the temple like 
a fury – only comes up towards the close of this wider 
discussion. In the most striking manner, she embodies 
the dangers that threaten to arise from a lack of collec-
tive attention to a phenomenon as volatile as foreknowl-
edge. Oracular practice of the kind Plutarch describes is, 
52 To be sure, this manner of separating a person from her symptoms 
is in no way to be confused with the separation of patients and their 
diseases as described by Canguilhem. Rather, the separation in ques-
tion relies on an entirely different model of patients, pathologies, 
and their relation to one another.
53 Nathan and Stengers, Doctors and Healers. See also Tobie Nathan, 
L’étranger ou le pari de l’autre (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2014).
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in our view, a precedent when it comes to the ecology of 







This book began with a twofold challenge. The first was 
to go beyond the critical perspective that Alice Rivières 
vehemently established as she apprehended the violence 
inherent in diagnosis as more than the failure of a par-
ticular doctor or institution. Our task, instead, was to 
make sense of it as the effect of a given epistemological 
and deontological regime. The second challenge was to 
resist the widespread notion that new techniques come 
into being with already stabilized, clearly defined prob-
lems, and that our mandate was to react by taking ethi-
cal and legal measures like setting protocols, establishing 
terms of accessibility, and other guidelines.
To depart from this approach, I suggested we take up 
an ecological perspective that would force us to elabo-
rate well-constructed problems in relation to the new 
technical entities that inhabit our world. These prob-
lems would allow us to establish more constructive rela-
tionships with these entities. On this basis, rather than 
knowing whether a technique is in itself admissible or 
not, the question becomes one of knowing how we might 
assemble ecological milieus or situations fostering the 
existence of the conditions needed to most assuredly and 
effectively welcome an entity like the creature commonly 
known as the “predictive test.”
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Yet modern medicine – in the name of the scientific 
recognition to which it aspired – separated the sick per-
son from the disease and thus interrupted the doctor–
patient relationship. At the same time, it drew upon a 
radical epistemological separation of facts from values 
in order to delegitimize any modes of access to disease 
deemed “unscientific” by modern standards. There is lit-
tle room for the patients’ perspective within this kind 
of medicine. What such perspectives might contribute 
to diagnosis as well as to therapeutic decisions must, in 
keeping with this logic, remain at a minimum. Only in 
this way could medicine achieve and sustain its aspira-
tion to scientific rationality, which is to say, to the sys-
tematic universalization of medical knowledge. Within 
a system like this, the patient or anyone else lacking 
medical qualifications, no matter how profound their 
connection to the illness, is denied from working to-
wards fashioning a given disease on the basis of experi-
ence or artistic, historical, or philosophical know-how. 
For as we have seen, to put it in the plainest terms, the 
very people touched by disease are, strictly speaking, no 
longer the objects of medicine. This is especially due to 
the increasingly dominant role ascribed to quantitative 
methods within health. Coinciding with the emergence 
of the 19th-century social hygiene movement, the close 
connection between medicine and statistical knowledge 
gradually imposed itself upon all its domains. So-called 
“evidence-based medicine” has continued this tradition, 
and since the 1990s, statistically derived (and therefore 
unimpeachable) knowledge has been elevated to the rank 
of the central truth criterion. 
Taken to its limit, it can be said that from a statistical 
point of view the patient is not a person. They are not 
somebody but rather, following Tobie Nathan, anybody 
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(quiconque).1 The regime of modern medicine is intimate-
ly entwined with this practice of anybodification. When 
the doctor foretells that the “verdict” Alice receives of “44 
cag repetitions” will be “unbearable,” this speech act can 
be understood as the effect of the statistical transforma-
tion of a person into an anybody. It is a form of proof-
making that surreptitiously shifts from constative utter-
ance (“44”) to performative utterance (“unbearable”). The 
two kinds of utterance merge through this operation, 
dissembling a fundamental point: the term “unbearable” 
refers to a statistical monstrosity whereby anybody pre-
senting forty-four repetitions will have an unbearable fu-
ture. And yet such a statement fails to account for Alice’s 
actual and concrete future.
Stephen J. Gould offers perhaps the most compelling 
account of the traps and devastating effects to which 
statistics give rise in relation to life-changing diagnoses. 
In a short piece eloquently titled “The Median Isn’t the 
Message,” Gould writes that in 1982 he learned he “was 
suffering from abdominal mesothelioma, a rare and se-
rious cancer.”2 He then decided to review the latest lit-
erature on this form of cancer. “The literature couldn’t 
have been more brutally clear: mesothelioma is incur-
able, with a median mortality of only eight months af-
ter discovery.”3 Then, Gould explains, he used his under-
standing of the purposes and limits of statistics, learned 
from evolutionary biology, to convince himself that this 
scientifically founded information did not mean, as one 
generally presumes, that he would invariably cease liv-
1 Tobie Nathan, “En psychothérapie: maladies, patients, sujets, clients 
ou usagers?” paper presented at La psychothérapie à l’épreuve de ses 
usagers, Centre Devereux, Paris, France, October 12, 2006. Available 
online at http://www.ethnopsychiatrie.net/tobieusagers.htm
2 Stephen Jay Gould, “The Median Isn’t the Message,” in The Richness of 
Life: The Essential Stephen Jay Gould, eds. Paul McGarr and Steven Rose 




ing in eight months’ time. His main argument is that our 
Platonic heritage, with its emphasis on clear distinctions 
and firm boundaries, beguiles us into radically misinter-
preting statistical studies – “opposite to the appropriate 
interpretation in our actual world of variation, shadings, 
and continua.”4 Instead of considering variations as the 
“hard realities” and means and medians as abstractions, 
our customary view of things has us take up the polar 
opposite position. We are used to conceiving of “means 
and medians as the hard ‘realities,’ and the variation that 
permits their calculation as a set of transient and imper-
fect measurements of this hidden essence.”5 Therein lies 
our fundamental mistake, a mistake that comes with an 
existential threat. In effect, when “the median is the real-
ity and variation around the median just a device for its 
calculation, the ‘I will probably be dead in eight months’ 
may pass as a reasonable interpretation.”6 Statistics, it is 
plain to see, are a total abstraction translated into num-
bers. It is therefore from the perspective of science itself 
that the narrative hold they have over the individual 
must be called into question. We must do away with the 
habit of automatically turning means and medians into 
proof, deemed valid for a given concrete case such that its 
distinctiveness is not taken into account, not even ges-
turally or provisionally. In effect, if we emphasize varia-
tions, the only person whose life expectancy is reduced to 
eight months is an anybody, an anybody who only exists 
in the statistical realm.
In this sense, the task of elaborating a milieu that is 
capable of welcoming our creature, the “predictive test” 
for hd, is above all one of resisting the hold of the any-
body. From within this context, resisting this hold as-






results which appear to take an abstract form, such as the 
number “44,” are not explanatory but instead, because 
they address a concrete person, are first and foremost a 
riddle. What is to be done, then, is to take care of this 
riddle together and, along the way, take lesson from the 






I am writing this afterword as almost ten years have 
passed since the founding of Dingdingdong, the Institute 
for the Coproduction of Knowledge about Huntington’s 
Disease. Initiated by Emilie Hermant and Valérie Pihet, 
both Katrin Solhdju and myself are among its members. 
This collective began its adventure following Alice Riv-
ières’s early encounters with a medical establishment 
that proved to be in complete disarray in the face of Hun-
tington’s disease, its definitions, its incurability, its he-
redity, and its predictive testing. In 2013, Alice Rivières 
recounted this experience in The Dingdingdong Manifesto, 
the inaugural publication of the Éditions Dingdingdong 
publishing house. Two years later, Éditions Dingding-
dong published the French edition of Testing Knowledge. 
These two texts make up the present volume.
Founding the Dingdingdong Collective turned out to 
be a transformative experience for all of its members, 
whatever their practice. This is because Dingdingdong 
creates an understanding of these same practices such 
that they warrant the interest of the virtual community 
concerned with, attached to, or connected through the 
questions Huntington’s disease raises. Joining Dingding-
dong therefore involves actively and creatively situating 




Katrin Solhdju’s Testing Knowledge is the work of a 
historian and epistemologist of medicine and its experi-
mental practices. However – and this is no contradiction 
– it is also a book committed to, thought through, and 
written “in the presence” of people who have decided to 
take the genetic test that stands to identify them as car-
riers or non-carriers of the genetic mutation responsible 
for Hungtington’s disease. It puts into question a diagno-
sis, one whose predictive power is matched only by the 
disarray it causes; because, in this instance, for every call 
of “now that we can know,” there is never a corresponding 
“here’s what we can do.” In medicine, the idea that once 
a “cause” is identified then treatment follows is alive and 
well. Research is ongoing. Its temporal horizon, however, 
is too far off to enable those who pronounce the diagno-
sis to follow it with words of hope and encouragement 
(or the prospect of good news to come).
When reduced to a “fact” – you’re either a carrier or you 
aren’t – diagnosis can crush the very person who wanted 
to know. As she explains in The Dingdingdong Manifesto, 
Alice Rivières experienced the announcement of her test 
results as an extremely violent verdict. The doctor knows 
what will happen to her, and this knowledge brooks no 
appeal. She cannot do anything but await the inevitable, 
the onset of the first symptoms that mark the beginning 
of a slow decline. Solhdju reminds us that we use the 
word “prophet” to refer to someone who speaks in the 
name of a power that legitimates or authorizes their dis-
course. The doctor prophesizes in the name of the power 
of scientific truth, but it is a truth that deprives Alice of 
any possible hold on her own life, because medicine has 
no hold over the disease. Dindingdong was created, as a 
collective, on the basis of Alice’s refusal to let this knowl-
edge crush her. It is not a matter of denying its truth, but 
rather, of repopulating the world that it depleted.
Solhdju argues for an ecology of diagnosis, that is to 
say, for an approach that does not separate diagnosis 
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from the milieu that confers meaning upon it and lends 
it consequence. It is worth emphasizing that such an 
approach is not critical in the sense of aiming to reduce 
diagnosis to a mere function of its milieu. Coming from 
someone who treats people, a diagnosis is agentive, it is 
a vector of transformation in and of itself, and as such 
has a stake in the art of healing. Hence, the milieu does 
not explain diagnosis. Rather, it achieves its explanation 
through diagnosis. For Solhdju, the ecological approach 
“problematizes” because it excludes any position of exte-
riority or detachment. It seeks to “posit” a problem “well.” 
This does not mean making the problem go away, but 
rather, deploying it in a mode through which it acquires 
irreducible bearing and significance.
You might say that Solhdju offers her own response to 
the call Bruno Latour made in his landmark article “Why 
Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” After glossing the ways 
in which the “merchants of doubt” captured and repur-
posed the critical approach, he asks: “Can we devise an-
other powerful descriptive tool that deals this time with 
matters of concern and whose import then will no longer 
be to debunk but to protect and care, as Donna Haraway 
would put it? Is it really possible to transform the critical 
urge in the ethos of someone who adds reality to matters 
of fact and not subtracts reality?”1
This is no coincidence but the trace of a common com-
mitment: whether it is the “fact” that climate scientists’ 
observations and models allow for a conclusion about 
manmade climate disruption or the “fact” that particular 
genetic traits allow for the predictive diagnosis of Hun-
tington’s, each requires commitment as a “matter of con-
cern” but this does not mean simply yielding or deferring 
to them. They must take on a greater reality than the ab-
1 Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters 




stract reality of “Q.E.D.” For facts like these say nothing 
about the consequences of their demonstration. Indeed, 
it is in this sense that they differ from the “experimental 
fact.” Solhdju reminds us that the experimental fact’s suc-
cess hinges on the possibility of the experimenter with-
drawing, avowing that the experimental set-up allows 
the phenomenon under investigation to “speak for itself.” 
However, the people it addresses, other experimenters, 
do not suffer a verdict. Rather, they are concerned: they go 
on to explore the consequences of their colleagues’ suc-
cess, which is to say they augment its reality.
Solhdju’s ecological approach draws a strong distinc-
tion between the respective milieus of the “experimental 
fact” and the “clinical fact,” even though so-called “evi-
dence-based” medicine insists on their common ances-
try. Facts are “agentive” in both instances; they prompt 
action, although not in the same way. However, this claim 
to common ancestry is itself agentive. This is because the 
doctor does not take on the role of mediator, of some-
one who creates a putatively therapeutic relationship be-
tween the patient and “the facts” by “adding” something 
to “the facts” such that they become the centerpiece of 
a healing process. Instead, the doctor plays the role of 
mere intermediary, that is to say, of the spokesperson 
for a verdict wrought from another order of knowledge 
altogether, so-called objective knowledge, which charac-
terizes what “objectively” ails the patient.2 Of course, the 
doctor can profess their confidence in a given course of 
treatment, the effectiveness of which is also grounded in 
“facts,” and it is assumed that they always behave “hu-
manely.” However, they can go no further. Another agen-
2 A central distinction Bruno Latour has introduced is the difference 
between an intermediary, an entity that loyally translates relations 
but does not transform them, and a mediator, an entity that has the 
capacity to create relations and transform them. See Bruno Latour, 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 39.
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tive figure haunts the stage: the charlatan. Their art runs 
the risk of producing therapeutic effects reminiscent of 
medicine’s shameful past.
Within this milieu – which requires that the doctor, 
lest they pass for a charlatan, be a loyal intermediary and 
refrain from adding anything to the facts that might 
commit them to a healing relationship – the predictive 
diagnosis for Huntington’s disease is a disturbance that 
gives rise to what Solhdju terms an “ecological crisis.” It 
is as if the novel entity’s very presence is disordering and, 
barring a disastrous turn of events, calls for the prob-
lematization of roles and positions. In following Nancy 
Wexler and referring to this entity as “the creature,” she 
irresistibly turns our thoughts toward Frankenstein’s 
creature, that unfortunate being hated by its creator and 
whom this hatred, the father’s refusal to invent a way of 
welcoming it, turned evil.
How can the Hippocratic oath’s call to “do no harm,” 
the doctor’s primary duty, combine with the effective 
malevolence that this loyal intermediary must present as 
factual information? The doctor may claim that doing no 
harm in this instance means respecting the autonomous 
subject who must confront the naked truth, i.e., find the 
inner resources needed to mourn any hope of leading a 
normal life. However, with a curious sleight of hand, the 
intermediary then transforms themself into conscience’s 
guide. They direct the patient to give up on the fantasy 
of consolation “for their own good.” This is, to be sure, an 
ecological crisis: a fact becomes a duty.
The Dingdingdong collective does not take blame as its 
vocation. However, it wagers that narratives other than 
decline without remedy and experiences other than irre-
trievable displacement and fractured relationships exist 
and can, when activated, become agentive, repopulating 
the imaginations of people concerned with Huntington’s 
disease. They may be carriers, sick persons, loved ones, 
or medical and paramedical caregivers; we name them 
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“users,” because the task is to cultivate “usages,” ways 
of doing and building relations. This is Solhdju’s wager. 
Nothing will make the telling of a “positive” genetic test 
result something other than an ordeal (épreuve) – a test-
ing experience for the person who thereafter knows they 
are a carrier, for their loved ones, and also for the doctor 
who has to make the announcement. The “creature,” how-
ever, remains silent about the nature of this ordeal. What 
speaks in their name is, above all, the doctor’s knowledge 
of medicine’s powerlessness.
In a video produced by Dingdingdong in 2013, this 
doctor’s name is Marboeuf, and he recounts his con-
frontation with Alice Rivières’s sister who reproaches 
him for not having said that he did not know. Yes, she 
allows, there may be statistics, but they are just as silent 
about what will happen to her sister in particular. Giving 
voice, as Solhdju observes, to those to whom the ordeal is 
presented as something to which they will be subjected, 
when it is in fact the doctor who is subjected to medicine’s 
powerlessness to act, Rivières’ sister adds: “The truth of 
our disease does not belong to you or, at any rate, at least 
not only to you.” This presents an opportunity to propose 
a speculative narrative. What if, instead of buttressing 
his clear conscience as “someone who is no charlatan, 
who sticks to the facts,” Doctor Marboeuf took an inter-
est in the way that elsewhere (e.g., in the Netherlands) 
the “truth of medicine” exists only in caregiving, in spa-
tial arrangements, in inventing techniques for enabling 
life, modes of attention, as a range of ways of doing eve-
rything possible to “dedramatize” this sickness? Hence, 
another ecology of illness would be possible, an ecology 
that would multiply agentive systems, not to produce 
miracles but rather to give living well a chance.
These days, a whole range of user groups are taking 
shape, some with doctors and some without, creating new 
milieus, to forge new ecologies for the sicknesses that ail 
them or to “depathologize” the singular disorder with 
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which they live. Hence, voice hearers refuse to accept that 
their voices belong to schizophrenia as a psychopatho-
logical category. As for Dingdingdong, we reject the term 
“neurodegenerative” as applied to Huntington’s disease, 
we can accept the term “neuroevolutive,” yet refuse to 
isolate the neurological from the relationships that come 
together or fall apart within its multiple milieus. Can we 
really imagine a doctor turning an unfavorable test result 
into the revelation of a metamorphic future and the need 
to “prepare the soul” so that this metamorphosis goes “as 
well as it can, despite the intense turbulence it will not 
fail to bring about”?3
Can we also imagine that a doctor, reading the final 
pages of Solhdju’s book, would seriously consider the 
connection she ventures to draw with the oracular prac-
tices of the Pythia at Delphi? For the Pythia was also an 
intermediary, yet she belonged to a world in which peo-
ple knew that contact between her and her god ran the 
risk of destructive possession and that ritual precautions 
were necessary for her own safety. It was also known that 
naked prophetic speech was dangerous, requiring that 
mediators intercede and interpret it. Today, the oracles 
are gone but seers do still exist. One such person, Maud 
Kristen, agreed to extend the speculative story of Doctor 
Marboeuf by addressing a letter to him. The following is 
an excerpt:
Your practices, like mine, question the future and in-
terpret data using various markers.
You question and interpret samples, as do I… Your 
media are blood or secretions. Mine are initials, im-
ages, cards, or photographs. Divination or medical ex-
3 See “Composer avec Huntington: La maladie de Huntington au soin 




aminations deliver verdicts. But haven’t you forgotten 
that only your patient or my client turns this verdict 
into a “destiny”? Haven’t you forgotten that they are in 
no way reducible to the bad news afflicting them?
You and I, Doctor, we both own a diagnosis. That’s all. 
That’s quite a lot already. But we never own what they 
will weave from their “bad news,” never what their life 
will become after the announcement, nor the sense 
they will or won’t make of all this.
No point, therefore, trying to convince them that ev-
erything is done for. The only thing that’s done for is 
perhaps or probably, I concede, life as an able person 
for much longer, but it’s not the man or woman you 
have before you and about whom you know nothing.4
For Katrin Solhdju, the historian and epistemologist, the 
question of predictive diagnosis for Huntington’s disease 
forced her to vacate her analytical position, not to aban-
don its rigor but rather its presumed detachment. She 
had to give this question the form of a riddle that com-
pels thinking and imagining. What this meant, she notes, 
was going “one step further to interrogate the proposi-
tional potential of [her own] conceptual, historical, and 
empirical research.” In order to “posit the problem well,” 
to give it a reality that might be shared with those con-
cerned with this problem, she dared to take seriously the 
question that the presymptomatic test for Huntington’s 
disease raises. This is not one of prediction in general but 
the question of people who “tell the future,” who tell a 
person’s future when asked. The fact that Solhdju queries 
what makes someone capable of this – whether that is 
4 Maud Kristen, “Lettre de Maud Kristen au Dr Marboeuf,” Dingding-




genetics, cards, photographs, or the Pythia’s god Apollo 
– is not a sign of disrespect or irreverence, it shows no 
desire to scandalize those for whom only medical pre-
diction is objective. The question is not what authorizes 
such knowledge but the ordeal (épreuve) it enacts. What 
is specific about the situation of the doctor announcing 
test results is, perhaps, that the ecology of the medical 
milieu is unfavorable to the culture of protection that the 
“foreteller’s” position requires and to the multiplication 
of mediators necessary to add reality to the genetic “fact.”
In Alice Rivières’s case, the medical team’s preoccupa-
tion turned on the following question: can the person 
who asks to know withstand the telling of a future that 
will one day be theirs? This is a bad question, as the ge-
netic fact is not “their” future. However, it is a question 
that articulates the intermediary’s drama: what they have 
to foretell may lead to suicide, but the intermediary can 
only impart this knowledge in all its horror.
Of course, Solhdju’s ecological approach does not call 
for doctors to become possessed by a divine force or to 
learn how to read cards. But it does call for the copro-
duction of all kinds of knowledge and practice that make 
up the landscape awaiting the carrier. It calls for doctors 
to not leave the recipient of “bad news” alone before the 
desert of a life deprived of possibility, to add to this news 
some gesture of interest in a landscape of possible rela-
tions, encounters, futures, and histories. Such is the land-
scape that will give truth to diagnosis, the truth of a life 
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